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S U M M A R Y
The purpose of this thesis was to enquire into the possible 
causes of tax evasion and avoidance and to suggest reforms which might 
be considered by the legislature to limit those practices. It was 
shown that it is possible to resolve the possible causes of evasion and 
avoidance into two components: namely, the opportunity that exists in 
a tax system for those practices and the motivating influences which 
cause taxpayers to undertake them. By way of example the Australian 
income tax system and Australian taxpayers were studied. A brief summary 
of results follows.
Analysis of the Australian tax system revealed that inadequate 
bookkeeping requirements, inadequate resources used to detect evasion, 
anomalies in the penalty structure and failure to deduct tax at source 
for all types of income contributed to the level of evasion. Greatest 
scope for avoidance arose because of the failure of the Australian tax 
system to prevent income splitting, failure to tax all capital gains 
and failure to quickly remedy legislative defects. Further, the large 
number of exemptions to the tax base and the failure of the general 
anti-avoidance provision (s.260) also contributed to the level of 
avoidance.
Testing of various hypotheses about taxpayer behaviour suggested 
that the most important hypothesis was the exchange relationshiy 
hypothesis and that the main element of this was taxpayers' perception 
that tax rates were too high. Some support was also found for the 
social orientation hypothesis and the administrative control hypothesis. 
Though it was not the primary purpose of this thesis to outline reforms.
(iv)
some reforms were suggested. These covered reforms to remedy systemic 
weaknesses, for example introduction of a flat rate of tax and a 
capital gains tax, and reforms to affect taxpayer behaviour: for example, 
greater use of the media to improve taxpayers' knowledge of Government 
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INTRODUCTION
There are a number of reasons why tax evasion and avoidance are 
worthy of study. Not only do they result in a loss of revenue but they 
also shift the tax burdens, which would otherwise have been imposed, 
from those who avoid or evade tax onto those who do not. The extent 
of the problem of tax evasion and avoidance, in the Australian context, 
is shown in the following extracts: the first is from the annual report
of the Commissioner of Taxation and indicates the extent of the loss of 
revenue from one of these activities, tax avoidance; the second is from 
a speech in Parliament by the Treasurer when, on 27 May 1981, he intro­
duced new general anti-avoidance provisions and indicates the resulting 
inequities.
In the 59th and earlier Reports I recorded the adverse effect 
that investigations of tax avoidance activities had upon 
limited staff resources and collection of tax. Unfortunately 
I am unable to report any significant improvement for 1980-81.
  some $973m of tax assessed in tax avoidance schemes that
are under administrative challenge remained uncollected at the 
end of June 1981. ^
There is widespread abhorrence of blatant tax avoidance of the 
kind that we have recently experienced.
It distorts in a most unacceptable way the relative burdens 
of tax that are borne by different sectors of the community ...
... unless something is done along general lines there is a 
very real danger that our income tax legislation will become 
so voluminous and so complicated as to be virtually incompre­
hensible. ^
The second extract highlights another problem which results from 
attempts to remedy defects in our tax laws, namely, their increasing 
complexity. In fact, over the last ten years one loose leaf reporter 
(C.C.H.) on income tax legislation has increased, on average, by almost 
one hundred pages per year. When the service was introduced in 1969 
the reporter stood at 663 pages whereas presently ( 1 December 1982)
3it was almost three times that size and was of more compact form. 
Another example of the increasing complexity is the legislation before 
Parliament in November 1982 to recoup tax in one tax evasion racket.
kThe recoupment tax legislation extends to some sixty-one pages.
By the time this thesis was nearing completion official estimates 
of revenue lost from tax avoidance schemes had increased as Table A 
shows:
TABLE A






* approximately Stg f 600m.
Source: 61st Report of the Commissioner of Taxation 1981-82, Commonwealth Government Printer, Canberra, October 1982.
It is the purpose of this thesis to enquire into the possible 
causes of tax evasion and avoidance and to suggest reforms which might 
be considered by the Legislature to limit those practices. The enquiry 
will be divided into two main parts. Firstly, an enquiry will be made 
into the opportunity, in the Australian tax system, for such practices 
and secondly, an enquiry will be made into the motivating factors 
which influence taxpayers' behaviour. Opportunity is seen as the scope 
within a tax system for evasion and avoidance activities. This scope 
reflects weaknesses in a tax system which can be controlled. Motivating 
factors are seen as the inner driving forces which cause taxpayers to
undertake evasion or avoidance activities. They are the antecedent 
factors which cause such behaviour. In this thesis there was a basic 
problem in trying to determine the relevant motivating factors. Two
broad approaches were used and each had their own shortcomings. The
first approach was to determine taxpayers' attitudes to a variety of 
questions and the second was to ask taxpayers and tax agents to state 
why they thought taxpayers evaded or avoided tax.
Attitudes were regarded as being akin to reasonably settled 
opinions, being based on some degree of thought or analysis. Unfortunately 
as with many social surveys attitudes are not necessarily equivalent to 
behaviour, nor are they necessarily good predictors of it. Some studies 
have shown consistency between attitudes and behaviour but this 
consistency need not always hold. In the context of this thesis it 
could be argued that if anti-tax attitudes were held strongly enough and 
if there was opportunity for evasion then, perhaps, attitudes and behaviour 
would very likely be consistent.
Reasons were seen as ex-post rationalisations of what had been done. 
Again, these might not have been consistent with ex-ante factors (the 
motivating factors). Thus convicted evaders, when asked why they thought 
people felt justified in evading tax, might or might not have given 
honest or fully considered responses. They might have given answers 
which they thought would be acceptable to the interviewer. On the 
other hand, they might have been influenced in giving their answers by 
things they had read in earlier parts of the questionnaire. Alternatively 
they might not have known what actually caused taxpayers to evade. This 
ignorance may have been due to evasion being the result of a combination 
of motives or it may have been due to a single or a few factors which 
were difficult to explain. Notwithstanding these difficulties, attitudes
3a
and reasons were used as surrogates for motives for want of a more 
suitable approach. Attitudes were seen as the intervening variable 
between motives and behaviour and as something which could be determined, 
The approach used to determine the opportunity for evasion and avoidance 
in a tax system seemed less prone to criticism and is not especially 
justified in this part.
The author felt there was good reason why both opportunity and 
motivating factors should have been studied. While it may be true that 
enough controls can be built into a tax system to prevent individual 
evasion or avoidance such controls may not be able to prevent mass 
evasions or avoidances. Tax systems in modern democratic societies 
are only successful if they are generally accepted. Tax systems which 
employ too many controls, or controls which are very rigid, or which 
infringe the rights of individuals might lead to general tax revolt. 
Schmolders (discussed in detail at 2.4.1) argues that "willingness of 
taxpayers to co-operate" could, at some point, reach an optimum after 
which increased controls could lead to reduced co-operation. If in­
creased taxpayer co-operation is required then other means have to be 
employed. This is where the motivating factors could assume importance, 
Additionally it might be far too costly to devise a tax system which 
allowed no scope for avoidance or evasion.
Once the causes of avoidance and evasion have been determined 
recommendations can then be made on how taxpayers' behaviour can be 
influenced to make them more compliant and how systemic weaknesses in 
our tax system can be remedied to allow less scope for evasion and 
avoidance practices. The first task though is defining the two terms 
"tax evasion" and "tax avoidance". This is the function of Chapter One.
3b
As with much that is written about taxation no sooner is it written 
than it becomes out of date, especially matters dealing with tax law.
In this thesis a cut-off date had to be selected. This date was 
1 December 1982. Accouncements made, legislation enacted and cases 
decided after this date have not been incorporated in this thesis.
FOOTNOTES TO INTRODUCTION
1. Sixtieth Report of the Commissioner of Taxation 1980-81 
Commonwealth Government Printer, Canberra 1981, p.12.
2. The Hon. John Howard, Income Tax Laws Amendment Bill (No.2)
1981 Second Reading Speech, p.2.
3. Earlier figures taken from I.V. Gzell, "What's Ahead in Tax", 
The Oharteved Accountant in Australia^ September 1980, pp.39-44,
4. The relevant legislation is, in essence, contained in the 
Taxation (Unpaid Company Tax) Assessment Bill 1982 and the 
Taxation (Unpaid Company Tax) Bill 1982. There are, however, 
some other minor or consequential Bills.
CHAPTER ONE
THE MEANING OF THE TERMS 'TAX EVASION' AND
't ax a v o i d a n c e '
1.1 INTRODUCTION
There has been a growing number of empirical investigations in 
a number of countries into the causes and effects of tax evasion and 
tax avoidance. However, it is not altogether clear whether these 
investigations proceed from a common definition of these two terms.
If results are influenced by the terms used then lack of definition 
of these terms limits the usefulness of particular studies and makes 
comparative analysis tenuous. More is required to be known about the 
two terms than the fact that one (tax avoidance) is legal and the other 
(tax evasion) is illegal. Certainly more is required to be known than 
one writer lightheartedly suggested: "If you have a bright plan on how
to save taxes that is avoidance. If somebody else has a scheme to save 
taxes that is evasion." The purpose of this chapter is to attempt to 
determine what is meant by the terms "tax evasion" and "tax avoidance".
1.2 THE NEED FOR A DISTINCTION BETWEEN TAX EVASION AND TAX AVOIDANCE
The need for a distinction between the terms "tax evasion" and 
"tax avoidance" can be approached from a number of different viewpoints 
including the government, the taxation authorities, the Courts and the 
taxpayers themselves. A government's need to distinguish the two, 
particularly the former, was well pointed out by the Radcliffe Commission 
in 1955: "... until some certainty is reached upon this question of
definition the question of what sort of steps should be taken to prevent
2it remains an aimless one."
It is possible that once a suitable definition is found a govern­
ment might decide not to take any action to prevent tax evasion or tax 
avoidance because the costs of doing so might outweigh the benefits 
obtained. Such costs and benefits cannot be determined without knowing 
precisely what it is that is being measured. On the other hand the 
existence of widespread tax avoidance and evasion might simply reflect 
the need for reform of the tax system itself, to remedy defects and 
inequities in it.
Taxation authorities and Courts require a clear distinction between 
the two terms to enable tax laws to be administered and enforced.
Further, the type and size of the penalty, if any, which ought to be 
imposed on tax offenders will depend on the nature of the offence: 
whether it was lawful or unlawful, whether it was large or small, and 
whether it was serious or not serious.
The question of what is lawful and what is unlawful is only one 
of the questions which require attention. Often tax laws attempt to 
anticipate tax avoidance by including a general anti-avoidance provision. 
It is the duty of a taxation authority to administer such a provision 
and the duty of the Courts, where there are conflicts between the taxation 
authority and taxpayers, to interpret it. Taxpayers also require a clear 
statement of their responsibilities, rights and duties so that they can 
order their affairs accordingly. Finally, researchers cannot be 
confident of their findings on the nature and extent of tax evasion or 
tax avoidance, or their causes and effects, without adequate definition 
of the two terms. It is encouraging that at least some researchers
recognise the importance of defining the two terms before investigating 
them: "The extent of tax avoidance is not known. Nor indeed, without
much more careful definition of the phenomenon, could we ever hope to
3know it."
The method adopted to distinguish the two terms "tax evasion" and 
"tax avoidance" will begin with an historical review of income tax in 
the United Kingdom. This review should help determine when those terms 
were first used and to which activities those terms were first applied.
The United Kingdom is chosen as a point of reference because 
income tax evasion and avoidance seem to have been widespread there 
before income tax had really established itself in Australia. Federal 
income tax in Australia was not introduced until 1915 and evasion of 
income tax seemed to be widespread in the United Kingdom almost three- 
quarters of a century beforehand. As early as 1845 Lord John Russell 
said:
I believe no man who had been concerned in the collection 
of this tax will deny that his experience has shown that 
great frauds are practised under this tax ... those who 
wished to evade the tax, either found the means of doing 
so or entangled themselves and the Government in the most 
expensive proceedings. ^
1.3 INCOME TAX IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 1799 to 1920
One historical account of income tax in the United Kingdom suggests
that:
Taxation and evasion are complementary twins, and in 
England resistance to taxation had a long and not always 
dishonourable history from Wat Tyler to John Hampden.
This view is supported by instances of evasion of many different types
of tax. In fact there does not seem to have been any tax in the 
United Kingdom which has escaped evasion. Some of the more notable 
examples of evasion were:
(i) evasion of the poll tax of 1377. When the taxes of 1380 
were collected "it appeared that the population had 
fallen, since the poll tax of 1377, by nearly half a 
million." The tax was abandoned in 1380;
(ii) evasion of the window tax of 1696. This tax did not
yield the revenue expected of it because "taxpayers hit 
upon the simple plan of stopping up windows in preparation 
for the assessor's visit and re-opening them on his 
departure;" and
(iii) evasion of the tax on silver plate in 1765. This tax 
was also easy to evade. When tax gatherers called the 
silver plate was hidden.
These instances of evasion were not isolated ones. In some cases 
evasion was so widespread that it was no longer possible to persevere 
with the tax, as seen with the poll tax. The first serious attempt in 
the United Kingdom to tax income was made in 1799 and this was also
subject to widespread evasion. The tax in 1799 yielded only about 60%
8of that budgeted with much of the shortfall due to evasion. Income tax 
was withdrawn in 1816 but reintroduced in 1842. Although the rate of 
tax in 1842 was only seven pence in the pound, with a general exemption 
from tax where income was less than il50 p.a., evasion appears to have
9been widespread.
By 1901 the rate of tax had doubled to fourteen pence in the pound 
and for the first time collections from direct taxation exceeded those 
from indirect taxation. However, income tax evasion had become a more 
serious problem. So much so that, in 1905, a Government Committee "had 
as the first of its terms of reference to enquire into 'the prevention
10of fraud and evasion'." However, it is significant that although 
there had been a substantial increase in the amount of income tax being 
evaded the means by which it was achieved had scarcely changed since 
1842:
There were still only four main methods of evasion; 
by omission to make returns, ..., by fraudulent returns, 
by appeals against assessments ... and by incomplete 
accounts or erroneous deductions put forward in good 
faith.
It is also significant that until this time no mention was made 
of tax avoidance as a means to reduce tax liabilities. This suggests 
that either no tax avoidance was detected or what is now known as tax 
avoidance may then have been referred to as evasion. However there 
seems little reason to support the latter. It would seem that little 
avoidance was detected because little was carried out:
... but for the first time (1906) the phrase 'legal 
avoidance' as distinct from mere evasion makes its 
appearance, instances being the free exchange of coupons 
on foreign securities and virtual direction from this 
country (U.K.) of companies situated abroad.
Avoidance does not appear to have become a serious problem until 
after the First World War when high rates of excess profits duties and 
complex laws imposing them combined to precipitate the first significant 
era of tax avoidance in the United Kingdom. Extracts from the 1920 
Budget Committee give some clues as to the nature of avoidance at this 
time:
... it would strengthen the position of the authorities 
in their dealings with the taxpayer who seeks to avoid the 
tax hy so arranging his business that the intention of the 
law is defeated, if power were given similar to that now 
existing under the provisions of the E.P.D. Act, that is 
to say, the power of ignoring, for the purposes of assessment 
any fictitious or artificial transactions entered into for 
the purposes of evading or avoiding income tax.
[emphasis added]
10
Avoidance was seen to be the circumvention of the law by 
arrangements, transactions or other business dealings which appeared 
fictitious or artificial. Both in intent and effect avoidance was 
similar to evasion although unlike evasion it was carried out within 
the law.
The assistance that the findings of these early government 
committees has provided suggests that further insights might come from 
a review of the findings of other committees. Therefore it is proposed 
to review more recent reports, made for governments, in which the 
question of tax avoidance and evasion has been addressed as a major issue, 
Reports prepared in Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom, will be 
examined with the hope of finding more universal definitions of the 
terms "tax evasion" and "tax avoidance". The reports to be reviewed are:
14
- The Royal Commission on Taxation of Profits and Income Final Report U.K. 1955 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Radcliffe Commission')
15
- The Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation Canada 1966 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Carter Commission')
16
- The Taxation Review Committee - Full Report Australia 1975 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Asprey Committee').^'
1.4 GOVERNMENT ENQUIRIES INTO THE NATURE OF TAX EVASION AND TAX AVOIDANCE
1.4.1 The Radcliffe Commission
The Radcliffe Commission prefaced their discussion on tax avoidance
with the caution that "the phrase (tax avoidance) was used to denote
18something which a tax system ought to be concerned to control." This 
caution is often overlooked when the Commission's definition is used. 
However, it ought not be overlooked as it implies that if the phrase
n
"tax avoidance" was to be defined for another purpose it might take 
a different meaning. For their purpose the Commission's definition was 
given as follows:
It is usual to draw a distinction between tax avoidance 
and tax evasion. The latter denotes all those activities 
which are responsible for a person not paying the tax that 
the existing law charges on his income. Ex hypothesi he 
is in the wrong, though his wrong doing may range from the 
making of a deliberately fraudulent return to a mere 
failure to make a return or to pay his tax at the proper 
time. By tax avoidance, on the other hand, is understood 
some act by which a person so arranges his affairs that he 
is liable to pay less tax than he would have paid but for 
the arrangement. Thus the situation which he brings about 
is one in which he is legally in the right, ...
This definition maintains the clear legal distinction between tax 
avoidance and tax evasion with only the former being within the law. 
Further, it ought to be emphasised that the range of activities which 
the Commission specify as constituting instances of tax evasion do not 
differ materially from those outlined already.
The Radcliffe Commission also gave examples of tax avoidance 
activities which it considers the tax system ought to control:
... the tax avoidance that should be struck at is to be 
found in those situations in which a man, without being 
in law the owner of income, yet has in substance the power 
to enjoy it or to control the disposition of it in his own 
interest. ^
and in relation to companies:
But, as things are, the tax avoidance against which 
legislation has been directed has taken the shape of 
transactions designed to take advantage of these special 
provisions and so to escape or reduce the tax otherwise 
payable.
It appears that opportunity for these instances of tax avoidance 
arose out of features of the tax system itself. Had there not been 
a progressive rate structure individuals would not have saved tax by
12
splitting income. Avoidance of tax by companies was also partly attribu­
table to the features of the tax system, particularly the rate structure 
and the complexity of particular provisions. This was recognised by the 
Radcliffe Commission.
Indeed, if the charge (to profits tax) were imposed in a 
single form, without exemptions or qualifications or varia­
tions of rate, it might be that the question of tax avoidance 
by companies would not arise at all. ^2
Three instances of tax avoidance by companies were outlined by the 
Radcl iffe Commission, which conceded that each was "invited" by particular
23provisions themselves.
1.4.2 The Carter Commission
The Carter Commission accepted, unequivocally, the Radcliffe 
Commission's definition of tax evasion. It also, in essence, accepted 
their definition of tax avoidance. However in the Carter Commission's 
discussion on tax avoidance there was a distinction between those types of 
tax avoidance which it considered ought not be limited in any way and 
those against which there should be legislative action. Instances of the 
former included a person reducing his tax liability by preferring leisure 
to work or by making a gift to charity. However the Commission argued 
that where a person "contrives matters in such a way that he continues to 
enjoy the benefits of income, or if he continues to control that source
24or disposition of income, he should not be allowed to reduce his liability." 
Taxpayer action which was regarded to be of a type which the legislature 
ought not permit, included income splitting through trusts, dividend 
stripping, trading in loss companies, converting income into capital by 
means of a premium and transferring the source of income to jurisdictions 
where the rate of tax was lower. The distinguishing feature of the two 
broad types of tax avoidance, from the Carter Commission's point of view.
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seems to rest with the motives of the taxpayers for undertaking particular 
arrangements.
For our purposes, as will be elaborated below, the 
expression 'tax avoidance' will be used to describe 
every attempt by legal means to prevent or reduce tax 
liability which would otherwise be incurred, by taking 
advantage of some provision or lack of provision in the 
law ... it presupposes the existence of alternatives, 
one of which would result in less tax than the other.
Moreover, motive would seem to be an essential element 
of tax avoidance. A person who adopts one of several 
possible courses because that one will save him the most 
tax must be distinguished from the taxpayer who adopts 
the same course for business or personal reasons.
The Commission guarded themselves from possible criticism by adding that
a taxpayer's purpose was to be "assumed from the circumstances and the
26nature of the transactions".
1.4.3 The Asprey Committee
The Asprey Committee's definitions appear at the beginning of 
their chapter on "Income Splitting". Their definitions of the terms 
tax evasion and tax avoidance were also accompanied by examples of each
The phrase 'tax evasion' describes an act in contravention 
of the law whereby a person who derives a taxable income 
either pays no tax or pays less tax than he would otherwise 
be bound to pay. Tax evasion includes the failure to make 
a return of taxable income or the failure to disclose in a 
return the true amount of income derived
and
... tax avoidance on the other hand usually connotes an act 
within the law whereby income, which would otherwise be taxed 
at a rate applicable to the taxpayer who but for that act 
would have derived it, is distributed to another person or 
between a number of other persons who do not provide a hona 
fide and fully adequate consideration; in the result that 
the total tax payable in respect of that income is less than 
it would have been had no part of the income been distributed 
and the whole had been taxed as income of that taxpayer.
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The means by which tax avoidance was carried out "was most 
frequently to be seen in partnerships, alienation of income, trusts,
private company arrangements, loans, gifts and employer/employee relation-
28ships". The Committee recognised that there was "a very fine line to 
be drawn between the transaction which offended and the one which merited
29no condemnation" yet it attempted to outline the features of those types 
of tax avoidance which should be prevented:
... unless the arrangement was an ordinary business trans­
action creating rights and obligations that would normally 
be created between people dealing at arms length in a trans­
action of the nature in question and effected by means 
normally employed in such a transaction, or was made in the 
ordinary course of changing an investment, or was a bona fide 
arrangement of a person's or a family's affairs, and the 
Commissioner was satisfied that the arrangement was not 
entered into solely or primarily for the purpose of obtaining 
the tax advantage or that one of its main objects was to 
obtain the tax advantage.
The Asprey Committee's definition of tax evasion is no different 
from that already outlined by the two Royal Commissions. Their definition 
of avoidance is similar but it distinguishes between those types of 
avoidance which were intended by the legislature and those which were not. 
Both types of avoidance are within the law and are therefore different 
from instances of evasion which are outside the law.
Examples of tax evasion, whether taken from Government Committee 
Reports in the United Kingdom in 1851 or from Australia in 1975 bear 
remarkable resemblance. The means by which taxes have been evaded have 
changed little during that time and this facilitates an understanding of 
the phrase "tax evasion". Perhaps one of the few "new" means of evading 
tax was evidenced in a recent court case. A tax assessor from the Parra­
matta Office was convicted after pleading guilty to accepting bribes to 
ensure incorrect assessments for certain taxpayers. The assessor provided
15
accomplices with written instructions on how to get larger refunds on 
their returns. The returns were taken to the Tax Office where the 
assessor would have them processed using a bogus stamp and false initials.
31In return he was paid half the additional refund.
1.4.4 Recent Developments in Official Thinking
Over recent years in Australia the only substantial changes affecting 
income tax evasion practices have been (i) the introduction of The Crimes
32
(Taxation Offences) Act 1980 and (ii) the Treasurer's announcements 
on 25 July, 1982 and 17 August, 1982 of the Government's intention to 
recover company taxes from vendor shareholders who participated in certain 
tax evasion practices including those covered by the above Act.
The operation of The Crimes (Taxation Offences) Act 1980 will be 
discussed later in this thesis but it is relevant to examine its scope 
here. The provisions of the Act are directed at two main kinds of tax 
evasion practices:
(i) The first ensures that a company is stripped of its
assets before tax is due and payable or before tax, which 
will become due and payable on previously derived income, 
can be collected; and
(ii) The second is designed to ensure that liability for tax
falls from the outset on a "straw" company or trustee which 
does not have, and was never intended to have, sufficient 
funds to pay the income tax liability.
Prior to the introduction of legislation to prevent these practices 
the Commissioner of Taxation had referred to them as "alarming tactics"
34which would be regarded by most as "pure tax evasion". He went on to 
say that these actions by a company are "the more egregious when members
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of the company resolve to place it in voluntary liquidation before an 
income tax assessment can be issued so that early destruction of records
35may be achieved." These practices, although new, amount to little more 
than failure to pay tax which has fallen due and so do not expand the 
definition of tax evasion, notwithstanding the Commissioner's reference 
to them as "pure tax evasion". Further review of the Commissioner of 
Taxation Reports reveals features of tax avoidance which are thought to 
be of a type which should be prevented.
According to the Fifty-ninth Report of the Commissioner of Taxation 
the features of those tax avoidance arrangements which are likely to be 
the subject of administrative challenge by the Commissioner are those for 
which
there is no real commercial purpose;
a great deal of secrecy surrounds them;
they seek to take advantage of provisions of the law
for purposes which could not conceivably have been
intended by the legislature.
The features which emerge when one compares these more recent 
"definitions" of avoidance with earlier ones are the complex legal nature 
of the avoidance transactions, the predominant purpose of tax avoidance, 
the lack of commercial reality and the requirement of some degree of
secrecy. These attributes are not dissimilar to those outlined by a
working party of Organisation For Economic Co-operation and Development's 
Committee on Fiscal Affairs as the main features of tax anoidanoe schemes 
which aimed to frustrate the intent of the Zaw\
(i) Almost invariably there would be present an element 
of artificiality, or to put it another way, the various 
arrangements involved in a scheme would not in the 
absence of tax factors, take the form they do;
(ii) Such schemês would often take advantage of loopholes 
in the law or apply legal provisions for purposes for
which they were not intended;
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(iii) Searecy may also he a feature of such schemes,
where tax advisors sell ready made avoidance devices, 
one term of the contract of sale being that the taxpayer 
keeps the facts secret for as long as possible. 3?
[emphasis added]
Tax evasion presupposes that a liability to tax has fallen upon 
a taxpayer, for example income has been derived by him, and he then takes
steps to escape payment of that tax. However in respect of tax avoidance
no liability has yet fallen on the taxpayer and before it does, and to 
prevent it from falling upon him, he takes steps, which are within the
law, to get out of its way. Some of the means by which a taxpayer gets
out of the way of the tax appear to merit no condemnation from society's 
point of view, but others do. Often, those which are to be condemned have 
arisen out of loopholes or lack of definition in particular provisions 
of the tax laws. They could be said to have resulted from taxpayers' 
actions which have been against the-spirit or intent of the law. Unfor­
tunately there is only a fine line between what was intended by the 
legislature and that which was not and it is not always possible to say 
with certainty that this was intended and that was not.
Tax laws often try to anticipate tax avoidance schemes of the latter 
type by including general anti-avoidance provisions. The Courts, in 
resolving disputes between taxpayers and taxation authorities, are often 
required to determine the intent of legislation when it is not clearly 
expressed by the words used. Consequently an analysis of various Court 
decisions involving anti-avoidance provisions might be a fruitful means 
of determining characteristics of those types of tax avoidance which were 
intended by the legislature and those which were not. In the analysis 
that follows, selected Court decisions of various countries are examined 
to see whether a more universal meaning can be attributed to the phrase 
"tax avoidance". It should be emphasised that only Court decisions of
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38countries operating under the 'Westminster System' are examined.
1.5 THE APPROACH OF THE COURTS TOWARDS INTERPRETING THE TERM "TAX AVOIDANCE"
If the Courts, in interpreting the phrase "tax avoidance", have 
adopted a common approach it would assist in determining what is meant 
by that phrase. One working party on fiscal affairs of the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development sought to gain further under-
39standing of the term "tax avoidance" by this means. They collected 
examples of judicial decisions from member countries to see whether it 
was possible to find a common definition. However no single text proved 
fully adequate because the Courts in different countries had different 
approaches to interpreting the law. In some countries, such as the 
Netherlands, the Courts had developed the concept of "fraus legis" to 
enable them to outlaw transactions which were outside the spirit of the 
law. Those transactions, being outside the law in those countries, were 
therefore instances of tax evasion. However, in other countries where 
the Courts took a different approach to interpretation of tax laws, the 
same transactions were viewed as avoidance rather than evasion. This 
meant that different approaches by the Courts to interpreting (tax) laws 
resulted in different classifications of transactions. Inter-country 
comparisons, therefore, proved fruitless in the search for common meanings 
of the terms "tax evasion" and "tax avoidance".
Not only was it found that interpretation of tax laws by the Courts 
differed but also terminology differed. For example in France tax
evasion was referred to as "fraude fiscale" and tax avoidance was referred
40to as "evasion". The working party eventually abandoned its attempt 
to find a common definition by looking at judicial decisions and sought
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an alternative approach. With this failure in mind only a brief review 
of the approach of the Courts in some countries operating under the 
Westminster System is given here. The underlying spirit of the West­
minster System is emphasised in the following extracts:
... if you cannot bring the subject within the letter of 
the law, the subject is free, however apparently within 
the spirit of the law the case might otherwise appear to 
be 41
... you have no right to assume that there is any 
governing object which a taxing Act is intended to attain 
other than that which it has expressed ... by making such 
objects the intended subject for taxation, you must see 
whether a tax is expressly imposed
My Lords there is a maxim of income tax law which, though 
it may sometimes be overstressed, yet ought not to be for­
gotten. It is that the subject is not to be taxed unless 
the words of the taxing statute unambiguously impose 
the tax upon him
The question is not whether* the substance of the trans­
actions is within what may be said to be 'the policy of 
the Act' or within its spirit and intendment ... But 
whether the transactions themselves can be said to fall 
fairly within the terms of that paragraph.
Unfortunately, for purposes of present analysis, the legislatures 
of the selected countries have not always used the words "tax avoidance" 
in their anti-avoidance provisions. The actual words used, the selected 
countries and cases interpreting those words are summarised below:
Country Relevant Provision Relevant Phrase Used
Australia s.260* "avoiding any duty or
Income Tax Assessment Act liability imposed ..."1936
45[Relevant Australian Case - Newton v FCT J
United Kingdom s.460(1) "Where ... a person is in
Finance Act^ 1970 a position to obtain, orhas obtained a tax advantage ..."
4 6 _[Relevant United Kingdom Case - IRC v Parker ]
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Country Relevant Provision Relevant Phrase Used
New Zealand s.108 "... altering the incidence
Land and Income Tax Aoty of tax or relieving any person 1954 from his liability to paytax ..."
47[Relevant New Zealand Case - Mangin v IRC (NZ) ]
Canada s.138(1) "Where the Treasury Board
Income Tax Act has decided ... improperavoidance or reduction of taxes ..."
r 4 8 ^[No relevant Canadian Case ]
(* Now replaced by Part IVA but no case has been decided in respect of that provision. In any event Part IVA uses the term "tax benefit" rather than the term "tax avoidance".)
Newton*s Case was the first case involving s.260 to go before the 
Privy Council. On behalf of the taxpayers it was submitted that the 
words "liability imposed on any person" meant a liability which had already 
accrued and that the word "avoid" meant "displaced". This submission was 
not accepted by their Lordships who decided that
... the word 'avoid' is used in its ordinary sense in which
a person is said to avoid something which is about to happen
to him. He takes steps to get out of the way of it ...
To 'avoid a liability imposed' on you means to take steps 
to get out of the reach of a liability which is about to fall 
on you.
Their Lordships recognised that not all transactions which avoided tax 
in the sense outlined were intended to be struck down by s.260. To 
determine which ones should, the following test was laid down:
In order to bring an arrangement within the section, you 
must be able to predicate - hy looking at the overt acts 
by which it was implemented - that it was implemented in 
that particular way so as to avoid tax. If you cannot so 
predicate, but have to acknowledge that the transactions 
are capable of explanation by reference to ordinary 
business or family dealings, without necessarily being 
labelled as a means to avoid tax, then the arrangement does 
not come within the section. 5" [emphasis added]
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It was quite clear from the Privy Council's judgment that merely 
because an arrangement reduced a taxpayer's tax liability it did not 
necessarily mean that s.260 applied. Nor did the section apply if the 
motive behind a taxpayer's action was "tax avoidance". The crucial factor
51was the means by which a reduction in tax liability was achieved.
In Parker's Case Lord Wilberforce provided the key to interpreting 
the words "tax advantage" when he stated that the phrase
... presupposes a situation in which an assessment to tax 
or increased tax, either is made or may possibly be made, 
that the taxpayer is in a position to resist the assessment 
by saying that the way in which he received what is sought 
to tax prevents him from being taxed on it, and that the 
Revenue is in a position to reply that if he had received 
what is sought to tax in another way he would have had to 
bear tax. [emphasis added]
Again the Court emphasised the means by which transactions were carried 
out was significant in determining whether it was something which the 
particular provision was designed to prevent. In applying s.460 there 
were of course two further conditions laid down by the section which must 
be satisfied, but they have no bearing on the above discussion.
The Privy Council in Mangin's Case cited, with approval, the test 
laid down in Newton's Case and then proceeded to give an explanation 
of the phrase "without necessarily being labelled as a means to avoid tax."
Their Lordships think that what this phrase refers to is 
... a scheme ... devised for the sole purpose, or at least 
the principal purpose, of bringing it about that this tax­
payer should escape liability for tax on a substantial part 
of the income which without it, he would have derived. ^^
This could be taken to indicate a preference for taxpayer's motive as 
the criterion for determining whether an arrangement was of a type which 
was intended to be struck down by the legislature.
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1.6 STATUTORY EXTENSION OF THE MEANING OF THE TERMS "TAX EVASION" AND "TAX AVOTdA n CE"'
Whatever their ordinary meaning the terms "tax evasion" and "tax 
avoidance" have different meanings if the taxing statute in which they 
appear provides an alternative definition. The terms as such are not 
defined in the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936, as amended, although, since 
the introduction of subdivision D of Part III of Division 3 of the Act in 
1979, there has been a definition of "tax avoidance agreement". This 
definition is contained in s.82KH(l) and provides:
'tax avoidance agreement' means an agreement that was 
entered into or carried out for the purpose, or for purposes 
that included the purpose, of securing that a person who, if 
the agreement had not been entered into or carried out, would 
have been liable to pay income tax in respect of a year of 
income would not be liable to pay income tax in respect of 
that year of income or would be liable to pay less income 
tax in respect of that year of income than that person would 
have been liable to pay if the agreement had not been 
entered into or carried out J
However, this definition has relevance only for the subdivision in which 
it appears. Therefore, it cannot be taken as giving general meaning to 
the term "tax avoidance". Even the new anti-avoidance provisions,
S.177A-G, contain no definition of the term "tax avoidance". The 
provisions use the term "tax benefit" and apply to deny that benefit 
where, having regard to a number of specified matters, it would be concluded 
that the 'scheme' producing the tax benefit was entered into for the purpose 
of obtaining that benefit. The term tax benefit' is exhaustively defined 
in s.l77C(l) of the Act as:
s.l77C(l)(a) an amount not being included in the assessable 
income of the taxpayer of a year of income that would have 
been included, or might reasonably have been expected to be 
included, in the assessable income of the taxpayer of that 
year of income if the scheme had not been entered into or 
carried out; or
23
(b) a deduction being allowable to the taxpayer in relation 
to a year of income where the whole or a part of that 
deduction would not have been allowable, or might reasonably 
be expected not to have been allowable, to the taxpayer in 
relation to that year of income if the scheme had not been 
entered into or carried out.
The terms "avoidance of tax" and "evasion" both appear in paragraph (a) 
of s.170(2) of the Assessment Act which provides:
Where a taxpayer has not made to the Commissioner a full 
and true disclosure of all the material facts necessary for 
his assessment, and there has been an avoidance of tax, the 
Commissioner may -
(a) where he is of the opinion that the avoidance of tax 
has been due to fraud or evasion - at any time;
(b) ... amend the assessment ...
The use, in this subsection, of the terms "avoidance of tax" and "evasion" 
was considered by Full agar, J. in Westgarth's Case: 54
The word 'avoidance' is, I think, to be contrasted with 
the word 'evasion'. It involves, I think, no notion of 
escaping by any device or artiface, but conveys simply the 
notion of actually escaping through not being called upon 
to pay.
In its context in s.170 the word 'evasion' appears to mean something more 
than avoidance but something less than fraud. The views of Dixon, J.
56in a case involving the Commissioner of Taxation (NSW), seem to outline 
the accepted meaning of the word 'evasion':
I think it is unwise to attempt to define the word 'evasion'.
The context of s.210(2) [the NSW equivalent of s.170(2)] 
shows that it means more than avoid and also more than a mere 
withholding of information or the mere furnishing of misleading 
information. It is probably safe to say that some blameworthy 
act or omission on the part of the taxpayer or those for whom 
he is responsible is contemplated. ^7
Within the context of s. 170(2) it seems that both 'avoidance' and 'evasion' 
mean payment of less tax than is legally required, but, in the case of 
evasion this is achieved by deliberate acts or failures to act on the
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part of taxpayers. Although the word "evasion" has not been explicitly 
defined it does seem that it has a slightly different meaning for the 
purposes of s.170(2) than it might have for ordinary purposes, particu­
larly because it distinguishes between different types of evasions, viz, 
those resulting from deliberate actions of taxpayers and those resulting 
from failures to act. Where the taxpayer escapes payment of tax by mere 
failure to furnish information, mere furnishing of misleading information, 
or where for some other reason he is. not called upon to pay the correct 
amount of tax on his true taxable income, then the term "avoidance of tax" 
is applicable. This distinction would only seem relevant in s.170(2) 
as elsewhere these elements would be characterised as evasion.
Section 121F(1), effective from 24 June, 1980 defines "tax avoidance 
agreement" for the purposes of Division 9C. But again this definition
is limited in its scope, as the opening words of s.l21F(l) limit the
operation of this definition to Division 9C, i.e. it limits it to situa­
tions where, as part of a "tax avoidance agreement" income is diverted to 
an organisation or fund which would otherwise be exempt from tax. The 
term is defined as follows:
'tax avoidance agreement' means an agreement that was entered 
into after 24 June 1980 and was entered into or carried out 
for the purpose, or for purposes that included the purpose, 
of securing that a person who, if the agreement had not been 
entered into or carried out, would have been liable to pay 
income tax in respect of a year of income would not be liable
to pay income tax in respect of that year of income or would
be liable to pay less income tax in respect of that year of 
income than that person would have been liable to pay if the 
agreement had not been entered into or carried out.
The two terms, "tax evasion" and "tax avoidance" are not defined 
by the Income Tax Assessment Act though the terms "tax avoidance agreement" 
and "tax benefit" are defined. However these definitions are relevant 
only for the context in which they appear. Thus, in the absence of any
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statutory definition to the contrary, the two terms assume their ordinary 
meaning. The difficulty is then knowing what the ordinary meaning of 
those two terms is.
1.7 CONCLUSIONS
Of the terms "tax evasion" and "tax avoidance" it would seem that 
the former is easier to define. Tax evasion is an act in contravention 
of the law whereby the taxpayer pays less tax than he is legally bound 
to pay. Evasion presupposes that a liability for tax has already fallen 
upon a taxpayer who then takes steps to escape payment of that tax, 
either in whole or in part. The methods by which evasion takes place 
have changed little since income tax was reintroduced in the United 
Kingdom in 1842. These include failure to make a return, making a 
fraudulent return and failure to pay tax by the due date. The term "tax 
avoidance", or "legal avoidance" as it was first called, appears to be 
a product of the twentieth century. Like evasion, avoidance means that 
less tax is paid by a particular taxpayer but unlike evasion this end 
is achieved by means within the law. The distinguishing feature about 
avoidance is that the taxpayer takes steps to get out of the way of the 
tax before it falls on him. Avoidance occurred, initially, because of 
defects in particular provisions of taxing statutes. As statutes have 
become more complex opportunity for avoidance has increased. What is 
difficult to establish is the means of distinguishing between those types 
of avoidance which were 'intended* and those which were not. So elusive 
are the criteria for distinguishing the two that writers have coined a 
variety of terms when referring to the phrase "tax avoidance". These 
include the terms 'malevolent avoidance', 'hard core avoidance', 
'objective avoidance', 'subjective avoidance', Economic avoidance'.
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'improper avoidance', and 'deplorable avoidance'. Each of these probably 
tries to distinguish between different types of tax avoidance.
One means of distinguishing the two types of avoidance was to 
examine the way in which Courts, operating under the Westminster System, 
approached the matter of statutory interpretation. Such Courts give 
words and phrases their literal meaning unless this leads to some incon­
sistency or repugnancy with the rest of the statute. If it is not 
possible to achieve any clear meaning from applying this rule the Courts 
might apply the mischief rule. In doing so statutes are interpreted to 
suppress the mischief for which they were introduced to remedy. Appli­
cation of this rule, though, presumes that the Courts can see what the 
supposed mischief was.
Applying the literal rule to the phrase "tax avoidance" it became 
clear that tax was avoided whenever every future possible liability was 
not attracted. One consequence of this means of interpretation was that 
a person "avoided tax" by preferring leisure to overtime, or by marrying 
or by taking out a life assurance policy. A company "avoided tax" 
whenever it distributed dividends so as not to be liable for undistributed 
profits tax (i.e. tax imposed by Div. 7). These instances of "tax 
avoidance" would not have been struck down by a Court given the task of 
interpreting an anti-avoidance provision because they were usually 
specifically provided for, and encouraged, by other sections of a taxing 
statute. Courts would have applied the presumption generalia speoialibus 
non devogant to give effect to the provisions of such other sections 
rather than give literal effect to an anti-avoidance provision. This 
meant that Courts did not, and in fact could not, interpret the phrase 
"tax avoidance" in its literal sense. An alternative interpretation is
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required, one that will read down the meaning of the phrase so that it 
is consistent with the other provisions of a taxing statute yet still 
within the intent of the legislature.
Recognition that some tax avoidance was intended and some was 
not, really, requires a clear statement by the legislature as to how 
these should be distinguished. The Courts should not be put in a 
position of determining rules for this situation because it puts them 
dangerously close to the realm of policy making. It should not be for 
the Courts to say which types of tax avoidance are intended or acceptable 
and which are not. This is a function of the legislature and one which it 
ought to assume. Until it does confusion will continue to arise around 
the use of the phrase "tax avoidance". In the meantime the phrase "tax 
avoidance" should be taken to mean exploitation of provisions, or lack 
of provision, in a taxing statute by means which, though they legally 
reduce a person's tax liability which would otherwise accrue, have the 
appearance of being artificial and of being entered into solely or 
predominantly for the purpose of reducing tax liability. The means 
adopted are not those by which one would expect normal business or family 
dealings to be carried out. As soon as this definition is stated it 
must be conceded that it has its deficiencies especially from the point 
of making pronouncements about particular arrangements. However, 
without a much more definitive statement by the legislature, there is 
no sure way of determining what is meant. What the above definition 
suggests is that attention should be focused on the means adopted to 
implement a particular arrangement, transaction or scheme which is sus­
pected of being an instance of (unintended) tax avoidance. The greater 
the degree of artifice the more likely that the arrangement, transaction 
or scheme is of a type which was not intended to provide tax savings.
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POSSIBLE CAUSES OF TAX EVASION AND 
TAX AVOIDANCE
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Only a limited number of empirical investigations into possible 
causes of tax evasion and avoidance have been carried out. Most of 
these have been conducted since 1970 and they have been carried out in 
countries other than Australia. Almost all have concentrated on tax 
evasion, and given the relative ease with which this term can be defined, 
the emphasis on this aspect of taxpayer behaviour is understandable.
Much of the published research which has been done is reviewed in this 
chapter so as to develop a set of hypotheses which can then be tested 
against Australian data. As well as recent empirical work, the findings 
of certain government enquiries will also be considered to see whether 
some of the possible causes and effects of tax evasion and avoidance can 
be determined.
In this literature review there are at least two inherent problems, 
the first of which is that of definition of the two terms. In Chapter 
One it was shown that, although both result in less tax being payable 
than would otherwise be the case, evasion achieves this by means which 
are outside the law. Avoidance on the other hand involves taxpayers 
taking steps to prevent a liability from falling on themselves, or taking 
steps which cause lesser liabilities to fall. The difficulty with tax 
avoidance is that some of the means by which liabilities are avoided are 
against the spirit of the law while others are not. Acknowledgement of 
these two types of avoidance raises the question of how one is to
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distinguish between them. In this chapter it is only "evasion" and 
"avoidance which a tax system ought to prevent" which are of most 
concern. Avoidance of this latter type differs little from evasion and 
is likely to have only temporary legal status.
The other problem is that there is a lack of consistency between 
different empirical studies. In particular they seem to mix three things, 
namely taxpayers' attitudes towards tax offences, taxpayers' opportunities 
to evade or avoid taxes and taxpayers' reasons for avoiding or evading 
tax. When considering reforms to prevent evasion or avoidance a clear 
distinction is required, particularly between the latter two. The 
purpose of this chapter, and that of Chapter Three, is to determine 
possible causes of tax evasion and avoidance. In doing so it is proposed 
to distinguish factors which might motivate taxpayers to evade or avoid 
from those things which merely provide them with the opportunity to do 
so. The format of the analysis here will follow that of Chapter One.
2.2 INCOME TAX IN THE UNITED KINGDOM FROM 1799
Statements made before the Hume Committee 1851 provided the first 
evidence of why taxpayers in the United Kingdom might have wanted to 
evade income tax. One general opinion put before the Committee was
"that since income tax was intrinsically unfair, taxpayers were bound
1to try to evade it". This opinion seems to derive from the circumstances 
which surrounded the introduction of the tax in the United Kingdom. 
Essentially, tax on income was seen as a war tax and, in times of peace, 
there was little public support for it:
The tax was, nevertheless, only impatiently endured until 
the conclusion of the war, and was then again wholly repealed 
in obedience to a singularly emphatic expression of the
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popular will ... The function of the Income Tax was thus, 
down to 1815, declared to be the raising of funds for the 
war, and that alone. Its position was clearly defined as 
that of a fiscal expedient temporarily added to the tax 
list for this purpose. ^
Income tax in its early days in the United Kingdom was tolerated 
because it was seen as a necessary imposition to finance war expenditures 
This was seen to be the purpose of the tax because this, the people were 
promised, was the purpose of the tax. It is understandable that, in 
the absence of any war, dissatisfaction arose on its réintroduction in 
1842. Nowadays, income tax has become firmly entrenched as a government 
revenue raising device and this causal factor should no longer be 
relevant. At least, if income tax is widely regarded as being "intrin­
sically unfair" it should be for other reasons.
Before the Hubbard Committee (1861) it was said that "inequity 
produced evasion ... that revision by differentiation would ensure the
3automatic disappearance of evasion." The perceived inequity was the 
taxation of earned inaome (i.e. personal exertion income) and unearned 
inoome (i.e. property income) at the same rate. At the time, the view 
was held that because unearned income required no personal effort and 
because it was likely to be more permanent it ought to be taxed at a 
higher rate.
Inadequate book-keeping by some traders was also alleged to have 
contributed to evasion of tax in those early days:
But the greater number of the sufferers [of an over 
assessment] do not keep their accounts in such good 
order as would admit of their preparing a three years' 
summary at short notice. Many retail cash traders of 
the smaller sort keep no account at all. ^
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However it is unclear whether inadequate book-keeping simply 
created the opportunity for evasion or was a cunning device for perpe­
trating tax frauds. Just before the turn of the century another 
motivating factor was perceived:
There is also the undoubted fact that some of the evils 
of the tax are considerably lessened when the rate is low.
A nominal rate of two pence in the £ would certainly not 
present so great an inducement to evasion as the higher 
rates of recent years. ^
Although the "higher" rates cited by the author were rates of 
only seven pence in the pound it suggests that economic factors were 
important. The higher the rates of tax the more likely evasion. Perhaps 
a better statement of the position would be in terms of taxpayers' 
perceptions of the tax rates and their perceptions of the rate of 
increase in taxes. But the point remains that even before the twentieth 
century 'high' tax rates were seen as a positive inducement to evasion.
It was also considered that ineffective administration by the 
revenue authorities contributed to successful evasion. The view was
expressed that "no type of direct tax system could succeed with amateur
6interest and only an intrinsically amateur organisation". But cries 
from the Board of Inland Revenue, in the last decades of the nineteenth 
century, for more resources and increased powers were not heard with 
much sympathy. Government revenue was not heavily dependent upon income
7tax and the granting of increased powers to bodies such as the Board 
of Inland Revenue was contrary to government thinking at the time.
Witnesses before the Ritchie Committee (1906) agreed that the 
penalties imposed upon tax evaders were ineffective as a deterrent.
Though it was not suggested that inadequate penalties stimulated evasion, 
rather that such penalties did not act as a deterrent. Other evidence
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before the Committee indicated that avoidance of excess profits duties 
had but one causal factor, namely, the high rate at which that tax was 
imposed.
2.3 FINDINGS OF THE RADCLIFFE AND CARTER COMMISSIONS AND THE ASPREY COMMITTEE
2.3.1 the Radcliffe Commission
High rates of tax and inadequate means of detection were influences 
on the level of avoidance and evasion stressed by the Radcliffe 
Commission:
Avoidance of tax is a problem that faces every tax system 
and is likely to continue to do so when rates of tax are 
high and the burden of tax is seen to have a major influence 
upon the affairs of business and upon every aspect of social 
and personal life. ®
and
An adequate supply of well trained staff is probably the 
most effective single instrument of the Revenue in reducing 
evasion of tax. ^
The first extract suggests that high tax rates motivate taxpayers to 
avoid whereas the second suggests that ineffective administration provides 
a conducive environment for those who have decided to evade to do so.
While inadequate staff may contribute to evasion too much emphasis should 
not be placed on this. The fact that it was emphasised may simply reflect 
that the bulk of information on evasion came to the Commission from the 
Board of Inland Revenue who may have had other motives for the content 
of their submissions. Valuable insights into the possible causes of tax 
avoidance and tax evasion come from another part of the Radcliffe 
Commission's Report: the Memorandum of Dissent. The minority recognised
a number of possible causes of tax avoidance and evasion:
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The incentive to make such adjustments ... is in direct 
proportion to the effective marginal rates of tax and 
is inevitably powerful at the present level of taxation.
.o. we feel impelled ... to record unequivocally our view 
that the existence of widespread tax avoidance is evidence 
that the system, not the taxpayer, stands in need of 
radical reform.
Our present schedule of rates ... tends to take account of 
the fact that the tax base lags increasingly behind true 
taxable capacity as we move up the income scale - just as 
in some other countries, where tax evasion is prevalent, 
evasion leads to higher nominal rates which in turn leads 
to further evasion and still higher rates.
Further reading of the minority report reveals that the tax system 
itself was seen as providing the opportunity as opposed to the motivating
13factor for avoidance. In particular, the exemption from tax of 
capital gains was seen as the most serious defect of the system. The 
above supports the majority view that the dominant motivating factor 
for avoidance and evasion was the high level of taxes.
2.3.2 The Carter Commission
The Carter Commission outlined five specific reasons for which the 
practice of tax avoidance deserved condemnation yet only scant attention 
was paid to possible reasons why taxpayers wished to avoid tax. The 
heavy burden of taxes appeared to be the only reason offered as a 
motivating factor:
The propensity of taxpayers to avoid tax probably tends to 
follow tax rates, and with the rates of tax as high as they 
are to-day [1966], the temptation is strong. Tax avoidance 
probably came into its own during World War II and in the 
post war period when the rates were sufficiently high to 
make the tax savings outweigh the expense and inconvenience 
of tax avoidance measures ...
Problems with the tax system were seen as providing an opportunity 
for particular avoidance schemes and in this respect the Carter Commission
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concurs with the minority view expressed in the Radcliffe Commission's 
Report:
It is our view that the adoption of the comprehensive 
tax base we recommend would greatly improve taxpayer 
equity by bringing virtually all increases in economic 
power into tax. Such a tax base would also have the 
very desirable ancillary benefit of substantially 
eliminating the uncertainty, and the various opportunities 
for tax minimisation and avoidance.
Taxation of capital gains was also the most fundamental change 
considered necessary to widen the Canadian tax base and improve equity. 
This was also the view of the minority of the Radcliffe Commission on 
the United Kingdom's tax system.
2.3.3 The Asprey Committee
As with the reports of the two Royal Commissions the Asprey 
Committee's Report provides only brief insights into the possible causes
of tax evasion and avoidance. Once again though, the chief motivating
factor was seen to be the high level of taxes:
What it is possible to be rather more certain about is the
encouragement high marginal rates of income tax give to 
avoidance and evasion.
and
... while evasion will always be a problem for tax 
administration, the problems can be expected to be more 
severe the lower the willingness of the public to accept 
that the tax system is a fair and equitable one.
Although the latter quote suggests a second causal factor, namely 
perceptions of fairness of the tax system, further reading of the same 
paragraph indicates that, in the Committee's view, taxpayers judge 
whether a system is fair and equitable mainly in terms of the burden 
of tax: "Except in special situations such as wartime, a high burden
of income tax is unlikely to be favourably received by the population
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18at large." Emphasis by the Asprey Committee on the "high burden" of 
taxes more likely suggests that both high marginal rates, which receive 
special mention, and high average rates of tax are both influential.
2.4 A REVIEW OF RECENT RESEARCH INTO POSSIBLE CAUSES OF TAX EVASION AND TAX AVOIDANCE
2.4.1 Schmolders (1970)
19Schmolders' study was based on large samples (n> 1000) in Great 
Britain, France, Spain and Italy and was conducted to find out more 
about taxpayer mentality, taxpayer tension feelings and taxpayer morale. 
Results of the survey were combined with results from earlier studies 
in Germany and with a critical evaluation of enforcement techniques in 
all five countries. It was found that where the control system was very 
weak it resulted in a deterioration of taxpayer attitudes, sometimes 
to a "grotesque degree". When this happened the tax system did not 
achieve its goals because taxpayer non-compliance was very high. On the 
other hand it was also found that if the control system was too tight 
it achieved its goals only at the expense of heavy confrontation with 
taxpayers. This confrontation could, over time, lead to general 
taxpayer resistance. These findings can be combined to suggest a 
relationship between enforcement activities and taxpayers' willingness 
to co-operate similar to that in Figure 2.1.
Implied from this representation is the need to balance tax 
enforcement techniques and co-operation with taxpayers. Schmolders' 
work on the intensity of confrontation indicated that greater fear of 
being caught might increase taxpayers' willingness to comply on the one 
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precise effect of increased confrontation with taxpayers (for example, 
tighter controls through more investigations) might cause some taxpayers 
to comply rather than evade and it might cause others to evade rather 
than comply. For instance, it was found that both the West German and 
British tax systems were effective but for different reasons. Intensive 
controls in the German system resulted in lack of co-operation especially 
by the self-employed. In the British system a more cautious assessment 
procedure operated with the result of greater co-operation by taxpayers. 
However, there are limits to the amount of slack that should be allowed 
to develop in a tax system. Tax systems in countries such as Italy,
Spain and France, which had very weak control systems, also had very 
little compliance. Maximum willingness of taxpayers to co-operate is 
achieved at something less than "a very tight" control system.
Schmolders points out that "tax enforcement is a behavioural 
problem and any success depends upon co-operation; this means not so 
much individuals but group co-operation. Tax administration can make up
for individual tax resistance but not for the hostility of the group or
20of everybody concerned." He also suggests that opportunity for evasion 
is higher where a large proportion of the population is engaged in 
agriculture or in small trading. Where a large proportion of the
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population are wage and salary earners, particularly where they are 
employed by large firms or government agencies, evasion is likely to 
be less.
2.4.2 Allingham and Sandmo (1972)
21Allingham and Sandmo's findings are based on a theoretical 
analysis the objective of which was that of analysing the individual 
taxpayer's decision on whether to evade taxes by deliberate under­
reporting. They consider both the simple static case and the dynamic 
case where individuals are required to make a sequence of tax declaration
decisions. Their models are based on the Von Neuman-Morgenstern axiom
22for behaviour under uncertainty where taxpayers structure their 
decisions according to the following equation:
E(U) = (1 - p) U ( W - Q X ) +  pU [W-QX-Tr(W-X)]
where U = cardinal utility
p = probability of investigation 
W = actual income (known only to the taxpayer)
Q = tax rate
X = declared income
7T = penalty rate (tt is assumed > 0)
According to Allingham and Sandmo actual income (W) is exogenously 
determined and known, for the time being, only by the taxpayer. The 
taxpayer will choose to report a level of income (X) that will maximise 
the expected value of his utility. The taxpayers decision variable then 
is X and the value of X is influenced by the probability of detection 
(p), the tax rate (Q) and the penalty rate (tt).
One thing the static model suggested was that taxpayers would 
under report their income where "the expected tax payment" on undeclared
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income was less than the regular rate, i.e. where tt<Q. Analysis of 
the dynamic model did not alter the range of factors influencing 
taxpayers' decisions. The only difference was that taxpayers' decisions 
to maximise were based on lifetime utility [z^ E(Ut)]. That is, the 
dynamic model takes into consideration the fact that if a taxpayer was 
discovered cheating in "tn" and was investigated it might also mean that 
he would also be discovered for cheating in "tn - 1, t n - 2 ,  etc".
Allingham and Sandmo's model has been developed in different ways by
23various writers including Mork (1975) who found that "there was a 
steady decline in income reported to tax authorities as a proportion of
2kincome stated in the interview" i.e. the greater the proportion of 
income withheld the higher true income is. Although it is suggested 
that evasion is positively related to true income it does not suggest 
any new motivating factors.
Norsworthy (1966) had also developed a theoretical analysis of 
taxpayer behaviour which alleged that evasion of the personal income tax
25was based on utility maximisation. The theory, based on a number of 
simplifying assumptions, was also one of individual taxpayer behaviour. 
Yet empirical verification of the hypotheses was made using data, 
aggregated for classes of taxpayers, stratified by either level or source 
of income. Both mathematical and graphical models were presented showing 
optimal strategies for individuals. Graphically tlie individuals'
marginal adjustment of the rate of concealment of income was that shown
26in Figure 2.2, where
M = marginal utility of the income level (Y)
MEL = marginal expected loss
tm(Y) = marginal utility of the tax liability of theconcealed dollar of income.
m
MEL
Figure 2.2: Individuals Marginal Adjustment of the Rate of
Concealment of Income.
Source ; J.R. Norsworthy, "A Theory of Taxpayer Behaviour: Evasion
of the Personal Income Tax", Univ. of Virginia Ph.D., 1956, 
at p.16.
[N.B. The above assumes a constant rate of tax.]
42
Figure 2.2 depicts Og as the equilibrium rate of concealment, where the 
marginal gain is equal to the marginal expected loss. Below Og there 
is a marginal net gain from further evasions and beyond Og there is 
a marginal net loss from further evasions. Although this analysis 
assumes a constant tax rate Norsworthy relaxes this assumption to allow 
consideration of progressive and discontinuous rates. In these instances 
multiple evasion equilibria are possible and the rational, utility 
maximising individual will select the equilibrium of the highest level 
of income concealment. The theory presented by Norsworthy suggested 
"taxpayer sensitivity to the marginal tax rate on income, probability
27of audit, and penalty for tax evasion."
2.4.3 Vogel (1974)
One of the most intensive and extensive empirical surveys was
28that conducted by Vogel. Over 200 questions were asked of 1796 Swedish 
taxpayers by way of hour long personal interviews. Among other things 
it was hoped to ascertain the determinants of taxpayer attitudes and 
tax evasion. The study postulated three determinants:
(i) the, exchange, tncUcatô  - which was calculated from 
individual tax burdens compared with governmental 
services received;
(ii) the 6octaZ ô entatton tndtcatoK - which was determined 
by classification of respondents by social class and by 
knowledge of the tax system; and
(iii) the ttZegal oppontunvty tndtcatoK - which was based on 
respondents own estimates of their chances of successful 
evasion.
On the basis of the data collected a typology was developed to establish 
a deeper understanding of the motivational bases of behaviour. Three
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deviant types of behaviour were distinguished:
- devtavvt tntzAnaZyUation, This type saw the tax system 
as unfair and internalised this perception into deviant 
behaviour.
- déviant identi{̂ ijeation. This type saw the tax system 
as fair but questioned the legitimacy of the laws and 
regulations.
- deviant compliance. This type accepted the legitimacy 
of the laws and regulations but decided to evade taxes 
because of group pressure.
However, of these three types only deviant intenmJUjbcJtion was found 
to be significant. Closer analysis of the data by income level indicated 
that deviant internalisation was twice as common for taxpayers earning 
40,000 Kronor a year as it was for those earning 20,000 Kronor a year.
One possible reason for this was suggested from the relationship of 
income with the exchange indicator. It was found that those with
higher incomes generally perceived their exchange rate was less favourable
than those with lower incomes.
Another statistically significant finding from this study was that 
"group support forms a deviant sub-culture within the larger dominant
29culture." Group support included the transmission of deviant norms, 
techniques of evasion and techniques of neutralising deviant behaviour 
to keep up a positive self conception. As well as suggesting possible 
motivating factors Vogel also sought to determine factors which provided
the opportunity to taxpayers who wished to evade:
... in my opinion, tax evasion goes back to the built-in 
opportunities available in the Swedish tax system and its 
collecting practices. Legal complexity itself and the 
amount of data to be checked facilitate tax evasion.
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Vogel found that illegal opportunity was greater for self-employed 
than for employed and also that it was greater where income was not 
taxed at its source. Both opportunity to evade and motivation to evade 
must co-exist; for all the motivation in the world will not matter 
unless the opportunity also exists.
2.4.4 Spicer and Lundstedt (1976)
31Spicer and Lundstedt's study was conducted in the United States 
in 1974 and sought to determine factors influencing taxpayer attitudes 
and taxpayer behaviour. They used a survey questionnaire but believed 
that the survey design they used and a pretest assured them of a "fairly
32high degree of face validity". Questions used in the survey had been
pretested and selected from a larger inventory of questions by factor-
analysis. Responses to the main questions relating to hypotheses were
scored on a Likert type scale and questions were also asked to determine
the background characteristics of respondents. Of concern to the
researchers was the problem of eliciting honest responses. They felt,
however, that responses which were guaranteed complete confidentiality
and which related directly to individuals own propensity to evade could
produce reliable results. They could, provided respondents were given
"a scale which differentiates between moderate and extreme rejection of 
-, 33[evasion]". They concluded that "while any individual response on 
items or questions may not quite honestly reflect his own orientation 
towards the commission of tax evasion, it is reasonable to assume that 
variations in responses across respondents should correspond fairly 
closely to variations in the true propensity of individuals to evade
34taxes."
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Spicer and Lundstedt viewed the taxpayer/government relationship 
as containing three elements: an element of coercion, an exchange 
relationship, and an internalisation of norms. The first element was 
tested by two hypotheses: that evasion is likely to be less when
sanctions are perceived to be severe and that evasion is also likely 
to be less when the probability of detection is perceived to be high.
The second element was tested with the hypothesis that evasion is more 
likely when a taxpayer perceives his terms of trade, vis a vis other 
taxpayers, with the government is inequitable. The final element was 
tested with the hypothesis that the more tax evaders a taxpayer knows, 
the more likely he is to evade taxes.
Spicer and Lundstedt attempted to determine factors affecting tax 
resistance, or propensity to evade taxes, as well as tax evasion itself.
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Their hypotheses were also tested a‘gainst a number of background variables 
and the following results were found:
(i) Tax ê&l&tance was found to be positively related to 
perceptions of inequity, number of evaders known and 
the probability of detection. However there was no 
significant relationship with the perceived severity 
of sanctions. The most important background variable 
was age, with increasing age being positively related 
to lower resistance; and
(ii) Tax evasion was found to be positively related to
perceptions of equity and number of evaders known but 
there was no significant relationship between evasion 
and probability of detection. The most important 
background variable was experience taxpayers had had 
with tax audits, with a positive relationship between 
evasion and experience with tax audits.
Spicer and Lundstedt also used open ended questions to determine what 
aspects of the exchange process caused taxpayers to perceive their
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terms of trade as being unfair: "of those who thought the distribution
[of tax burdens] to be not too fair, unfair, or very unfair, 75 per cent
stated that a major reason was extensive tax avoidance by affluent tax-
36payers or corporations."
37In a further study Spicer and Becker (1981) sought, by using 
an experimental approach, to examine the relationship between fiscal 
inequity and tax evasion. Specifically they wanted to test whether the 
amount of taxes evaded would increase for victims of fiscal inequity 
but decrease for beneficiaries of fiscal equity. Fifty-seven University 
students were recruited for the experiment which, they were told, would 
take the form of a tax game. For each of ten periods they would receive 
a salary, in respect of which they had to decide how much to declare for 
tax purposes. Random audits were conducted and fines imposed for under­
reporting income. Participants were also given additional information 
about tax rates which was designed to stimulate perceptions of equity or 
inequity about the taxes they would pay. The information given was not 
the same in all cases but differed to see what influence it might have.
They found that participants on average evaded 23.13 per cent of 
total taxes payable. Evasion was higher among the group told they were 
paying higher taxes than the average. Spicer and Becker's results are
38reproduced below:
TABLE 2.1
Percentage of Tax Evaded, Analysed by Perceived Relative Tax Rates
% of Tax Evaded
"Low Tax" Group 12.26
"Medium Tax" Group 24.50
"High Tax" Group 32.63
All Groups 23.13
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Though the researchers said their findings should be treated with 
caution they felt their hypotheses received support from the experimental 
results.
2.4.5 Dornstein (1976)
39Dornstein's study, based on a sample of about 2500 self-employed 
taxpayers in Israel, was designed to investigate some factors relating 
to conformity of taxpayers in Israel to income tax regulations. The 
population chosen for Dornstein's study was self-employed taxpayers and 
therefore excluded employees. It was considered that there would be 
little scope for evasion of this latter group because tax was deducted 
at source. A random sample of 4600 was obtained from a population of
130,000 and this sample was then reduced by excluding all taxpayers who 
were not liable for tax. Information was mainly gathered from individuals' 
tax files but other sources were used.
Significant relationships were found with the two main hypotheses 
that were tested, viz. that taxpayer conformity was positively related 
to his basic orientation towards norms and that it was also positively 
related to the control system. Taxpayers' basic orientation was shaped 
by a number of factors among which were their past and present socio­
cultural experiences, their ideological predisposition towards the State, 
and their experience in dealing with bureaucratic and governmental 
institutions. Two factors were considered to influence the type of 
control system which operated; first, the penalties imposed for evasion 
and second, the amount and quality of control by the tax authorities. 
However, it was found that the relationship between control and compliance 
to tax regulations was complex: "on the one hand, where control is
efficient and deviations are easily detectable, control encourages
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conformity ... On the other hand, low efficiency of control may
40encourage ‘covert' nonconformity and 'overt' conformity."
Dornstein stresses that taxpayer conformity is a compound concept 
which has several elements including ethnic background, length of time 
taxpayers had resided in the country and age. For instance, she found 
a significant inverse relationship between age and conformity which she 
said "was explained by the greater daring in dealing with tax authorities,
41as a consequence of greater experience with bureaucratic institutions."
It is possible that Dornstein's findings have implications for 
Australia. According to a joint statement issued, on 14 September 1980, 
by the Commissioner of Taxation and the Secretary of the Department of 
Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, illegal immigrants were offered a 
régularisation of status program. _From a tax view point such persons 
were advised:
No tax penalty will be imposed in any case where a taxpayer 
voluntarily lodges back-year returns and the tax assessed 
is found to be fully covered by the PAYE tax instalment 
credits due. In some cases, a tax refund may even be 
available.
and
It is a long standing practice of the Tax Office to treat 
leniently people who make voluntary disclosures of failure 
to coirply with the tax law before departmental inquiries 
into their cases had begun.
Illegal immigrants might then be more likely to evade tax than persons
born in Australia because they (the immigrants) could fear that lodgement
of a return might expose them and lead to their deportation.
2.4.6 Frank and Dekeyser-Meulders (1977)
The methods used in this study to determine the level of tax
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evasion were macroeconomic and consisted of comparisons of declared 
income for tax purposes with income statistics from national accounts 
and other sources. It involved the calculation of tax discrepancy 
coefficients which is the difference between taxes paid and tax which 
would have been paid if there had been no evasion. These coefficients 
only have meaning for taxpayers of a particular income bracket and 
social-professional group. In the study such coefficients were obtained 
for nine income classes and eleven socio-professional groups. Unfortu­
nately to carry out the study a large number of data adjustments had to 
be made. It might also be noted that the technique used in this study 
could also be used to analyse other aspects of taxation, e.g. estimating 
the loss of revenue from tax evasion or from tax expenditures or 
concessions.
43Frank and Dekeyser-Meulders ‘ found that the "propensity to tax 
evasion varied according to income brackets and socio-professional
44groups". Their study however was based on Belgium data and the results 
may be of significance in that country alone. It was found that the 
main source of evasion by certain socio-professional groups was in 
respect of income derived from investment in stocks and shares especially 
where they were held abroad. Only taxpayers in high income groups held 
such investments and opportunity for evasion was, generally, limited to 
them. Perhaps what the study reveals is that the opportunity to evade 
is related to the type of income derived and that the motivation to evade 
is related to the taxpayer's marginal rate of tax.
2.4.7 Criminal Investigation Division - U.S. Treasury (1978)
The Criminal Investigation Division of the U.S. Treasury has over 
recent years been compiling statistics on tax fraud "to determine the
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extent of criminal tax fraud (tax evasion) and to determine the value
45of criminal investigatory activity." The Interim Report which is 
based on the results of a number of individual district projects came 
to the following conclusions:
(i) There is a close correlation between enforcement 
activities and compliance; where there is more 
enforcement there is more compliance.
(ii) In the Special Enforcement Program there was a rapid 
decline or erosion in compliance where there was 
sporadic or termination of enforcement activities.
(iii) While publicity of criminal investigation activity 
enhanced compliance, publicity without concomitant 
enforcement activity did not improve compliance.
(iv) District projects were effective in encouraging and 
achieving voluntary compliance as well as spreading 
work loads. Taxpayers in small districts often tended 
to be closely knit and this often meant that investi­
gation of one taxpayer resulted in voluntary compliance 
by others.
(v) The apparent potential increase in recidivism for some 
taxpayers might indicate some systemic weakness which 
required remedy.
(vi) Taxpayers once investigated tended to report additional 
tax in subsequent years. For taxpayers sentenced in 1972 
the average additional tax reported, in years subsequent 
to the criminal investigation activity, was five times46larger than for all U.S. individual taxpayers.
It was suggested that recommendations for policy were clear. Tax 
laws must be enforced, enforcement activities must receive wide publicity 
and enforcement follow-ups must be carried out. Where the same taxpayers 
are found to be evading taxes or the same frauds are being committed, it
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was suggested that the tax system itself might require reform. For 
example, in the Waterman Project (Baltimore District) it was found that 
improved book-keeping requirements and a different method of payment of 
income to the watermen (cheque rather than cash) increased compliance. 
Further, it was found that cost of the Federal grant required to provide 
training in record-keeping was more than offset by the increased tax 
collections. It was also found that occupational structures influenced 
taxpayers' propensity to bear the risk of detection. Hence, it was 
thought that attempts should be made to determine the propensities to 
evade of each group so that the marginal costs and marginal benefits of 
tax investigations of the groups could be determined. This would lead 
to improved cost effectiveness of tax fraud investigation work.
2.4.8 Song and Yarbrough (1978)
47Song and Yarbrough's findings were based on 287 questionnaires 
completed by persons who, in their respective households in a small 
city of North Carolina, normally prepared the income tax returns. These 
responses were obtained from a sample size of 640 randomly selected 
from a total population of 10,141 households. Taxpayers' attitudes 
towards their tax obligations as well as their behaviour (or compliance) 
with tax laws were explored. Though both aspects of their study are of 
interest it is the behavioural dimension which is most relevant here. 
They found that "the governing factor explaining people's tax compliance 
behaviour was the probability and subsequent fear of detection by law
48enforcement agencies."
Correlates to tax ethics (i.e. taxpayers' normative attitudes to 
their tax obligations) produced some significant associations. Among 
them income (r = 0.36) and education (r = 0.26) were the most strongly
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related to tax ethics (r=0.36). Song and Yarbrough also considered
other variables such as whether the respondent had been audited, whether
the audit experience was pleasant, and whether the respondent felt he
received sufficient benefits from the tax he paid. None of these
variables was found to be significantly related to tax ethics though
49it was felt that "tax auditing may affect compliance behaviour". 
Unfortunately there was no elaboration on this latter point and it is 
uncertain whether the authors meant that tax audit experience would lead 
to an improvement or deterioration in taxpayer compliance behaviour. Of 
more concern was the fact that the survey was based on responses of a small North 
Carolina city (population approximately 34,000) and may not be represen­
tative of the whole population.
2.4.9 Lewis' Survey (1979)
As with Song and Yarbrough's survey this survey is limited in 
value because of the nature of the population frame. Lewis' survey 
population consisted of two hundred male taxpayers in Bath (U.K.), the 
population of which is approximately 90,000. Responses to questions were 
obtained with the assistance of four trained interviewers.
The survey carried out by Lewis attempted to assess "tax mentality"
or attitudes of taxpayers to various taxation matters rather than
50motivation or propensity to evade. However, his findings have impli­
cations for other studies outlined herein. Among the findings were
51first, "that attitudes to taxation are in part dependent on earnings"; 
second, that "the 'exchange' model clearly does not explain all the data, 
attitudes to income tax are more complicated than this." In fact, it 
was felt that "the 'exchange' model of tax mentality was not a central
52part of respondents' cognitive field." Lewis also considered that the
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'social orientation' model was inappropriate and that left him to 
conclude that tax mentality is probably based on something akin to self 
interest.
Some aspects of the methodology used in this study deserve comment.
The attitude measure consisted of a five point Likert-type scale with 
"disagree strongly" at one end and "agree strongly" at the other. Though 
sixteen questions were asked only eight items were tested. Each item 
was tested with a question requiring a "favourable response" (or agree­
ment) and an "unfavourable response" (or disagreement). "Each statement 
was paired in such a way that a consistent response would require
53favouring one of the pair and not the other (a negative correlation)."
It was found that in all cases there was a significant negative corre­
lation but that overall respondents had a greater tendency to agree with 
statements rather than disagree. This serves as a warning for questionnaire 
design and for interpretation of results.
2.4.10 Dean, Keenan and Kenney's Survey (1979)
The survey by Dean, Keenan and Kenney found that "respondents cited 
factors such as personal economic considerations, the general level of 
taxation and its inequity as being in the forefront of reasons for
54people deciding to evade tax." Taxpayers' feelings of inequity or 
their perceptions of an unfavourable exchange index were seen to depend 
first, on the high level of taxes, and second, on the belief that the 
Government (United Kingdom) did not spend taxpayers' money wisely.
2.4.11 Investigations in Australia into the Causes of Tax Evasion and Tax Avoidance
Most of the surveys reviewed in this part have been carried out
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in the last ten years and none of these has been carried out in 
Australia. There is therefore little evidence, other than the conjectures 
of the Asprey Committee, on why taxpayers in Australia want to evade tax. 
Some research has been done in Australia on taxpayers' attitudes to the 
level of taxation, fairness of the tax system and to understatement of 
income. For instance, Kemp (1980) argued that the so-called "tax revolt
really reflects declining trust and declining confidence in the government
55rather than specific problems with tax rates." He based this argument 
on his own observations and on a poll conducted by the Roy Morgan Research 
Centre. Kemp noticed that high tax rates do not always lead to evasion. 
There have been instances where high tax rates have been tolerated, for 
example, during wartime. The poll referred to asked four questions by 
way of nationwide interview of 1100 men and women during the weekend 
15-16 December 1979. Among the findings were:
(i) That one in five approved, to some degree, of tax 
evasion by understating income.
(ii) While a similar proportion was found in a 1972 interview 
(see Australian Sales Research Bureau, March 1972) the 
proportion then which strongly disapproved was 70% 
compared with 45% in the 1979 survey.
(iii) It was felt therefore, that there was no strong relation­
ship between believing that income levels were too high, 
or that the tax system was unfair. Rather it was 
considered that tolerance of evasion was related to
56negative attitudes to taxation itself. It followed 
that a reduction in tax rates might not reduce the 
propensity of taxpayers to evade.
Apart from the Morgan Research Centre's poll little other empirical 
work has been done in Australia. There have, however, been several 
opinions expressed about things which might motivate taxpayers to avoid
57or evade tax. Recently one eminent Queens Counsel (Hulme, 1981)
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added his opinion:
The success we achieve in effectively curbing tax avoidance 
will be directly influenced by the speed with which we 
achieve the goal of a taxation system which contains both 
greater equity and greater incentive.
Hulme argues that fear, not greed, is the reason why self-employed 
taxpayers avoid tax. Fear that when age or illness brings their income 
earning life to an end they will not have enough funds put aside to 
provide for themselves and their families. He argues that if the tax 
system was fairer towards the self-employed they would be less likely 
to go in for tax avoidance. The two aspects of the tax system which he 
suggested ought to be remedied were (further) deductions for superannuation 
contributions and collection of tax by way of provisional tax. Hulme 
demonstrated that, in respect of superannuation provisions in the Act, 
self-employed taxpayers were disadvantaged and asked why this was so.
2.5 PROBABLE EFFECTS OF TAX EVASION AND AVOIDANCE
The first four parts of this chapter have attempted to find 
possible causes of tax evasion and avoidance. This has been done so 
that suggested reforms can be contemplated. However, before embarking 
upon reforms it is also necessary to consider the probable effects of 
tax evasion and avoidance. If the effects are negligible it would be 
unwise to embark upon reforms which might be costly to implement and 
have far reaching effects. On the other hand if many reforms must be 
undertaken then those reforms which are likely to be most beneficial 
should be undertaken first. In this part of this chapter it is proposed 
to outline some of the probable effects of tax evasion and avoidance.
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2.5.1 Direct Effects of Tax Evasion and Avoidance
By definition one effect of tax evasion and avoidance is loss of 
revenue for those seeking to impose the tax. Estimates of the extent 
of tax evasion and avoidance, in Australia, vary considerably. For 
instance, the Institute of Public Affairs was reported to have said that 
total income involved in the tax avoidance industry and the cash economy
59amounted to some $11,000 million a year. In respect of lost tax
revenue, one member of Parliament is reported as saying that "tax
evasion varied from a Federal Government acknowledgement of $1000 million
60to other sources' figures of up to $7000 million." It is probable that 
reference in the quote to Government estimates is based on data supplied 
by the Commissioner of Taxation in his annual reports. But when this 
is studied closely it reveals that the estimate of $1000 million refers 
only to tax avoidance and then only to those schemes under administrative 
challenge. Schemes which have resulted in avoidance of tax and which 
have not come to the attention of the Commissioner of Taxation have not 
been included in these estimates. The 60th Report of the Commissioner 
of Taxation expresses further alarm because the Taxation Office has not
61been able to record any significant improvement in compliance behaviour. 
In regard to estimates of tax evasion the Report states:
Enforcement programmes to detect income tax evasion and 
fraud continued to be carried out during the 1980-81 year 
in the form of investigations, field audits and internal 
check processes. The increase in tax assessed and 
additional (penalty) tax arising from these activities 
totalled $167.7m.
While available statistics do not permit the extent of tax 
evasion to be quantified, it can be said that results from 
enforcement activities provide no indication that evasion 
is decreasing. Sadly, the reverse would appear to be the 
case. Research is continuing into ways and means of 
systematically measuring the level of non-compliance in the 
community.
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Answers given recently, by the Treasurer, to questions asked in 
Parliament reveal further tax avoidance and evasion.
(1) A separate record of claims for deductions under tax 
avoidance arrangements against which the Government has 
taken action was not kept in respect of the income years 
1975-76 and 1976-77.
Identified claims by individual and company taxpayers 
for such deductions in respect of the 1977-78 income year 
amounted to about $2,100m. A further $660m was claimed 
in returns for the 1978-79 income year. Comparable 
figures are not yet available for the 1979-80 income year. 
Returns for that year are still being received and 
processed.
(2) On the assumption that the taxpayers concerned derived 
enough income in relevant years to fully absorb the 
deductions claimed it is estimated that the revenue loss, 
if the 1977-78 and 1978-79 claims were allowed, would be
in the vicinity of $l,300m. ^3
Answers to other questions also reveal another direct effect of tax 
evasion - viz. shifting the burden of tax from those who evade to those 
who do not:
I think it must be accepted that tax evasion resulting 
from unrecorded transactions that go to make up the 'cash' 
or 'underground' economy has a bearing on the rates of
income tax. The taxation laws are, of course, designed
to raise a substantial portion of the revenue necessary 
to meet essential Government expenditure. As a general 
proposition, therefore, indulgence by some sections of the 
community in tax evasion practices, whether through 
participation in the cash economy or not, would increase 
the taxation burden borne by the general body of taxpayers 
who coiiply with the revenue laws.
This latter effect is not confined to tax evasion practices. It also 
results from tax avoidance as the Asprey Committee, considering one 
tax avoidance practice, noted:
Generally speaking, as salaries and wages cannot be made 
the subject of income splitting, the opportunity by that 
means to order one's affairs so as to reduce the amount of 
tax otherwise payable is not equally available to all 
taxpayers. This is inequitable to the taxpayers who do not 
have that opportunity.
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The Asprey Committee was not the first to observe this effect.
The Radcliffe and Carter Commissions emphasised the inequities between 
taxpayers which tax avoidance caused. The Radcliffe Commission saw tax
avoidance as defeating the final purpose of the tax system; that
66purpose was the assessment of each person upon his true income.
Mathews has also stressed the inequity that results from tax 
avoidance and evasion:
In addition to eroding the revenue base and threatening the 
stability of the whole tax system, tax avoidance and evasion 
have radically changed the distribution of the tax burden 
between wage and salary earners and other income recipients 
on the one hand and between different income classes - rich 
and poor - on the other.  ̂̂
He showed that the tax paid by wage and salary earners as a percentage 
of total tax paid by individuals has increased significantly since the
mid-sixties. In 1965-66 wage and salary earners paid 67% of the tax
68paid by individuals but in 1978-79 it had risen to over 81%. While 
this could have been due to rising incomes of wage and salary earners, 
relative to other taxpayers, it could also have been due to tax evasion 
and/or tax avoidance by the "other income recipients".
Vinberg outlined a number of probable interconnected effects of
69undue concentration of effort on tax considerations:
(i) It might impair economic activity - what might be good 
for the individual, viewed in an after tax sense, might 
not be good for society.
(ii) It might result in expensive litigation.
(iii) A spate of tax cases might unduly clog the legal system.
(iv) It might result in additional legislation. This takes 
time and resources of the legislature and, over time, 
makes tax laws more complex and incomprehensible.
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(v) Because the benefits of particular tax avoidance schemes 
might only be transitory, further legal manipulations 
might soon be required with the result that the taxpayer, 
his customers, clients and business associates become 
confused in their business dealings with one another.
(vi) It might misdirect the careers of some young professionals.
The experience Vinberg cited was that of young lawyers 
viewing tax office experience as postgraduate training 
for later service in the tax avoidance industry.
From a revenue authority's point of view other direct costs would 
include the cost of detecting avoidance and evasion and the cost of 
considering reform proposals to prevent them. From a taxpayer's point 
of view Sandford summarises the direct costs. These include the time
and enterprise of the taxpayer and the skilled manpower and costs to
70implement the scheme.
2.5.2 Indirect Effects of Tax Evasion and Avoidance
Sandford saw the effects (or costs) of tax avoidance as falling 
into three categories: "the resources taken up with tax avoidance work,
including those required to implement any particular scheme; second, 
economic costs to society as a result of the implementation of avoidance
71schemes; third, a group of psychic costs." The second two categories 
are examples of indirect effects of avoidance and evasion. When the tax 
avoidance scheme has been implemented, if all has gone well for the tax 
avoider, his after tax return should have increased. But the way in 
which he is now running his affairs may involve a more wasteful use of
72resources from the point of view of society. The biggest psychic cost 
from tax avoidance arises from the narrowing of the tax base. Tax 
avoidance narrows the tax base and increases inequities between taxpayers
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Perceptions o f  these results by non-avoiders lead to resentment and 
unhappiness. If tax avoidance also leads to high tax rates then the
psychic costs will further increase. The minority report of the
73Radcliffe Commission also emphasised these considerations.
Where evasion is widespread the possible economic and social costs 
in some countries can be quite severe. The reluctance of tax evaders 
to bring "black money" into circulation in Ceylon in 1965 threatened
74general economic stability. This resulted in a tax amnesty because:
there was a general feeling, before the amnesty, that 
trade and business were grinding to a halt and that one 
factor in this trend was that a lot of capital owned by 
tax evaders was idle as they dared not use it in business 
ventures for fear of providing evidence for the Tax 
Department of wealth for which they could not legitimately 
account.
Gopal found that similar effects were evident in India, but one must be 
wary of using examples from underdeveloped countries such as India and 
Ceylon.
Vogel prefaced the conclusions of his study with the warning that 
any statements regarding the causes and effects of tax avoidance and 
evasion must be somewhat speculative. However, he distinguished primary 
evasion from secondary evasion and said that whatever the causes of 
primary evasion the internalisation of group norms can lead to secondary
76evasion. Thus one of the effects of (primary) evasion by some taxpayers 
was (secondary) evasion by others. Evasion within groups might, therefore, 
be infectious. This conclusion, although speculative, received support 
from Dornstein's work on compliance by self-employed taxpayers in Israel. 
Dornstein, however, approached the matter from a slightly different 
point of view. She saw that evasion often traditionally encouraged the 
taxation authorities to increase their control which worsened taxpayer
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morale and this, in turn, increased the willingness of others to evade,
77More taxpayers became disoriented. As well, the Carter Commission, 
in condemning tax avoidance, suggest that it might lead to tax evasion:
Indeed it may be said that the widespread practice of tax 
avoidance will lead to an increase in evasion. Taxpayers 
v^o have little opportunity to practice tax avoidance and 
see others using legal means to reduce their taxes are sorely 
tempted to adopt illegal methods to achieve the same 
result ... 78
One sociologist has suggested other probable effects of evasion 
which are equally worrying. Davies suggested that people seeking to 
evade tax "are potentially liable to end up breaking more serious legal
79or moral rules than those regulating taxation." Davies supported this 
contention with a quote from Teresa's book My Life m t h  the Mafia-,
Doctors are big with the mob. They have so much buried 
money, money they don't report to the tax boys. They want 
that money to work for them but if they invest it legiti­
mately the tax man will find out. So they invest it with 
the mob people. In Boston there were dozens of doctors 
who provide money to the mob guys for loan sharking —
That is, secondary crimes not merely secondary evasion can arise out of 
primary evasion. These secondary crimes, cited by Davies, are however, 
carried out by the same taxpayer and not by others. As evasion becomes 
more widespread governments might seek greater legislative powers to 
combat it. If such powers were granted then, in the long run, Davies
suggested that individuals' civil rights will suffer from "further
81encroachments of the State".
Shenfield makes the further point that experience has shown that
82anti-avoidance legislation has infringed the rule of law. He argues 
that examples can be cited from experience in several countries where 
such legislation has either increased discretionary powers of particular 
officers or has operated retrospectively. Both of these infringed the
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rule of law. Shenfield also argued that the idea of tax avoidance 
causing a shift of the tax burden pro tanto onto the shoulders of the 
non-avoider was too simplistic. He suggests that "tax rates are 
determined by other factors in addition to the presumed need for revenue 
and these factors are in general of more influence upon the outcome than
83avoidance." This view is supported by Wildavsky who, from behavioural 
analysis of the budgetary process, found that the largest determining 
factor of the size and content of this year's budget was last year's
84budget. Bracewell-Milnes also refused to accept the proposition that 
tax avoidance reduced overall revenue and continued:
Once it is recognised that the artificial avoider and 
evader ... are in general no less likely to increase tax 
revenue than to reduce it, the other dimensions of the 
question begin to fall into perspective. If the avoider 
and evader are not in general imposing burdens on the 
fisc or their fellows, the moral and political arguments 
against them lose much of tjieir point.
In fact, if high rates of tax are a disincentive to work then "tax
avoidance may benefit the fisc by maintaining the incentive to activity
86that would otherwise be frustrated by taxation." That is, the alter­
native to untaxed economic activity might be leisure which could leave 
revenue authorities worse off. A summary of the probable effects of 
tax avoidance and evasion is given in Table 2.2.
2.6 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Of the empirical research on possible causes of taxpayers' deviant 
behaviour the two most influential studies, in terms of their rigour, are 
those of Vogel (1974) and Spicer and Lundstedt (1976). The hypotheses 
they tested and the results they achieved were similar and their work 
suggests three general hypotheses which can be tested against Australian
63
TABLE 2.2
Probable Effects (Costs) of Tax Evasion and Tax Avoidance
(a) Direct Effects
(b) Indirect Costs
- loss of revenue for the government
- gain of revenue to individual avoiders or evaders (assuming their behaviour goes undetected)
- redistribution of tax burdens with increasing burden on those who do not avoid or evade
- time and skill of taxpayer and his advisers in undertaking these activities
- costs incurred by taxpayers in imple­menting the necessary arrangements
- time and costs to revenue authoritiesin attempting to combat these activities
- possible mi sal location of resources from society's point of view
- secondary avoidance and evasion by others
- other crimes being carried out by evaders and avoiders
- unnecessary complication of business affairs
- possibility of legal system becoming clogged up in tax cases
- misdirection of careers of young accountants and lawyers
- worsening of taxpayer morale
- possible narrowing of the tax base
- increased complexity of the tax laws
- possible erosion of civil rights and professional privilege
data. These hypotheses, their symptoms and research consistent with 
them are summarised in Table 2.3.
TABLE 2.3





(i) Perceptions that tax rates are too high.
(ii) Perceptions that the tax system is unfair.





(b) SocialOrientation (i) Basic predisposition to the State and the law in general.
(ii) Influence of groups onindividual behaviour, particu­larly the number of evaders known by the taxpayer.
4,7,12
3,4,6
(c) Administrative Control (i) Tax administration toocoercive e.g. tax enforce­ment too oppressive or too obvious.
(ii) Tax administration perceived to be ineffective.
3.6.9
1.3.10
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Some of the symptoms in Table 2.3 require explanation as they are 
not the only ones which could have been chosen. They were the author's 
own choice and were based on several considerations including:
(i) a desire not to replicate exactly the work of others;
(ii) the knowledge that not all elements of the hypotheses could be 
tested, and
(iii) the results of a pilot survey which, with mixed success, had
considered other symptoms. The pilot survey had a low response
rate, 38%, and it was felt that the length of the pilot
questionnaire - 10 foolscap pages - was partly responsible.
The author hoped to improve the response rate in the main survey 
by limiting the number of questions asked. This led to a
compromise between number of usable responses and amount of
information obtained from each respondent.
When Spicer and Lundstedt and Dean et al considered the exchange
relationship, they did so in terms of taxpayers' perceptions of their 
own tax burdens relative to others and whether these were fair or
unfair. In the author's pilot survey several questions were asked to
explore the exchange hypothesis. These included question 2 which is 
reproduced below:
Much A Little About A Little Much too too Right too too High High Low Low2. What do you think about the amount of income tax you pay compared with the amount: (circle one number for each question)
(a) you earn ? 1 2  3 4 5
(b) others, who earn aboutthe same as you, pay ? 1 2  3 4 5
(c) others, who earn a lot
more than you, pay ? 1 2  3 4 5
(d) others, who earn a lot
less than you, pay ? 1 2  3 4 5
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For both groups surveyed, the answers to each part were similar.
That is, roughly the same proportion of evaders (or non-evaders 
respectively) answered "much too high", "a little too high" and so on 
to each of the four parts. A visual scan of returned questionnaires 
revealed why this might have been so. Respondents seemed to pick their 
answer to the first part (question 2(a)) and then circle the same number 
for each of the other three parts (questions 2(b)-(d)). This apparent 
problem in questionnaire design could have been overcome by asking four 
separate questions and spacing them throughout the questionnaire. But 
this would have added to overall questionnaire length when there was a 
desire to shorten it. It was decided, rightly or wrongly, to retain 
only the first part of the question (2(a)). Thus respondents were only 
asked to state whether they thought the amount of tax they paid COMPARED 
WITH the amount they earned was "much too high", "a little too high" and 
so on. This did more than ask them whether they felt taxes were too 
high. It asked them in considering their own tax burdens to compare 
them with the amount they earned. It was hoped that in doing so they might 
consider the other factors implied in questions 2(b)-(d). Just in case 
this question did not fully capture respondents' perceptions about the 
fairness or otherwise of the tax system the further question "how 
satisfied are you with income tax laws" was added. These laws cover 
both the rates of tax and the rules for determining taxpayers' taxable 
income. Taxpayers who felt that their tax burdens were too high would 
be expected to indicate dissatisfaction with the tax laws. The final 
questions and symptoms may have been deficient but they were based on 
considerable forethought.
It should also be emphasised that no one hypothesis was tested 
with a single question. At least two and usually more questions were
64c
used each seeking to specify another element of each hypothesis. To 
ask questions about all possible or all likely elements would have made 
the questionnaire far too long and analysis far too complicated.
One possible problem in exploring the exchange relationship is
that respondents might not be aware of the connection between tax rates
and government spending. Another point of the pilot survey (question 9) 
sought to determine whether respondents could see this connection. Both 
evaders and non-evaders were asked what they thought would happen, in 
the long run, to the level of Federal Government services if income taxes 
were reduced. A majority in each group thought that the level of 
services would remain about the same - but did this demonstrate that 
respondents failed to connect taxes and services ? Some may have felt
that the government might use remaining revenue more efficiently. Others
may have thought that as income taxes were reduced other taxes would be 
increased. Alternatively, lower income taxes may have meant less 
avoidance and evasion and overall revenue might have been maintained.
The latter could have been true of some responses from the evader group - 
more of whom thought that the level of government services would have 
increased rather than have decreased as income taxes were reduced. A 
more suitable question would have required a variety of assumptions none 
of which might have been understood. Alternatively several questions 
might have had to be asked. In the end it was decided to delete this 
question.
Also in the interests of abbreviating the questionnaire, the number 
of questions relating to the minor hypotheses was reduced. For example 
the question "how do you feel about the amount of influence Governments 
and Government departments have on your life ?" was omitted as a symptom 
of the social orientation hypothesis. In addition other aspects of the
64d
hypothesis were not explored including analysis of responses to question 7 
comparing attitudes to tax evasion and attitudes to other property crimes 
of similar magnitude.
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The determinants of taxpayer attitudes (i.e. the motivating 
influences) are seen as containing three elements:
(i) The, exchange element. This is represented by a taxpayer's 
satisfaction or lack thereof with his terms of trade with the 
government. This covers a variety of matters including a 
taxpayer's perceptions of his tax burden in relation to others, 
the amount of tax he pays relative to benefits received, his 
perceptions of how 'wisely' the government spends taxpayers' 
money and the taxpayer's general attitude to private versus 
public spending.
(ii) The 6ocamZ oHlentatlon element. This is represented by what 
an individual feels is good or bad and his norms which depend 
upon his social interaction. This element can also be affected 
by a variety of influences including a taxpayer's social class, 
his knowledge of the tax system, the number of deviant taxpayers 
known to him and his basic orientation to the State and its laws.
(iii) The admtnt&t/iattve cont/wl element. This can be divided into 
two parts. The first suggests that where tax enforcement 
activities are too oppressive it might achieve short run compliance 
but also might, in the long run, lead to non-compliance. The 
second part suggests that where the control system is perceived 
as being weak or ineffective it can facilitate tax evasion and 
avoidance.
The literature search undertaken in this chapter has also revealed 
specific systemic weaknesses which contribute to avoidance and evasion.
These can be viewed as aspects of a tax system which provide the opportunity 
for tax evasion and avoidance. Addington, as early as 1803, recognised 
that there was scope for evasion whenever tax was not deducted "at source". 
His proposals in 1803 to extend the principle of deduction at source
87substantially increased the yield of income tax in the United Kingdom. 
Inadequate book-keeping, notably by small traders, and insufficient trained 
staff employed by revenue authorities also, according to the Radcliffe
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Commission, contributed to evasion of income tax in the United Kingdom
88in the postwar (WW2) years.
Vogel (1974) considered that the Swedish tax system and its 
collection practices provided taxpayers with the opportunity to evade.
Frank and Dekeyser-Meulders (1977) exposed a similar problem in Belgium. 
They found that evasion was most widespread in one socio-professional 
group but this group also tended to derive a more than proportionate 
share of their income from securities held abroad. Where such income was 
not voluntarily declared by the taxpayer the tax system was inadequate 
to ensure tax was paid on it. As a result of cross-national comparisons, 
Schmolders (1970), found that where a large proportion of the population 
was engaged in agriculture or small trading evasion was more likely. Both 
of these situations were characterised by a low standard of book-keeping. 
More stringent book-keeping requirements similar to those self imposed 
by large firms or government agencies were likely to result in less 
evasion.
Witnesses before the Ritchie Committee (1851) exposed inadequate 
penalties as providing a favourable environment for evasion. Over one 
hundred years later, Dornstein (1976), supported the view that taxpayer 
compliance was related to various aspects of the control system including 
the amount and quality of enforcement activities of the tax authorities. 
Spicer and Lundstedt (1976) made a sharp distinction between the effec­
tiveness of penalties for evasion and the probability of detection. They 
found that only the latter was significantly related to taxpayer resistance
Vogel also found that evasion is higher amongst self-employed tax­
payers than it is with those taxpayers who are employees. Once again the 
opportunity to evade exists with the self-employed to a greater degree.
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Employees would normally require collusion with employers to evade as 
tax instalments for wages and salaries are deducted at source in most 
countries. It ought to be pointed out that the distinction between 
the two classes - "employed" and "self-employed" - is not altogether 
clear. In fact it is quite possible for some taxpayers to be members 
of both groups. There is no reason why a carpenter employed by a builder 
during the week could not become self-employed at the weekend. That 
person has greater opportunity to evade tax on payments for weekend work 
than he has in respect of payments for work he does during the week.
The tax system itself was seen, by the members of the Radcliffe 
Commission submitting the minority report, as providing a favourable 
environment for tax avoidance in the United Kingdom. Absence of a tax 
on capital gains was seen as the most notable defect. This same defect 
was seen by the Carter Commission as influencing tax avoidance in Canada. 
The Meade Committee (1978) suggested that the income tax system itself 
(if retained) might require further reform to reduce avoidance. They 
suggested that avoidance, under an income tax regime, could be reduced
89if tax were imposed under a single rate structure. It seems then that 
as well as enquiring into taxpayers' motives for avoiding or evading 
tax an enquiry ought to be made into the tax system itself to see whether 
it contributes by providing opportunities for evasion and avoidance. 
Possible headings under which this enquiry could be made are summarised 
in Table 2.4.
The Australian tax system is evaluated in terms of this structure 
in Chapters Three and Four. Thereafter, in Chapters Five and Six, results 
are given of two nationwide surveys conducted to determine what might 
have motivated Australian taxpayers to evade and/or avoid tax.
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TABLE 2.4
Aspects of a Tax System which could facilitate Tax Evasion and Tax Avoidance
(a) Tax Evasion
(b) Tax Avoidance
adequacy of tax collection procedures 
adequacy of book-keeping requirements 
adequacy of resources used to detect evasion 
adequacy of the penalty structure 
adequacy of various administrative procedures
opportunity to split income 
opportunity to convert income into capital 
exemptions from the tax base 
adequacy of anti-avoidance provisions.
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CHAPTER THREE
OPPORTUNITIES FOR TAX EVASION IN THE AUSTRALIAN 
TAX SYSTEM
3.1 INTRODUCTION
In Chapter Two it was shown that the extent of tax evasion and 
avoidance was influenced both by a taxpayer's willingness to undertake 
those activities and the opportunities for those activities within a 
particular tax system. Until information is obtained from taxpayers 
themselves in a particular country little can be suggested, by way of 
reform, to reduce the desire of taxpayers to evade or avoid. If forced 
to suggest reforms experience from similar countries might be relevant 
though this might not be entirely satisfactory. In the meantime the tax 
system of a country can be analysed to see whether it provides taxpayers 
with scope for evasion and avoidance. In this chapter an analysis is 
made of the Australian tax system to determine whether it provides 
opportunities or scope for tax evasion. A similar analysis is made in 
Chapter Four, for tax avoidance. Though there is little hard evidence 
that tax evasion and avoidance result in a loss of welfare for society 
it must be conceded that a tax system itself should not be so designed 
as to provide opportunity for either activity. If there is scope for 
evasion and avoidance then those opportunities are unlikely to be equally 
available to all taxpayers. Where evasion and avoidance result there is 
a shift in the incidence of tax. The tax system then results in inequality 
Robbins provides the classic statement on equality:
I do not believe and never have believed that in fact men 
are necessarily equal or should always be judged as such.
But I do believe that, in most cases, political calculations 
which do not treat them as if they were equal are morally 
revolting. ^
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The analysis in the remainder of this chapter is preceded by a brief 
outline of income tax in Australia to provide the necessary background.
3.2 THE AUSTRALIAN TAX SYSTEM
On Federation s.51(ii) of The Commonwealth of Australia Constitution 
Act 1900 gave the Commonwealth power to make laws with respect to 
taxation. Those laws, to be valid, could not however discriminate 
between States or parts of States. Though the Commonwealth had power to 
impose direct taxes from the date of federation it did not begin to do so 
until 1915, when, as a means of providing additional funds for the First 
World War it imposed income tax for the first time. Before 1915 it had 
relied on customs and excise for the greater part of its revenue. State 
governments had imposed and collected income tax for some time prior to 
1915 and continued to do so after the Commonwealth first imposed income 
tax in 1915. This meant, of course, that taxpayers in each State faced 
two sets of tax laws and were required to complete two income tax returns 
so that income tax could be paid to both State and Federal governments. 
Some uniformity was achieved in 1936 when the Income Tax Assessment Act 
(Cth) 1936 was adopted as a model by the States. Acceptance of this Act 
by the States meant that income tax was imposed according to the same set 
of rules. Complete uniformity was not achieved until 1942 when, as a 
wartime measure, the Commonwealth took over the income tax field 
exclusively. The Commonwealth's action was immediately challenged by 
South Australia but the High Court upheld the validity of the four Acts
which the Commonwealth had enacted to give it, in effect, exclusive rights
2to income tax. Since the War the States have not reintroduced a tax on 
income. To do so would have meant loss of financial assistance from the 
Commonwealth. In 1976 the Commonwealth and the States agreed on an
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alternative arrangement for sharing income tax. Stage 1 of the new 
scheme involved the enactment of The States (Personal Income Tax Sharing) 
Act 1976 which gave the States access to a fixed percentage of net 
personal income tax collected by the Commonwealth. Under stage 2 of the 
arrangement The Income Tax (Arrangements with the States) Act 1978 gave 
the Commissioner of Taxation power to collect any State tax (or pay any 
State income tax rebate) which a State might impose (or allow). However, 
to date, no State has used this facility and none had indicated that it 
is likely to do so.
The Commonwealth income tax is, at present, levied and collected as 
a result of an assessment Act and various rating Acts. The main Acts 
are the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936, the Income Tax (Rates) Act 1976 
and the Income Tax (CompanieSy Corporate Unit Trusts and Superannuation 
Funds) Act 1981. Further details of particular provisions of these Acts 
are given throughout this chapter and in Chapter Four. In this chapter 
an analysis will now be made of five areas, outlined in Table 2.4, to see 
whether, and if so to what extent, the Australian tax system provides 
taxpayers with scope for evading tax. The five areas are: tax collection
procedures, book-keeping requirements, resources used to detect evasions, 
the adequacy of the penalty structure and the operation of various 
administrative procedures.
3.3 ADEQUACY OF TAX COLLECTION PROCEDURES
Addington's first budget in the United Kingdom in 1803 was important 
for two reasons apart from the fact that it sought to continue with the 
income tax which had only been introduced four years earlier. First, it 
placed the structure of the tax into five schedules which still exist today
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and second, it introduced the practice of deduction of tax at source. 
This latter practice has almost been elevated to the status of being 
a basic principle of taxation:
It is a general principle of the Tax Acts in the United 
Kingdom that as far as possible tax is charged at the point 
where the income first emerges from the source; and this is 
so even if the person primarily in receipt of the income does 
not ultimately enjoy it but pays it over or accounts for it 
to another v^o is the person beneficially entitled to it. ^
Failure to deduct income at source means that alternative ways must 
be found for collecting the tax and such alternatives are likely to 
increase the scope for evasion. Evasion is still possible where tax is 
deducted at source but it is less likely because it requires collusion 
between at least two parties. In fact the introduction of collection 
of tax at source by Addington resulted in a sharp increase in the amount 
of tax collected without any increase in tax rates. Deduction of tax at 
source might increase compliance costs but experience in the United 
Kingdom demonstrates that it is at least administratively possible to 
deduct tax at source from a wide range of different types of income.
At present tax law in the United Kingdom requires deduction of tax at 
source from the following types of income:
(i) interest on most British Government securities;
(ii) foreign dividends where payment is entrusted to a paying agent in the United Kingdom;
(iii) income from office, employment, pension and certain social security benefits (e.g. widows pension, invalid care allowance, industrial death benefit paid under the Social Security Act);
(iv) certain annuities and royalties;
(v) mining rent and rent from land in the U.K. where payment is made to a non-resident;
(vi) certain copyright royalties paid to non-residents; and
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(vii) dividends* and other distributions by resident companies.
[* in the form of advance corporation tax nowadays]
Although tax is not required to be deducted, at source, from rental 
income payable to residents or income derived from a trade, business or 
profession the broad coverage does limit the opportunities for successful 
evasion. If evasion is more likely for taxpayers deriving rental or 
business income, then those taxpayers could be subject to more frequent 
investigations. Tax collection practice in Australia for the financial 
year ended 30 June 1982 is shown in Table 3.1.
Adherence by the Australian income tax system to the principle of 
deduction of tax at source is overstated in some ways by Table 3.1. For 
example, the use of the term "salary or wages" suggests that things 
commonly regarded as salary or wages are subject to deduction of tax at 
source. However, this is not the case even though the definition of the 
expression in s.221A(l) extends the coverage to include any "payments 
made under a contract which is wholly or substantially for the labour of 
the person to whom the payments are made" [para.(a)]. In practice, 
interpretations of this paragraph, and therefore the phrase "salary or 
wages", have been restricted to those situations where it can be shown 
that an employer/employee relationship exists. In essence, this requires 
one person to engage another to perform work under his control and 
direction (i.e. it requires the establishment of a master/servant 
relationship). In circumstances in which a person is required to provide 
his own tools, equipment or materials this relationship breaks down and 
tax instalments, therefore, are not required to be made. Further, where 
payment for services rendered is arranged to be made through an agent 
rather than directly to the person rendering the services, instalments 
are not required. This defect emanates from the words used in paragraph
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TABLE 3.1
Tax Collection Practice for Income Derived by Australian Resident Individuals
Year Ended 30 June, 1982
Type of Income 
Salary or Wages
Meal, sustenance, use of premises, cash allowances
Benefits other than above, e.g. use of car
Retiring allowances - lump sum annual leave & long service leave
- other lump sums
Income from trade, business or profession






























Periodical instalments throughout the year
With annual adjustment assessment.
Instalments at standard rate (32%) when payments are made.
With annual adjustment assessment.
Approximately 31 March, 1982.
* Provisional tax is based on the amount of income derived during thepreceding year of income. If the level of income and/or the tax rates change an adjustment will be required. The size of the adjustment will be determined when the taxpayer's return is assessed and the balance taken into account with payment of provisional taxfor the following year (viz. on or after 31 March, 1983) .
** Trustees are required to pay tax on income falling under s.98,
SS.99,  99a,  100a,  101A and 102.
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(a) of the definition of "salary or wages" in s.221A(l). The paragraph 
operates only where payments under a contract which is wholly or substan­
tially for the labour of a person, are made to the person who performs 
that labour.
Hence tax instalment deductions are not required in respect of 
payments made to groups of individuals working in partnership or to 
agents on behalf of the person performing the services. Individuals who 
form "one man companies", trusts or partnerships and who contract through 
those entities, rather than contract personally, can also avoid P.A.Y.E. 
instalments. On a literal interpretation of the paragraph instalments 
are only required "where payment is made directly to the person rendering 
those services". Thus where payment is made to an interposed entity or 
to an agent no instalments are required.
The Asprey Committee recognised some of the problems with the present 
requirements and recommended that instalments be required where payment 
was substantially for the labour of one person or a small group of 
persons - irrespective of whether an employer-employee relationship 
existed. The Committee further recommended that provisions be introduced 
to ensure that coverage was extended to "the building and construction 
industry; primary production including forest and fishing operations; the 
entertainment industry, including professional sport and freelance writing" 
and to "fringe benefits". They further argued that present instalment 
requirements in respect of meals, sustenance and use of premises required
5updating.
There is evidence to suggest that deductionsof instalments from 
wages and salaries are still not made in many instances in the building 
industry. Attempts to prevent evasion in this industry have not been
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6entirely effective. In 1978 the Government announced that it was 
looking at ways to curb tax evasion from cash transactions including 
those in the building industry. Some three years later, in reply to a
question in Parliament, the Treasurer said:
We have for some time been in discussion with the building 
industry and have been looking at ways in which things might 
be introduced in respect of that industry. We have done this 
in a way that would not cause any disruption, but at the same 
time we have worked towards a reduction in the amount of tax 
evasion. It is something that we are trying to do in co­
operation with the building industry and it also has, as I
understand it, the active interest and support of a number of 
the building trades unions which have an interest in preventing 
tax evasion practices. ?
Finally, in his Budget Speech of 17 August 1982, the Treasurer
8announced that the Government was going to do something to reduce 
evasion in this area. He stated that legislation is to be introduced 
- to take effect from 1 July 1983 - to catch those persons not declaring 
income consisting of payments for labour and services. The proposed 
measures are directed primarily at those in the building industry. The 
new system is to be made up of two parts: firstly, selected payments
for labour and services, not presently subject to P.A.Y.E. provisions 
will have tax deducted at source at rates to be determined by regulation; 
and secondly, householders who enter into certain building or construction 
projects will be required to report certain prescribed payments made in 
connection with projects whose cost exceeds $3,000.
Existing P.A.Y.E. provisions are also to be amended:
(a) so that they apply only to payments wholly or prinoipally for the payee's labour;
(b) to restrict a householder's liability to make P.A.Y.E. deductions to payments made to a person who is an employee in the ordinary sense of that word; and
(c) to make it clear that payments wholly or principally for the labour of the payee fall within the existing system -
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(i) where the payee performs or is to perform the labour even though he or she has the right under contract to engage other persons to do it; and
(ii) where the payee is an individual who renders services, or performs, as a musician, entertainer or other person of creative talent.
The Treasurer has also warned that "to ensure compliance with the system 
and to guard against its abuse, the legislation will provide appropriate
9and substantial penalties for breaches of it." The effectiveness of 
these provisions, if enacted, cannot yet be gauged. In fact until the 
relevant legislation is introduced the full effect of these proposals 
cannot be fully appreciated.
Until changes are made scope continues to exist for successful 
evasion in respect of income derived from the rendering of personal 
services. Scope for evasion also exists for taxpayers who derive other 
income. Non-wage and salary earners are required to pay the bulk of their 
tax by way of provisional tax. The system of payment of provisional tax 
has operated since 1944 and requires payment in a single sum nine months 
into the year of income. More than one million taxpayers pay provisional 
tax and this confers on them at least two distinct advantages over 
taxpayers who pay tax on a P.A.Y.E. basis. Firstly, provisional tax 
payments usually fall short of actual liabilities and as any shortfalls 
are not paid for another twelve months thus taxpayers have the use of 
their funds for longer periods. If P.A.Y.E. instalments are insufficient 
the shortfall is required to be made up soon after an assessment is 
received. Ironically, P.A.Y.E. instalments are usually in excess of 
actual liabilities and refunds are subsequently made. Secondly, although 
provisional tax is required to be paid in a single sum it is not paid 
until after the expiry of approximately nine months of the year of income. 
This confers a similar advantage on provisional taxpayers because P.A.Y.E.
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instalments are made each week or each fortnight as income is derived.
To improve equity the Asprey Committee recommended that there be two
instalments of provisional tax and that any shortfall be paid separately,
10soon after the end of the year of income. Although this would improve 
equity it would not necessarily reduce the opportunity for evasion.
In view of experience in the United Kingdom there seems little 
reason not to require deductions of tax at source from interest, dividends, 
royalties, annuities and mining rents. There also seems to be little 
reason why trust income should not also be subject to tax instalment 
deductions where appropriate. In the United States, the Tax Equity and 
Fiscal Responsibility Aat 1982 will expand withholding of tax responsi­
bilities. The Act will generally require the withholding of tax at the 
rate of 10% on the payment of dividends and interest made after 30 June
1983. The purpose of this is twofold: to increase taxpayer compliance
11and to generate additional revenue. Pensions, annuities and certain 
other deferred income payments will be subject to tax instalments from 
1 January, 1983. Although extension of the principle of deduction of tax 
at source may mean overpayment of tax by some taxpayers it would, apart 
from reducing the opportunity for evasion, also improve taxpayer compliance 
in another respect. As Murray once noted:
The prospect of a tax refund tends to elicit the taxpayer's 
co-operation and encourages prompt return filing. It is 
normally more difficult to collect tax bills in small amounts 
than to distribute refunds of like magnitude.
If instalments required under such an extended system were likely to 
greatly exceed taxpayers' final liability to tax taxpayers might be given 
the opportunity to request a variation in tax instalments. A similar 
provision (s.221D) presently exists under the Act for salary and wage 
earners.
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3.4 ADEQUACY OF RECORD KEEPING REQUIREMENTS
Evidence before the Radcliffe Commission suggested that evasion 
can begin with careless record keeping. In particular small-scale traders 
often evaded tax because their records were inadequate to properly reflect 
their true income. To reduce evasion the Commission favoured some minimum 
statutory requirement regarding the nature of records which should be 
kept. They recommended that traders be required to keep a record of all 
receipts and payments, the value of opening and closing stock and the 
amount of opening and closing balances of accounts receivable and payable. 
If it is true that inadequate records can lead to evasion then an 
evaluation of the record-keeping requirements of taxing statutes can 
indicate whether the tax system itself facilitates evasion.
The record-keeping requirements of the Income Tax Assessment Aat 
1936, as amended, are now analysed. In Re Prince; Ex post the Bankncpt^^ 
it was held that cards in a filing system, pay-in books, cheque butts and 
bank statements did not amount to "books of account" for purposes of the 
Bankruptcy Aat 1924-1960. However, the Income Tax Assessment Aat does 
not require the keeping of "books of account". Rather, it provides that:
s.262A(l) Subject to sub-section (2), every person carrying 
on a business shall keep sufficient records in the English 
language of his income and expenditure to enable his assessable 
income and allowable deductions to be readily ascertained and 
shall retain such records for a period of at least seven years 
after the completion of the transactions, acts or operations 
to which they relate. [emphasis added]
Those taxpayers who might be aware of S.262A are unlikely to be 
able to translate phrases such as "sufficient records" and "readily 
ascertained" into actual book-keeping requirements. Enquiries of the
14Taxation Office and of the Tax Agents' Liaison Centre did not enable 
the author to determine what books ought to be kept. The Tax Office
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seems to be satisfied provided a taxpayer's records are in English, 
legible, orderly and allow his taxable income to be readily determined. 
Thus, if all a taxpayer has is an orderly set of record cards, the Tax 
Office would be satisfied. The record keeping requirements of S.262A 
appear to be inadequate and fall well short of the Radcliffe Commission's 
recommendations. The inadequacies of the section are only too apparent: 
firstly, as noted above, the section is couched in terms of "records" 
which should be kept rather than "books of account" and this is a much 
less formal requirement; and secondly, the section only extends to tax­
payers carrying on business and not to all taxpayers.
It appears that some taxpayers are aware of the inadequacies of 
S.262A. Certain practices have developed which take advantage of that 
section and these practices have been serious enough to receive special 
mention by the Commissioner of Taxation in his 59th Report:
Companies or trusts with current year profits are denuded 
of assets in a way which completely disregards the rights 
of creditors or potential creditors. This action is the 
more egregious when members of the company resolve to place 
it in voluntary liquidation before an income tax assessment 
can be issued so that early destruction of records may be
achieved.
The Income Tax Regulations extend the requirements of the Assessment 
Act. For instance Reg. 9(1)(b) provides that "every return under the Act 
shall ... be accompanied by all such balance sheets, profit and loss 
accounts, statements and other documents, as are mentioned ... or as are 
requisite." However, further reading of the Regulations indicates that 
this requirement does not extend to all taxpayers but rather only to 
companies, superannuation funds, partnerships and trusts. More importantly 
the Regulations do not appear to impose any greater book-keeping require­
ment than does the Act. All that the above regulation requires is the
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results of particular accounting procedures be stated, it does not 
indicate how these results should be achieved, i.e. it does not prescribe 
any particular accounting methods, procedures or books.
The Asprey Committee made a number of recommendations with respect 
to the form and content of information which should be supplied with 
annual returns. Their recommendations included:
(i) that the present requirements to supply balance sheets 
and/or statements of assets and liabilities with income 
tax returns should be enlarged;
(ii) that these requirements be extended so that a balance 
sheet or statement of business assets and liabilities
is also supplied with each income tax return of a
taxpayer carrying on a business or profession; and
(iii) that a standard form of balance sheet or statement of
assets and 1 labilities, should be issued by the Commissioner 
for completion and forwarding with returns other than 
company returns,
The Committee also made recommendations in respect of the agent's certifi­
cation suggesting that the current practice be reviewed by the Commissioner 
in consultation with members of the accounting profession and organisations 
representing tax agents:
to develop a question or series of questions that would go 
further towards securing a statement from the tax agent 
recording the steps he has taken to ensure the accuracy of
the returns covered by his certificate. ^^
But these recommendations fall short of those of the Radcliffe 
Commission which outlined a minimum set of records which should be kept.
If a basic set of records was prescribed consideration could then be 
given to standardising the format of those records. Such a move would 
facilitate preparation of annual returns by taxpayers and should speed
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up processing of those returns by the Tax Office. It might also provide 
an alternative mechanism for taxpayers to discharge their obligations 
in respect of annual returns. At least some taxpayers are unlikely to 
be aware of exactly what is required in terms of balance sheets, profit 
and loss statements, statements of movements in reserves and provisions 
and the like. Further, those who are aware of what is required may not 
have the technical competence to meet those requirements. These taxpayers 
could be permitted to submit balanced sets of books in order to discharge
their obligation. These books would then be passed on to a person
competent to prepare the necessary returns.
3.5 ADEQUACY OF RESOURCES USED TO DETECT EVASION
3.5.1 Enforcement Activities of the Australian Tax Office
According to Allingham and Sandmo probability of detection and the
penalty for evasion are the two main policy tools which are available 
to revenue authorities to combat evasion. Behavioural scientists have 
viewed the effects of these two variables from a different standpoint.
They argue that, if probability of evasion and the penalty for evasion 
are inversely related with the extent of evasion, it is a result of 
taxpayers' perceptions of these two variables, i.e. taxpayers' perceptions 
of the probability of their evasion being detected and taxpayers' percep­
tions of the severity of penalties for evasion. In this part of this 
chapter an analysis is made of the tax system itself and not taxpayers' 
perceptions about it. The latter will receive attention in Chapter Five.
Much of the analysis in this part emanates from information contained 
in the annual reports of the Commissioner of Taxation. This might bias 
the findings but, unfortunately, alternative sources of information are
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not available. The 57th Annual Report of the Commissioner of Taxation 
suggested that enforcement policy was not as strong as it ought to have 
been over preceding financial years to 1977/78 because of the need to 
deploy staff to introduce new technology and to assist in new policy 
initiatives in assessment and collection. "The necessity to deploy staff 
for these basic purposes caused some curtailment of enforcement activities
and this must be regarded as having brought about at least deferment,
18if not loss, of some tax revenue. On the other hand, computerisation 
together with a new file nmiber system should, in the long run, assist 
in detecting, if not also preventing, some evasion:
Information is also retained on computer files for post­
assessment processing of a law enforcement nature. This 
enables selection for further examination of possible cases 
of incorrect returns and deliberate attempts to evade tax 
... systems have been developed to cross check the validity 
of information shown in returns lodged by married couples 
to check information obtained from dividend and interest 
listings supplied by companies and building societies 
against taxpayers' returns and to identify cases for 
inclusion in the field audit program.
One other important development is the establishment of a Compliance 
Division within the Tax Office administration framework. The purpose of 
this Division is "the planning and co-ordination of investigation, audit 
and inspection activities ... with the aim of securing the maximum 
practicable degree of compliance with the taxation laws ... it is
responsible at the national level for planning and co-ordinating admini-
20Strative activity in relation to legal tax avoidance schemes."
According to the 59th Report of the Commissioner of Taxation:
(i) a further 400 staff were recruited since September 
1979 and this led to a marked increase in short term 
compliance.21
(ii) a good deal of the increased staff was directed into
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the area described as "internal check" the main 
objectives of which were the detection of omissions 
of income, the detection of false rebate claims and 
the identification of taxpayers who should have, but 
who had not, lodged tax returns.22
The results of enforcement activities over recent years are shown in 
Table 3.2.
TABLE 3.2
Enforcement Activities, Commonwealth of Australia,Income Tax Years 1977-78 to 1981-82
1. Jnv2^tlgcutlovi!>
No. of investigationsIncrease in tax assessed plus penalties
2 . VZeZd AadUtA
No. of audits conductedNo. of audits revealing evasionIncrease in tax assessed plus penalties
3. JnteAnaZ Ckzck
No. of assessments adjustedIncrease in tax assessed plus penalties
4. Jn6pe.ctLon P.A.y.E.
No. of inspections 1̂No. of prosecutions instituted





7540 7037 6752 5395
$95.3m $88.Om $76.7m $92.Im
10,333® 11,507 10,198 8,775
7,279 8,982 8,235 6,131
$37.2m $48.9m $51.5m $50.5m
NA NA^ NA NA
NA $27.3m $39.5m $35.6m
!29,000"^ 173,814 158,060 151,942
- NA 5,246 6,869
(a) First year of operation.
(b) No figures are available. However $19.8m of the increased tax and penalties resulted from adjustment of 63,000 assessments for omissions of dividends and interest. The corresponding figures for 1980-81 were $29m and 83,599 assessments; and for 1981-82 were $27m and 65,154.
(c) "Inspections in 1978-79 revealed evidence of an increasing tendency by employers and employees engaged in some industries to enter into contractual and other arrangements to circumvent the operation of the existing tax instalment deduction provisions of the income tax law." 
[58th Report, p.12]
Source: Annual Reports of the Commissioner of Taxation,
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Increased "tax assessed and penalties" more than doubled over the 
three years to 1979-80. This was partly due to a change in enforcement 
policy {viz, the implementation of field audits) and partly due to 
increasing yield from investigations ($8,958 per investigation in 1977-78 
to $17,071 per investigation in 1981-82). As yet, only four years' 
figures are available for field audits^ consequently there cannot be any 
inference as to the increasing effectiveness of this activity. In the 
first year of operation (1978-79) 70% of audits revealed evasions whereas 
in the second year (1979-80) the corresponding figure was 78% indicating, 
perhaps, an improvement in the effectiveness of audits. In 1980-81 the 
rate fell marginally to 75% and in 1981-82 there was a further marginal 
fall to 70%. The emerging pattern is not altogether clear. Further, 
the average increase in tax assessed per audit rose from $3,600 in 
1978-79 to $5,754 in 1981-82. It can be expected that as audit staff 
become more familiar with audit techniques, these improvements should 
continue, though at some stage one would hope to see a decline in 
productivity which may be indicative of greater voluntary compliance.
According to Table 3.2 there does seem to be an alarming decrease 
in the number of "investigations" and "inspections" since 1978-79.
The reason is given in the 60th Report of the Commissioner of Taxation:
It is appropriate to comment that, as at the time of making
this report, resources employed in enforcement activities 
have had to be considerably reduced owing to the recent 
decrease in staff ceiling. The combined effect of this 
reduction and the need to deploy substantial resources to 
the investigation of tax avoidance activities has seriously 
affected capacity to detect and control tax evasion and, as 
I have stated in previous Reports, is a matter of 
considerable and increasing concern to me. 2 3
The number of staff employed by the Taxation Office is shown in Tables
3.3 and 3.4. Also shown is the number of staff per thousand tax returns
lodged. While the actual number of staff employed has risen by 9%,
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TABLE 3.3
Total Number of Staff Employed, at 30 June Each Year, by the Australian Taxation Office - 1974/75 to 1981/82
Year No, of No, of Returns No, of Staff
Staff Lodqed per '000 Returns
1974-5 11,740 7,733,000 1.521975-6 11,870 7,917,000 1.501976-7 11,841 8,128,000 1.461977-8 11,802 8,254,000 1.431978-9 11,910 8,405,000 1.421979-80 12,323 8,487,000 1.451980-1 12,311 8,745,000 1.411981-2 12,773 9,018,000 1.42
Source : Annual Reports of the Commissioner of Taxation,
TABLE 3.4
Number of Investigation Officers Employed, at 30 June Each Year, by the Australian Taxation Office - 1974/5to 1981/2
Year No, of Staff* No, of Staff
Employed per 'OOP Returns
1974-5 938 0.1211975-6 1,024 0.1291976-7 1,028 0.1261977-8 974 0.1181978-9 937 0.1111979-80 1,013 0.1191980-1 983 0.1131981-2 1,060 0.118
[* About two-thirds involved in Income Tax and onein Sales Tax.]
Source: Annual Reports of the Commissioner of Taxation,
between 1974-75 and 1981-82, the number of staff per thousand returns 
has fallen by 7%. This has been due to the 17% increase in the number 
of returns being lodged.
Work of the tax audit staff has undergone a change in emphasis 
which, we are told, has increased the recovery of tax. Little information
92
is available concerning this change of emphasis other than the brief 
comment that, now, audits are less exhaustive than before. The purpose 
of this change, we are told, is to increase the cost effectiveness of 
investigations, but no evidence is available to confirm that this purpose 
is being achieved. A more likely explanation of the reduced intensity 
of audit, apparent from Tables 3.3 and 3.4, is the critical shortage of 
staff.
3.5.2 The Use of Computers to Detect and Prevent Tax Evasion
According to one report about the United States Internal Revenue 
Service "the use of DIF formulae has significantly improved the audit 
selection system. It has helped reduce the percentage of individual 
taxpayers contacted whose audit resulted in no tax change from 43% in
241968 to 23% in 1975." Compliance characteristics of all returns filed 
are determined from a random sample (n= 50,000) using the ending digits 
of the social security numbers. This is done every three years and those 
returns are thoroughly audited. Though most returns selected for audit 
in the United States are chosen by use of the discriminant function formulae 
a number are also selected at random to ensure that all taxpayers have 
some chance of being exposed to official investigation. There is no 
evidence to suggest that the Australian Taxation Office is selecting 
taxpayers for investigation by use of computerised discriminant function 
formulae as is the case in the United States. In fact there is evidence 
to suggest that the Australian Tax Office is not yet ready to use this 
approach. Over the last few years the Tax Office has only just started 
to computerise its tax files and this, together with staff ceilings now
25imposed would make it difficult for it to embark upon new projects.
Also, according to the 61st Report of the Commissioner of Taxation, problems 
have been encountered in the past few years because computer based systems
93
have not been integrated. Rather than having one overall system, there
26appear to have been many separate systems.
3.5.3 Use of Regional Offices
Another trend which could assist in tax audit and tax investigation 
work is the use of regional offices. At present, though, only a handful 
of offices exist in regional areas whereas in the United Kingdom there 
are over 700 district offices. The use of regional or district offices 
should provide a more convenient base for tax audits and tax investigations 
But rather than increase the number of regional offices and upgrade their 
ability to detect evasion, the reverse appears to be the case in Australia:
The Taxation Office advised that the functions of regional 
offices had been reviewed and it had been decided to withdraw 
investigation officers to maximise use of resources. However, 
this would not affect service to public in areas of lodgement 
of returns, lodgement programme, etc. 27
3.5.4 Adequacy of Commissioner's Powers to Obtain Information
Though s.263 does not empower the Commissioner to seize a taxpayer's
books, papers or other documents he has, on accasions, used s.10 of the
28
Commonwealth Crimes Act to do SO. This section, in effect, provides
29that, in certain circumstances, a Justice of the Peace may authorise 
a constable of police to enter the place described in the warrant and 
seize any such things for which there are reasonable grounds for believing 
that they will afford evidence as to the commission of any offence against 
the laws of the Commonwealth. In respect of income tax laws, such offences
would include failure to submit a tax return or submission of a tax return
30which was false in any material particular. According to Burges and King 
s.10 of the Coimonwealth Crimes Act may have application "if, for example, 
the Commissioner was concerned that, if a document was discovered on a
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search under s.263, it may disappear before a s.264 notice was able to
31be issued." Given these additional powers it still seems that they 
fall short of those contained in the United Kingdom Act because it is 
doubtful whether the Commissioner can use force to gain access to premises
32or to inspect documents. Similar provisions appear in the Canadian Act. 
Section 231(4) of the Canadian Act gives authority to tax officers to 
obtain a search warrant, on the approval of a judge of a Superior Court, 
to search premises and seize records. However, where an investigator 
is satisfied that he can obtain the required evidence without resorting 
to a search he can, on special authorisation signed by a Deputy Minister, 
seize and remove available records and documents from a taxpayer's 
premises [s.231(1)(d)]. Section 231 also gives authority to require 
answers either orally or in writing, on oath or by statutory declaration. 
Failure to comply with the section.can bring fines from $200 to $10,000, 
or both a fine and imprisonment.
The Commissioner's powers, in Australia, under s.263 are much more 
limited than those of his counterparts in either the United Kingdom or 
Canada. Further powers to obtain information are given in s.264 which in 
essence, provides that the Commissioner may by notice in writing require 
a person to furnish him with such information as he may require, to attend 
and give evidence and to produce all books, documents and other papers in 
his custody. This provision lacks a good deal of force. Since the
33decision in Ganke's Case it seems that:
(i) The information must be described with sufficient 
detail so that the recipient can reasonably determine 
what information he is required to furnish;
(ii) The notice should specify the time and place at which 
the information is required to be furnished;
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(iii) A person cannot be required to furnish information
which is not available to him after consulting documents
in his possession.34
The scope of the Commissioner's powers under s.264 to require 
persons to attend and give evidence and to produce documents, papers
35and books was considered in Smorgon's Case. The case arose out of 
a challenge to the validity of notices which required a bank to produce 
documents contained in a safe deposit box held in a branch of the bank. 
Also challenged was the validity of notices served on members of the 
Smorgon family requiring them to attend and give evidence and to produce 
the same documents. In determining the validity of thé notices, the 
Court decided that:
(i) The Commissioner can validly issue a s.264 notice 
requiring a bank to produce documents contained in 
a safe deposit box kept on its premises since the bank 
has the necessary custody or control of those documents 
required by the section;
(ii) The only documents that the Commissioner can require to 
be produced are those that relate to the income tax of 
some person and that person must be named or otherwise 
indicated in the s.264 notice;
(iii) The power in s.264 can be exercised whether or not an 
issue or dispute has arisen between the taxpayer and 
the Commissioner. Therefore the section enables the 
Commissioner to fish for information to determine the 
amount of taxable income of any person.
While the Commissioner was successful in Smorgon's Case in 
exercising his powers to gain access to information it seems doubtful 
whether the Commissioner can use force to gain access to premises or to
36 .inspect documents. Elsewhere in Smorgon's Case, Stephen J. agreed
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with the taxpayer that a notice which required a person to produce all 
other books, papers, writings, and documents, concerning specified 
matters, which were in his custody was unreasonable and oppressive.
Thus, where a notice lacks that degree of particularity which would 
enable a person to know whether he had properly complied with it, then 
it is likely to be regarded as invalid.
Section 264(1)(b) is also defective in other ways. First, it only 
empowers the Commissioner to require natural persons to attend and give 
evidence. Thus notices served on companies would be ineffective. The 
Commissioner, in these circumstances, must direct questions to officers 
of the companies. Second, it does not specify the time in which tax­
payers are to provide the required information. Consequently the Courts
have decided that the time must be reasonable. What is reasonable depends
upon the nature and amount of information required.
Only a few new powers have been given to the Commissioner of Taxa­
tion which will assist him in his task of combating evasion, unlike the 
United Kingdom, where the Revenue's powers were increased substantially 
in 1976. Sections 20A-D of the equivalent Act were added, effective from 
31 July 1976, to give the Revenue power to:
(i) enter and search premises where there is reasonable
ground for suspecting an offence involving tax 
fraud (s.20C);
(ii) call for books, accounts and other documents either
from the taxpayer or from certain other persons (s.20A); 
and
(iii) require any tax accountant, who is convicted of certain 
tax offences after 30 July 1976, to produce documents 
which relate to any of his clients' affairs.
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These powers have been used sparingly and only for the more 
serious offences. For instance, in the first three years to the end of 
1979, S.20C had only been used to apply for warrants on twelve occasions. 
This resulted in the search of 65 different premises. Subsequently, 
five of the twelve cases had come before the Courts and prison sentences 
have been imposed on fourteen individuals. No similar powers exist in 
Australia. Those powers which do exist appear to be inadequate and 
appear to be overdue for reform. Any reform proposals should, at least, 
consider the 1976 changes to the Tax Management Act 1970 (U.K.).
However, over recent years in Australia few new powers have been 
given to the Commissioner of Taxation to help him prevent evasion. One 
new piece of legislation which has been enacted is The Crimes (Tax
Offences) Aat 1980 which received Royal Assent on 4 December 1980 and
it exposes to penalty:
(i) a person who enters into arrangements or transactions
which secure a company's or a trust's inability to pay
income tax;
(ii) a person who enters into such arrangements or is in any 
way concerned in, or party to, the entry by another person 
in the knowledge or belief that the arrangement will 
secure a company's or a trust's inability to pay income 
tax; and
(iii) a person who aids, abets, counsels or procures another 
person to be party to such arrangements or transactions.
Unlike previous legislation this legislation is aimed at penalising 
specialist tax advisers as well as the principals to the transactions 
or arrangements. A person convicted of an offence under the Act may be 
sentenced to up to five years imprisonment or to a fine of up to $50,000 
or both. The person may also be ordered to pay some or all of the tax
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evaded. The speed with which this Act was introduced and passed and 
the severity of the penalties indicate the seriousness of these evasion 
practices. Further, according to one report one promoter is alleged 
to have stripped 2,086 companies with the result, in 733 of these cases, 
that the Commissioner will be unable to collect income tax of about $60
37million. Whether this new legislation will have a significant impact
38on the extent of tax evasion remains to be seen. Hill does not believe
that the legislation adds significantly to the Commissioner's powers,
but he does warn that, in practice, this new Act might be used to 
discourage would-be evaders:
In practice, however, interested persons will be not 
particularly concerned ultimately with the question whether 
or not a conviction under the legislation could be secured 
but with the more pragmatic question of whether a prose­
cution would be likely to be brought. No doubt it could
be ruinous for a prosecution to be brought which was 
unsuccessful if the defence involved a lengthy hearing at 
which senior counsel would be briefed. 39
3.5.5 Appointment of a Special Prosecutor to Help Prevent Tax Evasion
One further development (22 September 1982) which will assist
40in the recovery of evaded tax is the appointment of a Special Prosecutor 
(Mr. Roger Vincent Giles, QC) who will be authorised to carry out prose­
cutions for offences against laws of the Commonwealth in matters referred
41to him by the Attorney-General. The Attorney-General has announced 
that this Special Prosecutor is to be assisted by a "Task Force" consisting 
of lawyers, taxation officers and police to deal with prosecution of 
persons directly involved in the promotion and execution of "bottom of
42the harbour tax evasion schemes." These schemes may, according to
Mr. Costigan, have cost the Revenue Authorities hundreds, if not thousands,
4 3 .of millions of dollars. Even the Commissioner of Taxation concedes
99
that at least A$465m (approx. stg£270m) have been evaded by these
44schemes. In his 61st Report the Commissioner gave details of the
45number of companies he regarded as being involved. Some 4,565 
companies had been identified at 8 October 1982 and a further 538 
companies were under examination. The Commissioner believed that the 
identification process was continuing and numbers were expected to 
increase.
The proliferation of "bottom of the harbour schemes exposed a 
further weakness in the Revenue Authorities' resources in preventing 
tax evasion, viz, gross negligence in the Crown Solicitor's Office. 
According to the Finanoial Review (25.8.81), the Fourth Interim Report 
of the Costigan Royal Commission into the Federated Ship Painters and 
Dockers' Union "recorded a shocking state of affairs which can be 
summarised thus:
. A Crown law officer disobeyed an instruction from 
the Deputy Crown Solicitor in 1977 - two years 
after the prosecution could have been launched - 
that he marshall the documentary evidence so it 
could be presented to the Crown Solicitor.
. The same Crown law officer failed to put the 
documents instructing counsel to proceed with the 
prosecution on to the departmental file but kept 
them in his bottom drawer where they were discovered, 
five years later, in 1982.
. A legal officer of the Crown Solicitor's Office, a 
Mr. Bercove, conducted a prostitution service using 
the Perth phone number of the Crown Solicitor's Office 
in advertisements for the business.
. The wife of the same legal officer acted as secretary 
for as many as 100 stripped companies as part of a 
bottom-of-the-harbour tax avoidance scheme and was 
asked to do so by an unnamed man who was a close 
associate of the also unnamed promoter and 'a close 
associate of painters and dockers and has acted as 
a recruiter of them for the purposes of the taxation 
fraud.'
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. While his wife was engaged in these activities, using 
their home address for the stripped companies, the legal 
officer was engaged in collection of taxation debts for 
the Crown Solicitor.
The Crown law officer and the legal officer have been suspended 
from duty pending charges under the Public Service Act. The crux of 
the above is that the Crown Solicitor's failure to prosecute resulted 
in the proliferation of these "bottom of the harbour" schemes. In an 
effort to mitigate the loss of revenue from these schemes the Government 
announced (25 July 1982) its intention to introduce retrospective legis-
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lotion to recover evaded tax from the vendor shareholders. Recovery 
will be by way of special tax payable by persons who beneficially 
received the proceeds of the sale of shares. The tax will generally be 
due for payment thirty (30) days after the assessment is issued and a 
special penalty of twenty per cent per annum will be payable on any 
tax remaining unpaid after that period. At the time of writing 
(1 December, 1982) the retrospective legislation had not received Royal 
Assent.
3.6 ADEQUACY OF PENALTIES FOR EVASION
Under the Australian income tax system penalties can be imposed 
as a result of the operation of the Income Tax Assessment Act^ the 
Income Tax Regulations, and since 4 December 1980 under The Crimes (Tax 
Offences) Act. Though the severity of the penalties varies with the 
nature of the offence the penalty which is actually imposed is often 
the subject of determination by the Commissioner. The Commissioner does 
not have a free hand when determining the amount of the penalty to be 
imposed. Relevant provisions of the legislation usually set down the 
structure of penalties within upper and lower limits. This gives the
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Commissioner some discretion in setting the amount of penalties. The 
penalties imposed will reflect his views on the seriousness of the 
offences. Taxpayers who are dissatisfied with having penalties imposed 
on them may appeal to the Courts, which then decide whether the penalty 
should have been imposed and whether the amount of the penalty is 
justified. Courts have the power to reduce penalties imposed though not
47below the statutory minimum. The main penalties imposed under the 
Income Tax Assessment Act are shown in Table 3.5. (N.B. Some of these
penalties can be imposed for avoidance as well as for evasion.)
Though the list in Table 3.5 is not exhaustive it contains the 
main features of the penalty structure within the Assessment Act, its 
Regulations and The Crimes (Tax Offences) Act 1980. The list has been 
generated from the relevant provisions of the Act and does not reflect 
Departmental practice in respect of voluntary disclosures of income not 
previously declared. There is, in practice, a difference between the 
penalties which are levied in cases of voluntary disclosure and those 
which are levied in cases of non-voluntary disclosure. Table 3.6 gives 
a summary of the penalties applied where disclosure is voluntary.
The Commissioner of Taxation has a power [s.226(3)] to remit
additional tax, or any part thereof, which has previously been imposed.
48Though he has this power he is not compelled to use it. According to
an announcement by the Treasurer on 10 August 1982 "the Commissioner's
power to remit all or part of the penalty for late payment will be
limited to circumstances where late payment is due to business or other
factors beyond the taxpayer's control, provided the taxpayer has taken
49reasonable steps to mitigate the effects of those factors." Boards 
of Review can consider the amount of tax imposed and have on occasions
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TABLE 3.5
(a) Penalties Imposed Under the Income Tax Assessment Act, 1936 as amended, as at 30 June, 1982
Section Offence
S.16(6) Disclosure, by a Taxation Officer,of confidential information.
s.82T(2) Wilful false declaration of thevalue of shares.
s.128(c) Failure to pay withholding taxwithin the prescribed time.
s.l36A(7) Failure to make arrangements forp a r e n t  of tax on film royalties paid to non-residents.
s.207(1) Failure to pay tax on due date.
s.213(2) Failure to give security for taxon income derived from a business regarded by the Commissioner as being established or carried on for a limited period.
s.215(4) Failure of liquidator of a companyto comply with s.215.
s.218(2) Failure by debtor of a taxpayerto pay amounts due to the Commissioner, as requested by the Commissioner.
s.221(l) Failure of liquidator of a companyto pay company tax.
s.221C(lA) Failure by employer to deduct instalments due from wages and salaries.
s.221D(2) Failure to vary tax instalmentsof employees as requested by the 
Commissioner.
s.221E(3) Failure by an employee to returnan exemption from instalment certificate.
Penalty
$500 or 12 months imprisonment.
$1,000
10% p.a. of the* amount unpaid.
$200 max plus tax payable by non-resident on such royalties.
Interest at 10% p.a.*
$4 - $200
$2 - $100 plus tax payable by company being liquidated.
$100

























Alteration of above certificate.
Failure by group employers in respect of group instalments (various offences).
Failure of non-group employers in respect of tax instalment deductions and tax stamps.
Failure to deliver tax stamps on request by Commissioner.
Unauthorised sale of tax stamps.
Various other offences by employees in respect of tax instalments.
Forgery of tax stamps or dyes
Inaccurate (i.e. > 10%) estimate of provisional income;
Failure to remit withholding tax by the required time.
Failure to remit withholding tax where dividends not in money.
Failure to deduct mining withholding tax.
Failure to furnish returns or information.
Refusal to give evidence required by the Commissioner.
Failure to comply with a Court Order.
Omission of assessable income or claiming allowable deductions not actually incurred.
P e n a l t y
$100
Various. Some max. $1000 or max. 6 mths imprisonment Others max. $200.
As above for s.221F(12)
$100
$200
$4 - $1,000 or 6 mths. imprisonment.
Up to 5 years imprisonment.
10% of under estimated tax liability.
Failure to deduct withholding tax. Max. $200
Max. $1,000 or 6 mths imprisonment.
Not more than $200.




Double the tax avoided or $2 - whichever is the greater.




S.228(1) Failure to sign an agent'scertificate or giving false certificate.
s.229 Declarations made knowingly andwilfully to be false.
s.230 Understating income.
s.231 Fraudulent avoidance of tax.
s.232 Obstructing tax officers in thedischarge of their duties.
s.251J (10) Failure of tax agent to notifychange in constitution of partner­ship or company.
s.251K(7) Failure of tax agent to notifyand(8) of own bankruptcy or of cessationof business.
s.251L(l) Unregistered tax agents receivingpayment for preparation of returns
S.251N Preparation of returns by personsnot registered as tax agents.
s.2510 Advertising by persons notregistered as tax agents.
s.252(l)(d) Failure of a company to appointa public officer.
s.262A(l) Failure of taxpayer to keep"sufficient" records.
Penalty 
$2 -  $100
Liable for imprison­ment 4 years.
$40 - $1,000 plus max, of double the tax avoided.
As above.




$4 - $100 
$4 - $100
$4 a day 
$4 - $200
(b) Penalties Imposed under the Income Tax Regulations _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ as at 30 June, 1982_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Eegulation Offence
58LA Failure of tax agent to returncertificates of registration and exemption.






(c) Penalties Imposed under The Crimes (Taxation Offenoes) 
Act 1980 as at 30 June, 1982_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Section Offence
9 Offences against the Act.
Penalty
Fine (max.) $50,000 or imprisonment (max.) 5 years or both.
TABLE 3.6
Comparison of Penalties Usually Imposed for Voluntary and Non-Voluntary Disclosures of Omitted Income
1. Lodgement of returns where tax becomes payable
2. Omitted Income
Volimtary
5% - 25% of final debit on the assessment
5% - 25% of tax evaded
Non- Vo Itmtary
10% - 50% of final debit on the assessment
Up to 200%, but usually reduced to 50% of tax evaded
Source: Australian Federal Tax Reporter Report No.448, 1982, at p.3.(CCH Australia Ltd).
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50reduced the penalty where the understatement of income was not wilful.
The High Court has also seen fit to reduce some penalties imposed. In
51
Kurauskas V Kelton the Court decided that the maximum penalty should 
ordinarily be reserved for serious offences. The offence in this case 
was not regarded as serious and so the Court ordered that the penalty 
be reduced from $2,500 to $250.
When the penalties imposed under the Assessment Act are considered 
closely a number of anomalies become apparent:
(i) The maximum penalty for failure to keep sufficient records 
[s.262A(l)] is $200 - irrespective of the level of taxable income.
(ii) If a taxpayer fails to lodge a return the maximum penalty is $200 
(s.223) whereas the maximum penalty for omitting income is double the 
tax payable on omitted income [s.226(2)]. Where taxable income is high, 
taxpayers aware of these provisions, might deliberately court prosecution 
under s.223 so as to avoid prosecution under s.226(2) in respect of the
52same matter.
The burden of proof imposed on a taxpayer who has been penalised
under s.223 for failing to lodge a return shows up another inequity.
53In Alva Natona Fty Ltd a corporate trustee was convicted and fined for 
failure to lodge a tax return even though the Commissioner did not call 
any evidence to prove his case. The taxpayer company argued:
(a) that the Commissioner had not produced prima faoie 
evidence that the time allowed for the lodgement of the 
return was reasonable;
(b) that the Commissioner had not produced prima faoie 
evidence that the company had failed to furnish a return; 
and
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(c) that the notice served by the Commissioner on the
taxpayer requiring it to lodge the return was meaningless
and void.
However, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Court accepted 
the Commissioner's allegations that the return had not been lodged.
54In a later case, Ganke v FCT, another defect in s.223 was
exposed. In that case the Commissioner of Taxation was unsuccessful in
his attempt to have the taxpayer lodge several prior years' returns 
within fourteen days of service of notice requiring the returns to be 
lodged. The Court decided that the time allowed to comply with the 
Commissioner's direction must be reasonable and that fourteen days was 
not reasonable. Though the taxpayer was eventually required to lodge 
the returns the above litigation serves merely to frustrate and complicate 
the administrative processes. All this would probably not happen if 
provisions similar to those to be introduced in the United States from 
1 January 1983, were enacted: viz. for certain failures to file returns
or information the penalty is US$10 to US$25 per day with a maximum 
annual penalty of US$15,000.
(iii) The maximum penalty for failure to deduet withholding tax is $200 
[s.221YL(4A)] whereas the maximum penalty for failure to remit such tax 
which has been deducted is $1,000 or 6 months imprisonment [s.221YN(2)]. 
Taxpayers therefore face a heavier penalty for deducting withholding tax 
and failing to remit it than they do for not deducting it in the first 
place. Perhaps this is because employers have had cash flow benefits from 
collections in the first case but not in the second case.
(iv) Penalties are expressed in fixed dollar terms and these are likely 
to lose their significance over time unless they are adjusted to take 
account of inflation.
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Many of the penalties which are expressed in fixed dollar amounts 
are at the same monetary levels as they were when the Act was introduced 
in its present form in 1936. Since that date there would have been 
considerable inflation thus severely reducing the real burden of the 
penalties. Since 1941/42 when figures for average weekly earnings were
56first introduced those earnings have increased by almost thirty times, 
yet most of the fixed dollar penalties have remained unchanged. This 
suggests, in crude terms, that the penalties are only about one-thirtieth 
of the severity, in 1981/82, compared with their severity in 1941/42.
Such penalties are also unlikely to differentiate adequately between less 
serious and very serious offences. A better approach would seem to be 
to express penalties as a percentage of, say, the delinquent tax. Such 
penalties differentiate between different offences and maintain their 
real impact over time.
Consideration ought to be given to the penalty provisions in the 
equivalent Canadian Act before any reforms are made. Not only does that 
Act express the penalties as a percentage of the tax evaded it also 
distinguishes between different types of evasion. For instance, s.163(1) 
imposes a penalty of 50% of the tax which taxpayers sought to evade where 
the evasion was wilful whereas the succeeding sub-section imposes a . 
penalty of only 25% where the evasion occurred through negligence on the 
part of the taxpayer. The enactment of such provisions allows the 
seriousness of the offence to be reviewed and gives assurance that there 
will be consistency of treatment.
Alternatively, consideration could be given to the Tax Equity and 
Fiscal Responsibility Act (USA) 1982 which imposes heavier penalties on 
"substantial understatements of income tax" for any taxable year.
A substantial understatement of tax is then defined viz. an understatement
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which exceeds the greater of 10% of current tax or US$5,000 (or 
US$10,000 for corporations or personal holding companies). Where 
penalties are imposed according to predetermined rules such as these 
there is more scope for consistent application of the penalty provisions 
Taxpayers can then have a better perception of the likely consequences 
of non-compliance.
(v) The existence of prison sentences for some offences is open to 
criticism. Though there has been little research on the effect of 
penalties on recidivism of offences the research which has been done
in respect of crimes against property shows that imprisonment is likely
only to delay recurrence of those offences and may even lead to other
56more serious crimes on release.
(vi) The wording of s.226(2), the main operative section imposing 
penalties, seems to be defective. Section 226(2) imposes a penalty 
where a taxpayer, inter alia^ "includes in his return as a deduction 
expenditure incurred by him in excess of the amount actually incurred". 
If these words are given their literal meaning a taxpayer could not be 
exposed to a penalty under this section for merely claiming a deduction 
for expenditure actually incurred - irrespective of whether the expen­
diture properly gave rise to an allowable deduction. The taxpayer would 
be liable for a penalty only if he claimed a deduction in excess of 
expenditure actually incurred. In 12 TBRD Case M62 the Board was not 
prepared to give the above words their literal meaning. They preferred 
to read the section as a whole to ensure that s.226(2) applied whenever 
deductions were overstated or income was understated. This decision has
57been criticised by Smith, J. in Cyprus Mines Corporation's Case who, 
although not required to make a decision on this point, said that he was 
unable to follow the Board's reasoning in applying the relevant words
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58of 5.226(2). However, on 19 October 1982, the Victorian Supreme Court,
59  ̂ ^in Rahinov and Anor v FCT confirmed that s.226(2) does not apply
where a taxpayer incorrectly claimed a deduction for expenditure actually
incurred by him.
60(vii) The decision in Scanlon (DFCT) v Swan in the Brisbane District 
Court (July 1982) also suggests that s.232 might not be as effective as 
the Commissioner might have expected. In that case it was decided that 
a taxpayer was not guilty of obstructing a tax officer in the course of 
his duties by reason of his (the taxpayer's) refusing tax officer's access 
to certain documents until he had first obtained legal advice. The judge 
(Helman, DC.J) felt that temporary denial of access on reasonable grounds 
fell short of being an obstruction. It should be noted, however, that 
the decision in this case is currently on appeal.
êi(viii) The decision in Aoun v DFCT reveals a weakness with s.227.
In that case the taxpayer, of Lebanese origin and unable to speak or 
read English, had a firm of tax agents prepare his annual return. The 
firm in preparing his return declared that the taxpayer's wife had no 
separate net income whereas, in fact, it was in excess of $7,000. The 
taxpayer was subsequently convicted by a Court of Petty Sessions under 
5.227(1) for making a false return and was fined $40. However, the 
Supreme Court of New South Wales set aside the conviction upholding the 
taxpayer's argument that he was entitled to rely on the statutory defence 
under s.227(2) that the false return was made through ignorance or 
inadvertence.
Before recommendations are made to change the structure of 
penalties empirical work should be carried out on taxpayers' perceptions 
of penalties and the effect of these perceptions on their decisions to 
evade, because it is taxpayers' perceptions of penalties which are taken
ni
into account in the decision process rather than the penalties themselves 
Compliance is a behavioural problem and some attempt should be made, 
before reforms are made, to take taxpayers' psychology into account as 
well as the statutory requirements. It is probable that different 
taxpayers might react differently to different sanctions. It is also 
probable that different offences might be better dealt with using 
different types of penalties. Further, in addition to considering 
penalties as a means of preventing evasion one should also consider 
rewards. In the United Kingdom the Commissioners of Inland Revenue are 
authorised, subject to the consent of the Treasury where the amount 
exceeds £50, to pay a reward to a person who informs them of any offence 
against any Act relating to the Inland Revenue. According to one report 
however, payment of such rewards seems to be little used. It seems that
officials will admit to paying only £1,445 over a six year period to
62July 1980. In Australia the Revenue authorities seem to rely only on 
penalties. The extent of their reliance on penalties for the 1979-80 
financial year is shown in Table 3.7.
TABLE 3.7
Penalties Imposed in Australia for Various Tax Offences1979-80
Relevant Section No, of Taxpayers Additional Tax
of the Act Charged Charged $M
S.226(1) 125,637 $ 17.23s.226(2) 42,718 344.63s.223 34,117 2.08
SS.227,  230,  231 442 0.20Other 13,493 1.96
216.4gZ $366.18
Source: 60th Report of the Commissioner of Taxation.
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Using the number of returns lodged as an indication of the number 
of taxpayers the proportion of taxpayers charged additional tax is quite 
low. For the 1979-80 year the proportion is approximately one in forty. 
Another consideration in reforming the penalty structure is that of 
increasing taxpayers' awareness of the penalties. Existing penalties 
might be more effective if information about them was better communicated 
to taxpayers. Research could show which media might best be used for 
this purpose. Research might also show whether it would be better to 
provide information about the actual penalties or the probability of 
detection. To date only a few such studies have been undertaken. One 
study found that, in Israel, larger fines were more effective deterrents
63than more frequent investigations.
64The Asprey Committee recommended that there ought to be a general 
review of the penalty structure. Among its recommendations were:
(i) The need to provide a counterpart to s.207.
Section 207 imposes penalty interest for failure to pay
tax on the due date. The Asprey Committee argued that 
where a taxpayer has overpaid tax and is due for a 
refund, then he should receive that refund with 
interest; and
(ii) The need to allow for extensions of time to pay
pecuniary penalties. At present no such facility
exists irrespective of taxpayers' possible reasons 
for requesting extensions. The Asprey Committee 
believe, in the interests of equity. Courts should be 
given the power to grant such extensions.
3.7 OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS
The only direct contact of most taxpayers with the tax system 
comes when they lodge their annual return and receive their annual
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assessments. The influence this process has on taxpayers is likely to 
be important in determining their likelihood for evading tax. According 
to one newspaper report the relationship between taxpayers and the 
Tax Office has, over recent years, steadily deteriorated. This might 
have lead to increased evasion over these years. The report quoted one 
prominent Queen's Counsel as saying:
There was much more reasonableness on both sides 15 to 
20 years ago - there was not as much hostility ... Many 
of the Commissioner's procedures and practices were 
calculated to infuriate taxpayers ... he could rarely 
get a reply to correspondence unless it was suited to 
a standard computerised form or letter dictatorial in 
approach and usually not fully responsive.
On many occasions they seem more concerned to wage a war 
than to administer the law ... this made taxpayers bitter 
and determined to be even more aggressive in their 
avoidance of tax.
Letters from accountants to their Society's magazine also give 
instances of problems with the administrative process including delays 
in correcting (Tax Office) errors, delays in acknowledging and dealing 
with general correspondence and disallowing claims for deductions of 
amounts which ought to be allowable. In one case the Tax Office even 
disallowed a claim for accountancy fees. This made the accountant and
67his client quite indignant.
A summary of the main features of the annual assessment procedures 
which exist under the Australian tax system is given in Table 3.8.
This table shows strict time limits imposed whenever a taxpayer is 
required to act but no corresponding time limits imposed on the Commis­
sioner. Further, when a taxpayer lodges his objection he is limited, 
in the event of further appeal, to the grounds stated in his objection
(s.190) whereas no similar limit is imposed on the Commissioner. The
68decision in FCT v Reynolds was one instance in which the Commissioner 
was, in fact, entitled to change his stated ground for treating a
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TABLE 3.8
Annual Assessment and Review Procedures under the
Income Tax Assessment Act y 1936 as amended
Action
Lodgement of Annual Return
Assessment of Return
Lodgement of Objection against Commissioner
Consideration of Objection










Two months after close of year of income
No time limit
60 days from date of service of notice of assessment
No time limit
60 days from date of service of notice of decision re Objection
particular amount as assessable. An adjustment sheet which accompanied 
the taxpayer's notice of assessment indicated that the Commissioner 
wished to rely on S.26AAA. However when the case came before the Supreme 
Court of Tasmania the Court allowed the Commissioner to rely on s.25(1) 
to support his assessment.
The taxpayer's task in preparing his initial objection is not made 
any easier by the fact that, in making his assessment, the Commissioner 
is not required to give any reasons for his actions. All the Act 
requires of the Commissioner is "to make an assessment of the amount of 
taxable income of the taxpayer and the tax payable thereon" (s.166), and 
then "to serve notice thereof in writing by post or otherwise upon the 
person liable to pay the tax" (s.174). Similarly when a taxpayer lodges 
an objection, although he is entitled to a decision - at some stage - he 
is not entitled to know the reasons for the Commissioner's decision. 
Section 186 of the Act governs this aspect of the procedure and states 
that "the Commissioner shall consider the objection, and may either 
disallow it, or allow it either wholly or in part, and shall service the
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taxpayer by post or otherwise with written notice of his decision". The 
taxpayer does not have any right to know the reasons the Commissioner 
may have adjusted his return until shortly (not less than 14 days) before 
the matter is heard by a Board of Review. It is then too late for the 
taxpayer to alter the grounds upon which he relies. Once the assessment 
is issued the tax assessed must be paid (s.207). This is so even though 
the taxpayer may be disputing the assessment. This was confirmed in
69
FCT V Bevz and, according to the Treasurer's statement of 10 August 
1982, the Commissioner's practice of allowing 50% of tax in dispute, in 
genuine disputes, to remain in abeyance until the dispute is resolved,
70is to be overruled by statutory enactment.
If a taxpayer is dissatisfied with the Commissioner's decision 
on his objection he may ask that the matter be referred to a Board of 
Review, and provided this request is made within the appropriate time, 
the Commissioner must so refer the matter. However, over past years 
this is not a speedy process. For example, as at 30 June 1981 there were 
25,594 cases awaiting transmission to Boards, and during the 1980-81
71financial year only 17,484 cases were resolved. This means that 
taxpayers have to wait, on average, a year and a half before the matter 
will be resolved. When statistics relating to the number of objections 
lodged and number of requests for reference to Boards of Review are 
analysed one trend is clear: it is evident that more taxpayers are
becoming dissatisfied with their income tax assessments. Statistics 
for recent years are given in Table 3.9. Part of the increase in the 
number of objections lodged and the number of cases awaiting transmission 
to Boards of Review can be explained by the increase in the number of 
returns lodged. However, when the above figures are exoressed as 
oercentaqes of the number of returns lodged (see Table 3.10), the trend 
becomes even more apparent.
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TABLE 3.9
Number of Objections Lodged against Assessments and Number of Cases Awaiting Transmission to Boards of Review - 1974/5 to 1981/2
Year* No. of Objections 
Lodged
No. of Cases 
Awaiting Transmission
1974-5 70,065 5,1601975-6 73,997 7,3561976-7 91,264 9,5511977-8 132,681 10,9811978-9 183,101 17,0991979-80 188,768 24,2171980-1 206,164 25,5941981-2 189,311 25,569
Source: Annual Reports of the Commissioner of Taxation
TABLE 3.10
Number of Objections Lodged per Thousand Returns and Number of Cases Awaiting Transmission to Boards of Review per Thousand Returns
Year Objections Lodged - Cases Awaiting Trans-
per '000 Retur*ns mission - per '000 Returns
1974-5 9.06 0.671975-6 9.35 0.931976-7 11.23 1.181977-8 16.07 1.331978-9 21.78 2.031979-80 22.24 2.851980-1 23.58 2.931981-2 21.65 2.92
Source: Annual Reports of the Commissioner of Taxation
A clue to the source of this increased dissatisfaction is given 
in the 59th Annual Report of the Commissioner of Taxation:
... the greatest impact of dispute by objection has arisen 
in relation to assessments of salary and wage earners, while 
requests for reference to Taxation Boards of Review and 
Appeals to Courts have increased for all categories of 
taxpayers. It is clear however, that claims for deductions 
in respect of expenditure related to employment has consti­
tuted the greatest single cause of the growth in disputed 
differences between taxpayers and the administration.
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Though this indicates the source of the problem it does not explain why 
this group of taxpayers have taken this action.
Non-taxable assessments y on the other hand, would permit some 
disputes between taxpayers and the Tax Office to be settled at least 
twelve months earlier than is presently possible. Under the law as it 
stands if a taxpayer lodges a return upon which no tax is payable the 
Commissioner is not required to issue an assessment. If there is no 
assessment the taxpayer cannot lodge an objection. Thus, a taxpayer who 
carries on business during the year and incurs a loss, is required to 
lodge a return even though he is not entitled to an assessment. He 
cannot have the amount of that loss confirmed until he submits his return 
for a subsequent year when he claims a deduction for it. If the Commis­
sioner reduces the taxpayer's claim for the loss the taxpayer can object, 
but the existence of non-taxable assessments would have permitted this 
to have been done twelve months earlier.
The existence of a procedure which allows for prosecution by 
averment is also unlikely to meet with wholescale approval by taxpayers. 
This procedure allows the Commissioner to press his case without producing 
evidence to support the alleged facts. The Act provides for such a 
process in s.243(1) which states:
In any taxation prosecution, every averment of the 
prosecutor or plaintiff contained in the information, 
complaint, declaration or claims shall be prima faoie 
evidence of the matter averred.
This section does not lessen the burden of proof falling on the taxpayer 
[s.243(5)]. Fortunately, the section does not apply where an offence 
is punishable by imprisonment. Nevertheless, the fact that such a 
section can be applied is cause for concern for some taxpayers. Just 
as the existence of this provision is likely to cause resistance by some
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taxpayers, the absence of other provisions is likely to cause resistance 
by others. The absence of provisions allowing for advanae rulings and 
for non-taxahle assessments are two which stand out. A system of advanae 
rulings permits the Commissioner to issue formal statements on the 
efficacy for tax purposes of particular arrangements which taxpayers are 
about to undertake. Such a system operates successfully in Canada and 
the United States and allows taxpayers to be more certain of the tax 
consequences of particular arrangements before committing themselves to 
these arrangements. In this regard it should be noted that the Commis­
sioner has indicated that he is prepared to give rulings on the application
73of the new general anti-avoidance provision (Part IVA). However, 
without legislation supporting the Commissioner's good intentions, these 
rulings must remain unofficial and unbinding.
3.8 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
With the view to reducing the opportunity for evasion there appears 
to be considerable scope for improving the tax collection practices of 
the Australian tax system. Changes could be made to extend the principle 
of deduction of tax at source. At present this principle only applies 
in respect of "salary and wages" and even then not all payments for a 
person's labour are subject to tax. Deduction of tax at source should 
be required in respect of all payments which are substantially for the 
labour of a person irrespective of whether the recipient is an employee. 
Instalments should also be required from interest, dividends, royalties, 
annuities, mining rent and trust income. Where it is not practical to 
require income tax deductions at source, improvements ought to be made 
to the information reporting requirements. Changes such as those to take 
effect from 1 January 1983 (or at a time thereafter when the appropriate
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legislation has been enacted) in the United States might be reviewed. 
These new information reports cover interest payments, securities and 
commodity transactions effected by brokers, payments of US$600 or more 
as remuneration for services (other than wages), payments of US$5,000
74or more for sales and tips. Extension of the principle of deduction 
of tax at source in this way would reduce the opportunity for evasion 
and it may also have other effects which are beneficial. It is likely 
to lead to increased willingness of taxpayers to submit returns because 
deduction of tax at source usually results in slight overtaxing. It 
would also improve equity between taxpayers by bringing tax payments 
into closer temporal alignment. It does not seem practicable to extend 
the above principle to income derived by way of rent or from a business, 
trade or profession. Equity may be improved however, by requiring 
instalments of provisional tax and by requiring any underpayment of 
provisional tax to be made good soon after annual assessments are issued 
rather than with the next payment of provisional tax.
Present record keeping requirements also appear to be inadequate. 
Even qualified accountants would disagree if asked to translate the 
present so-called requirements into a specific set of records. The 
present lack of regulation is likely, in particular instances, to lead 
to at least some evasion. One way of reducing the likelihood of evasion 
is to compel all taxpayers to keep at least some minimum set of accounts. 
The set, such as that outlined by the Radcliffe Commission in 1955, could 
be prescribed by the Act. If no minimum set of records is required then 
the Commissioner should be able to determine what records have been kept 
and, perhaps, what accounting procedures have been adopted in preparing 
the annual returns. Tax assessors would, on the basis of the answers 
to such questions, be in a better position to decide whether further 
investigations of a taxpayer's affairs were warranted.
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Findings regarding the adequacy of resources used to detect 
evasion must be tentative because of the lack of independent evidence 
that is available. The Reports of the Commissioner of Taxation are, 
understandably, guarded in discussion of the methods which are used to 
detect evasion. These Reports do give some information on enforcement 
activities but the information available does not suggest that evasion 
is decreasing. This could indicate weaknesses in the methods used and/or 
insufficient resources used to detect evasions. While the Reports tend 
to indicate the latter one should be wary of accepting this too readily. 
Claims by the Commissioner for more staff might conceal the real problem 
- antiquated and inadequate methods used. Certainly it would seem that 
more use should be made of regional offices and more use should be made 
of computer technology in selecting taxpayers for investigation for 
possible evasion.
The review of the penalty structure also revealed weaknesses in 
the control system. For instance the apparent smallness of the amount 
of most penalties and the fact that most penalties are expressed in fixed 
dollar terms would not seem to deter would-be invaders. It might be 
argued that penalties have been left low so as not to cause too much 
friction with taxpayers; i.e. that compliance is based on co-operation 
rather than coercion. However, a more likely explanation is that 
penalties are small because of the impact of inflation on the fixed 
dollar limits which have been set many years ago, in some cases in the 
early 1940's. But, before major changes are made to the penalty 
structure, there should be an empirical investigation of the effects 
of particular penalties on taxpayers' behaviour. It is possible that 
increased penalties may increase evasion rather than reduce it. Until 
evidence is obtained regarding taxpayers' responses to the effects of
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particular penalties one can only be speculative. Improved compliance 
might best be achieved by normative appeals rather than increased 
penalties. Consideration should be given to (1) the notion of having 
a range of different types of penalties which can be imposed for a 
particular offence; (2) rewarding compliance, as well as punishing 
offenders; and (3) rewarding persons who provide information which 
results in the conviction of offenders. A provision of the latter type 
presently exists in the United Kingdom. Section 32 of the Inland Regu­
lation Act 1890 provides that:
The Commissioners may at their discretion reward any 
person who informs them of any offence against any Act 
relating to inland revenue or assists in the recovery 
of any fine or penalty, provided that a reward exceeding 
fifty pounds shall not be paid in any case without the 
consent of the Treasury.
Some use is still made of this provision. However, it is likely that 
it would be more useful if the maximum reward payable at the discretion 
of the Commissioners had been gradually updated from its initial level 
of £50, set in 1890. In the United States informers are paid a percentage, 
at present 10%, of the tax and penalty collected.
A number of the administrative provisions of the Act also require 
amendment. Provisions relating to returns, objections and appeals and 
lack of provisions dealing with advance rulings and non-taxable assess­
ments all require attention. It is easy to understand why some taxpayers 
who experience administrative difficulties with the tax system might be 
motivated to evade tax. For instance, if a taxpayer has waited for a 
year or more to have an assessment issued, or an appeal considered, he 
is likely to be quite dissatisfied with the tax system. At a future time 
this might encourage him to evade. For instance if he is unsure whether 
a particular amount is assessable as income he might, rather than enquire.
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simply omit it from his return. It seems that reform of many of the 
administrative procedures is overdue. Not only would this improve 
equity but it might also reduce evasion.
123
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER THREE
1. Robbins, L., "Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility; A Comment" 
Economie Joumaly Vol.48, No.192, p.635.
2. State of South Australia and Ors v Commonwealth of Australia 
(1942) 2 AITR 273.
3. Simon's Taxes "Introduction, Procedure, Schedules A, B & C",
Third Ed., Vol.A, Butterworths.
4. Taxation Review Committee - Full Report. Canberra: Australian 
Government Publishing Service, 1975, at para. 22.97.
5. Ib id y  paras 22.99 and 22.102.
6. Australian Federal Tax Reporter, No.436, 1981, p.5.
7. Ib id ,  p. 5.
8. See "Information Paper on Cash Payment Tax Evasion Measures" 
accompanying 1982 Budget Speech.
9 . Ib idy  p.8.
10. Asprey Committeey op, cit.y para. 22.123. Specifically it was 
suggested that instalments of-provisional tax be paid one third 
on 30 November and the balance on 31 May. Separate payment of the 
shortfall was to be on 30 September following the end of the year 
of income.
11. The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Ernst and 
Whinney Booklet, 19 August 1982, U.S.A., at p.31.
12. Murray, A.P., "A Proposal for Cumulative Withholding", National 
Tax Joumaly XV June 1962, pp.184-193 at p. 188.
13. Re Prince: Ex Post the Bankrupt (1961) ALR 889.
14. By letter dated 2 April, 1981.
15. 59th Report of the Commissioner of Taxationy Canberra: Australian
Government Printer, 1980, p.7.
16. Asprey Committeey op. cit.y paras 20.80 to 20.82.
17. Ib idy  para. 20.82.
18. 57th Report of the Commissioner of Taxationy Canberra: Australian
Government Printer, 1978. Parliamentary Paper No.l, 1978, p.4.
19. Ib idy  p.5.
20. Ib idy  p.7.
21. 59th Report of the Commissioner of Taxationy Canberra: Australian
Government Printer, 1980, p.4.
124
22. Ihidy p.54.
23. 60th Report of the Commissioner of Taxation^ Canberra: Australian 
Government Printer, 1981, p.15.
24. "The Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program: The Backbone of the 
Audit Selection System", The Tax Adviser, Oct. 1978, pp.605-607 at
p.606.
25. See 59th Report of the Commissioner of Taxation, op, ait,, p.5.
26. See 61st Report of the Commissioner of Taxation, op, cit., p.5.
27. Reported in Taxation in Australia, September 1981, p.276.
28. See CCH Federal Tax Reporter, Report No.351, 1979, pp.2-3.
29. The Act requires that a Justice of the Peace must be satisfied by
information on oath that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting 
that there is, in any place, anything as to which there are 
reasonable grounds for believing that it will afford evidence as
to the commission of any offence against the laws of the Commonwealth.
30. K.J. Burges and J.C. King, "Rights of Taxpayers and Their Agents 
to Disclose and Obtain Information". Paper presented at the 
Australian Society of Accountants' (Newcastle Branch) Annual 
Conference, Singleton, May 1979.
31. Ibid, p.9.
32. See in particular the judgment of Mason, J. in FCT v Smorgon 
79 ATC 4039 at p.4055.
33. Ganke v FCT 75 ATC 4097.
34. K.J. Burges and J.C. King, op, cit,, p.506.
35. FCT V ANZ Banking Group Ltd (1979) 9 ATR 483.
36. Ibid} see Mason's judgment at p.4055.
37. The Taxpayer, 13 December 1980, p.369.
38. D.G. Hill, "The Crimes (Tax Offences) Act - A Critical Analysis"
Taxation in Australia, April 1981.
39. Ibid, p.662.
40. To this end the Special Prosecutors Bill 1982 was introduced into 
Parliament on 8 September, 1982.
41. See CCH Australian Federal Tax Reporter, Report No.471, 1982, 
at p.4.
42. The following description of a "bottom of the harbour scheme" comes 
from the Fourth Interim Report of the Costigan Royal Commission 
into the Activities of the Federated Ship Painters and Dockers'
Union:
125
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target company. The target company was, as is frequently the 
case, a trading company conducting a legitimate business. The 
shareholders of the target company usually decided to continue 
the business, albeit under a different corporate structure. In 
this case, as in others, the following steps were taken to allow 
that to occur:
(a) A new company was incorporated, often using the same name as 
the old but with a modification that would be unlikely to suggest 
it was any different to the old company so far as the customers 
[were] concerned, and which would satisfy the Corporate Affairs 
Authorities that it was sufficiently different to allow registration. 
An example^ not drawn from any actual case so far as I am aware, is 
'Blackacre Pty. Ltd.', being the name of the target company,
and 'Blackacre (Aust.) Pty. Ltd.' being the name of the new.
(b) To facilitate this procedure the name of the target company 
was often later changed to something quite unlike its former name.
In the example, Blackacre Pty. Ltd. may become 'Zebra No.100 Pty.
Ltd.•.
(c) The assets and liabilities of the target company were then 
transferred to the new corporate entity, leaving, at the end of the 
day, a target company with only cash in the bank. The amount of 
cash in the bank was equal to the accumulated profits, plus the 
current year profits (if any). The cash in the bank reflected that 
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of the shares.
(d) The financing of the shares was achieved by the money being 
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shares. It is clear that was unlawful, whether done directly or 
indirectly, since it was in breach of sec.67 of the Uniform 
Companies Act.
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characterised in the books of account as a payment of dividend; or 
as a loan; or as an inter-company transaction; or the books of 
account may have disappeared so that no record remained of how it 
was treated. (The last option was also a breach of the Uniform 
Companies Act, particularly sec.l61A, which required companies to 
maintain proper accounts.)
(f) Since the money was used to acquire the shares it followed 
that the cash was no longer available to refill the coffers of 
the target company. The cash had been distributed to the original 
shareholders and to the promoter who both applied the money to their 
own purposes. Since it could not possibly be repaid, the company 
was thus left without any assets. At best it had a debt due to it 
from the financier which it wrote off as a bad debt. In a series
of schemes of this nature on which I have taken evidence, 2 finan­
ciers were consistently used in more than 120 cases and in every 
case the debt consituted by the loan was written off as a bad debt. 
Since the promoter well knew the purpose for which the money was 
to be used it followed that in advance he knew not only that the
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irrecoverable.
The net effect of these machinations was to leave the target 
company without the assets to pay the taxation debts."
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OPPORTUNITIES FOR TAX AVOIDANCE IN THE 
AUSTRALIAN TAX SYSTEM
4.1 INTRODUCTION
Inevitably some avoidance will occur because there are defects 
in the wording of specific provisions and remedial action can only be 
taken when these defects are exposed. However, other forms of avoidance 
will occur because there are fundamental weaknesses in the tax system 
itself. These forms of avoidance can, to some extent, be anticipated.
It is the purpose of this chapter to analyse the Australian tax system, 
using the structure given in Table 2.4, to see where the tax system 
itself provides scope for tax avoidance.
4.2 OPPORTUNITIES TO SPLIT INCOME WITH OTHERS
Income splitting only has tax advantages where it is possible to 
transfer income to others who will pay less tax. Thus high income 
earners who pay tax under a progressive rate structure will always find 
it advantageous to split income with others. The greater the degree of 
progression the greater the advantage. Given the rate structure it is 
easy to calculate the tax that can be avoided once income is split with 
others. Table 4.1 shows, for example, for the year of income ended 
30 June 1983, the tax avoided by an Australian resident taxpayer who 
splits income with another person who otherwise has no income.
The mere fact that a rate scale is progressive does not mean that 
there will be avoidance by income splitting, but it does ensure benefits 
for those who can find ways of splitting income with others. Other
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TABLE 4.1
Tax Avoided by an Australian Resident Taxpayer who, after Transferring One Dollar of Income, has a Taxable Income Greater than $35,788
Taxable Income of Tax Avoided
Transferee* 1982/8S Rates
Less than $ 4,462 60.0 cents
$4,463 - $17,894 29.3 "
$17,895 - $19,500 24.6 "
$19,501 - $35,788 14.0 "
*N.B. (i) Where the transferee is a fully dependent spouseof the taxpayer or is a "prescribed person" in terms of Div.6AA of The Income Tax Assessment Act 1936, as amended, the tax avoided may be less.
(ii) Where property income is alienated for short periods 
{viz. less than seven years), the tax avoided will be less.
features of the tax system contribute to provide the opportunity for tax 
avoidance. For instance, a taxpayer with a dependant spouse would not 
avoid tax if the tax system required the aggregation of income of 
husband and wife. (N.B. Under the Australian Tax System tax is payable 
by individuals on the income that he or she derives.) Unless the tax 
system limits the means by which taxpayers can split income, then the 
incentive to avoid tax, given by a progressive rate structure, is ready 
for exploitation. Because the Australian Tax System taxes individuals 
only on income that they derive it seems that the Australian Tax System 
might be open to avoidance through income splitting. In fact, the Asprey 
Committee cited five areas of tax avoidance through income splitting, 
which it considered required the attention of the legislature. These 
were:
(i) Income from gifts of capital;
(ii) Partnerships, inter-vivos trusts and arrangements achieving similar income sharing results;
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(iii) Excessive payments for services or benefits;
(iv) Alienation of income; and
(v) Family companies.
Some of the means by which taxpayers avoided tax by splitting income 
were simple while others involved complex arrangements. The five areas 
suggested by the Asprey Committee are analysed more fully below.
4.2.1 Income from Gifts of Capital
The outright gift of property confers upon the donee all rights in 
respect of that property including any right to income. This provides 
the donor with a simple means of reducing his income. As soon as he 
divests himself of title in income producing property he divests himself 
of income. Once title in the property has passed then, in the absence
of statutory provision to the contrary, it is the donee who derives the
income not the donor. Gifts of capital are, therefore, simple and 
effective means of splitting income and are means which are likely to 
have increased in popularity since the Asprey Committee reported. This 
increase can be attributed to the abolition, on 1 July 1979, of 
Commonwealth gift duty and the abolition of State duty by two of the 
three States which had previously imposed it (Queensland, 1 January 1977 
and South Australia, 1 January 1980). The only State which continues to 
impose gift duty is Victoria but in that State no duty is payable where
the aggregate of gifts by a donor does not exceed $15,000 in any eighteen
month period and a carefully planned gifting programme can avoid any 
duty. Example 4.1 shows how gifts of capital can result in avoidance of 
income tax.
Examptz 4.1
X has a salary of $30,000 and also derives $10,000 income from deposit
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of funds in a building society. Tax payable, on a taxable income of 
$40,000, for 1982/83 would be $14,707. If we assume X has a fully 
dependent spouse who has no separate net income of her own, and that 
they have dependent children, his liability is reduced by way of a 
dependent rebate of $963 to $13,744. However, if X were to withdraw 
his investment and make a gift of the funds to his wife who reinvested 
the funds in an equivalent investment then total tax payable would only 
be $11,216
i.e. Tax payable by X on salary of $30,000 $9,517
Tax payable by spouse on interest incomeof $10,000 1,699
$11,216
Tax avoided in this example is $2,528 but the amount will be greater 
if the gift is split between other family members who have no income of 
their own.
4.2.2 Partnerships, Inter-vivos Trusts and Arrangements Achieving Similar Income Sharing Results
Income splitting through partnerships has been an area of tax
avoidance which both the Ligertwood Committee (1961) and the Asprey
2Committee (1975) considered required the attention of the legislature. 
Many partnerships, it seems, were formed solely for the purpose of tax 
avoidance. The Ligertwood Committee cited one example in which tax was 
reduced by Ail9,549 to Af7,710. This was achieved when a partnership 
of four brothers increased the size of the partnership by admitting 
their seventeen children as limited partners. The Asprey Committee was 
particularly concerned with partnerships which split income produced by 
the occupational efforts of one person:
The taxation treatment of family partnerships should not 
depend simply on the existence of a document which, as a
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matter of form, satisfied the requirements of the law of 
partnership but which readily presents itself as a vehicle 
for income-splitting by distributing the profits in 
arbitrarily determined proportions to relatives whose 
services (if any) in the partnership activities and/or 
whose capital or property contributions are not commensurate 
with the remuneration or share of profits received. ^
If care is taken it is not difficult, for tax purposes, for families 
to establish partnerships. These enable many businesses to be carried 
on by means which result in less tax being payable than would otherwise 
be the case. The potential for tax avoidance in this way is shown in 
Example 4.2 which assumes a simple partnership of husband and wife.
Example, 4.2
X is a plumber and is about to commence business. He has a fully 
dependent spouse, and they have dependent children, none of whom derive 
income of their own. He decides to admit his wife to the business as 
an equal partner. Tax avoided as a result of this decision will depend 
upon a number of factors including the level of income. Set out below 
is the tax payable for 1982/83 given three different income levels:
Tax Payable, by PoAtneÂ  T9S2fS3
leve/ o£ Income Soit XiuxdtA (a) PoAtntukip161
Tax Aooldtd 6/a
$ 20,000 $ 3,954* $ 3,397 $ 557 86
$ 50,000 $19,744 $14,434 $5,310 73
$100,000 $49,744 $41,413 $8,331 83
[*After dependent spouse rebate of $963.]
The only section directed at tax avoidance through partnership forma­
tion is s.94 which, in effect, provides that where a partner lacks real 
and effective control and disposal of his share of partnership income 
that income is subject to a special rate of tax (50% for 1982/83). The 
section has had little effect because the Courts have decided that once 
legal ownership in funds is vested in a partner then he has the requisite
133
control and disposal. Thus, in the above example, if both partners 
actually received their shares of the partnership income they would be 
regarded as having real and effective control of the funds irrespective 
of how family or other commitments influence the disposal of the funds.
Income of a family business can be split with infant children if 
a trust is used and where income distributions are limited to $1,040 per 
child per annum no tax is payable on those distributions. Income distri­
butions of any amount can be made to infant beneficiaries but where 
distributions exceed $1,040 tax becomes payable. Further, provided 
beneficial ownership has passed to the children it is not necessary that 
the distributions be paid over to them. Control of the funds can remain 
with the trustee or parent. In fact, it is a common feature of trusts 
that the trustee retains control over an infant beneficiary's income. 
Greatest scope for tax avoidance exists if discretionary trusts are used. 
These permit trustees to consider beneficiaries' individual circumstances 
each year before distributing trust income. Trustees can vary annual 
distributions so that overall tax liability of a family is minimised. 
Example 4.3 shows how tax can be avoided if a family business is carried 
on by the trustee of a discretionary trust.
Example. 4.3
X is about to commence business. He has a fully dependent spouse and 
three infant children, none of whom has a separate income of his/her own. 
Tax avoided as a result of using a discretionary trust is shown below 
assuming three different income levels.
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$ 20,000 $ 3,954 $ 2,440 $ 1,514 62
50,000 19,744 12,999 6,745 66
100,000 49,744 37,433 12,311 75
Again it is not difficult to establish, for tax purposes, that a 
business is carried on by a trustee. Nor is it difficult to transfer 
an existing business to a trustee. It is also possible for a trustee 
to carry on the business of a professional practice if he is qualified 
to carry on that business in his own right. Different families can join 
together to carry on business through a trust structure if a unit trust 
is used. Figure 4.1 illustrates one of many possible structures which 
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FIGURE 4.1: Possible Business Structure for Families
Wishing to Carry on Business Together.
In the above structure the company, ABC Pty Ltd, carries on business, 
as trustee Of the ABC Unit Trust, and distributes income in the fixed 
shares to the family trusts. The trustees of the family trusts then use 
their discretion to distribute the income within the respective families
Use of a similar structure was made in Phillip's Case, though in that
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case many more families were involved than the three indicated above. 
Phillips was a partner in a large firm of chartered accountants which 
caused a unit trust to be formed to take over from the partnership 
various staff, plant and equipment. These were then made available to 
the partnership on payment of service fees. These fees were commercially 
realistic and enabled the unit trust to end each year with a profit.
The net income of the service trust was distributed to the unit holders 
who were, in almost all instances, the trustees of the respective 
partner's family discretionary trusts. The Commissioner of Taxation was 
unable to deny the taxpayers the advantages they derived from this 
arrangement even though the acquisition of trust assets was, in effect, 
financed by partnership funds.
One section of the Act which has been enacted to prevent income 
splitting through family trusts i s ‘s.102(1) which seeks to deny the tax 
advantages from the creation of trusts for children of the settlor who 
are unmarried and under the age of twenty-one. However, the section has 
been largely defective because it applies only where the settlor is also 
the parent of the infant beneficiaries. The section does not apply where 
someone other than the parent creates the trust even though the settlement 
monies are nominal and the parents later add substantial funds to the 
trust that has been created.
The most recent report of the Commissioner of Taxation (61st Report) 
outlines two other ways that trusts have been used to avoid tax:
... Trading or investment income is generally diverted through 
a chain of discretionary trusts to persons associated with the 
promoter, who were not expected to incur a tax liability on 
that income. The first trust in the chain would, however, 
not be out of pocket. That trust, or an associate, would be 
reimbursed in a purportedly non-taxable form.
These arrangements have been found to be contrived, 
circular and lacking in commercial purpose. Promoters
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and
claimed nevertheless that Part IVA did not apply on the 
ground that a tax benefit as defined in the legislation 
was not derived by beneficiaries of the particular 
discretionary trusts used in the stripping arrangements.
More elaborately-structured trust stripping arrangements 
introduced chains of overseas trusts for the intended 
purpose of attributing to the relevant trust income a source 
out of Australia. In other cases, companies allegedly exempt 
from Australian tax by virtue of provisions in double taxation 
agreements were made beneficiaries of trust income.
Trusts have also been used to avoid or minimise taxation 
by means of overseas beneficiaries. In one kind of arrange­
ment, trust income is allegedly distributed to a varying 
number of overseas beneficiaries in sums less than the 
minimum taxable amount. Under another method, trust income 
in the form of interest is 'distributed* to overseas bene­
ficiaries. It is claimed that the tax liability on the trust 
distribution is limited to the interest withholding tax payable. 
In both cases, however, the funds remain in Australia. The 
relevant distribution is merely credited to the non-resident 
beneficiary's account in the trust books and the beneficiary 
purportedly lends the funds back to the trustee or to 
individuals or entities associated with the creation of the 
trust. It appears in many cases that the overseas beneficiaries 
are unaware both of the purported distribution and the lending 
of the funds. ^
Other income splitting arrangements to meet with the wrath of the 
Asprey Committee included interest free loans to relatives and leases 
to relatives at token rents. Both of these devices split income to
relatives by means which would not have been adopted by parties dealing
6at arms length. The Act does not contain any provisions which prevent 
these latter arrangements.
4.2.3 Excessive Payments for Services or Benefits
Excessive payments to relatives for services rendered, benefits 
received or goods supplied were another means of income splitting which 
the Asprey Committee found objectionable. Such payments did not alter 
the gross income earned by a particular family though they did reduce 
the family's overall tax liability as Example 4.4 indicates.
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Example, 4,4
X carries on business as a sole trader and net income for the year is 
$30,000. His tax liability can be reduced if he decides to pay salaries 
of $10,000 to his wife, and $5,000 to his son aged 18 years. (N.B. It 
is assumed his two dependents have no other income. )




Tax payable by X $8,554 $3,232
Tax payable by X's Spouse - 1,699
Tax payable by X's Son - 165
$8,554 $5,096
Tax avoided by paying salaries is $8,554 - $5,096 = $3,458.
Tax payable after salaries are paid is 60% of that payable in the 
absence of salaries. The Act contains a provision (s.65) which tries 
to prevent tax avoidance by these means. Section 65(1) authorises the 
Commissioner to deny or reduce deductions claimed for payments made to 
"associated persons". Only those amounts which, in the opinion of the 
Commissioner, are reasonable reward for services rendered are allowable 
deductions for tax purposes. It might be thought by some that where 
the payment is "excessive" then the taxpayer has evaded tax rather than 
avoided it. The proper classification for what has been done will depend 
upon the facts of each situation and the intentions or motivations of 
the parties.
Section 65 has its defects. Firstly it is a difficult provision 
to police because the Commissioner cannot hope to know how much effort 
has been contributed by particular family members. Secondly, the 
definition of an "associated person" in s.65(lD) is inadequate. Though
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it extends to payments to close relatives made by a sole trader or a 
partnership it does not cover payments made to family members where the 
business is carried on by a trust.
4.2.4 Alienation of Income
Alienation or assignment of income refers to the transfer of rights 
to receive income from property without the transfer of legal title in 
the property itself. Such assignments are possible because the law 
attaches proprietary rights to the right to receive income from property 
as well as to the property itself. Though it is possible in law to 
assign both past and future income it is only possible to assign rights 
to future income for tax purposes. But even then not all future income 
can be assigned; for instance, wages and salaries cannot be assigned 
because the requisite proprietary rights do not exist. Table 4.2 
indicates in broad terms which types of income can be assigned for tax 
purposes.
TABLE 4.2
Income Rights which may be Effectively Assigned for Tax Purposes
Type of Income Capable of Assignment
Yes/No
Interest YesRent YesRoyalties YesPartnership Profits No*Trust Income - Fixed Trust Yes- Discretionary Trust NoDividends NoWages and Salaries No
*Partnership profits per se cannot be assigned though one can divest oneself of partnership income by assigning part or all of one's entire interest in the partnership.
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The Act does not prevent income from being assigned but it does 
require (Div.6A) that assignments operate for a period of at least 
seven years if the assignee is to bear the liability for tax. If an 
assignment is for a period of less than seven years then, unless the 
property itself has also been assigned, tax will be payable at the rates 
applicable to the assignor.
4.2.5 Family Companies
Family companies were singled out for attention by the Asprey 
Committee mainly because they were used to pay dividends to family members 
out of proportion to capital subscribed by them:
One type of transaction which may constitute an income- 
splitting device by means of a family company can be seen 
in the acquisition of shares by a relative of the family 
which (i) entitle the holder to a share in the distribution 
of the company's profits disproportionate to the amount of 
capital subscribed by him, or (ii) enable those in control 
of the coitpany to declare dividends in respect of his shares 
without distributing dividends to other shareholders, or 
(iii) enable those in control to declare differential 
dividends to selected shareholders. ®
Because companies have a separate legal identity proprietors can 
transfer their businesses to companies, assume control of those companies 
and allow family members to participate in distribution of dividends.
Table 4.3 shows how the issue of different classes of shares in a typical 
family company allows income to be split to different family members yet 
leaving the original proprietor in control of the business. Typically 
the 'A' class share is held by the proprietor who could also hold the 
'B' class shares which have been allotted to him in satisfaction of the 
sale price of his business. The proprietor can, therefore, maintain 
control of the business, resist moves to dislodge him as managing director, 
receive dividends and acquire the business should the company ever be 
liquidated. The proprietor takes income by way of salary or director's
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TABLE 4.3
Possible Share Structure of a Family Company
Class of Number Beneficial Riahts Attachina
Share Issued Shareholder to Shares
'A' 1 Proprietor Right to be Managing Director
'B' 9199 Proprietor Right to VoteRight to Return of Capital Right to Dividends
C  200 Spouse Right to Dividends
D' 200 Child 1 Right to Dividends
E ' 200 Child 2 Right to Dividends




fees allowing dividends to be declared in respect of shares held by 
other family members. The potential benefits that can be obtained from 
such an arrangement are shown in Example 4.5.
EmmpZa 4,5
A taxpayer, X, sells his business to a company. Below is a comparison 
of tax he would have paid had he continued to operate as a sole trader 
and that which will be paid under the new structure. The results are 
based on three different income levels and rates of tax are those for 
1982/83. It is further assumed that, under a corporate structure, X 
takes a salary of 50% of business income, his wife takes a salary of 
25% and dividends are distributed to minimise total tax payments. Shares 
are held by the taxpayer (X), his wife and by a trustee for their three 
children.
CompaxUon Tax Payable, by Sole. T̂ adex oj'id 
undex a Company StxacXuxe, ion. 19&2/&3
le,veZ oi Income. Sole, Tnxdex Company {a)-{b) b/a%
ia) (b)
$ 20,000 $ 3,954 (i)$ 4,164 $(210) 10550,000 19,744 (ii) 15,432 4312 78100,000 49,744 (iii) 39,424 10320 79
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X Spouse. Company ChyOdAcn
(i) Taxable Income $10,000 $5,000 $5,000 $180 eachTax Payable 1,699 165 2,300 -
(ii) Taxable Income 25,000 12,500 12,500 $450 eachTax Payable 7,217 2,465 5,750 -
(iii) Taxable Income 50,000 25,000 25,000 $900 eachTax Payable 20,707 7,217 11,500 -
Other purposes can also be achieved with the distribution of shares, 
shown in Table 4.3, because the declaration of dividends is at the 
discretion of the directors who can allocate dividends between family 
members so as to reduce the overall tax burdens.
4.3 OPPORTUNITIES TO CONVERT INCOME INTO CAPITAL
Conversion of income into capital is another means by which tax 
can be avoided. Strictly speaking though, the process is not one of 
converting income into capital because once income is derived, tax lia­
bility has accrued and one can only escape payment of tax by evading it.
If tax is to be avoided^ steps must be taken prior to the derivation of 
income. Thus, the phrase "converting income into capital" refers to 
the situation where steps are taken to ensure that a potential income 
receipt will be regarded as capital when the relevant transaction occurs.
Sometimes amounts are regarded as "income" simply because of the 
form of their receipt. In such a case a change in the form of receipt 
can change its character. For instance, certain annuities are income 
only because they are received periodically. Commuting annuity rights 
to a lump sum can change the character of those receipts to capital. 
However, where retirement pensions are involved, the decision to commute 
pension rights soon after retirement may have tax implications under
9
S.26(d). Where amounts are income by nature rather than by form, nothing 
can be done to change their character. Nevertheless, tax might still be
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avoided - by having another taxpayer derive that income. Steps must be 
taken before the relevant amount accrues to allow it to be received by 
that other taxpayer. These are the general principles behind tax 
avoidance schemes in this area. Some of the schemes to emerge and which 
are still available are briefly mentioned below.
4.3.1 Disposal of Property
Many circumstances influence the character of proceeds flowing from 
the disposal of property. These include the type of property disposed 
of, the length of time it was held, the vendor's occupation and the 
frequency of sales of like property by the vendor. For instance, a real 
estate agent who buys and sells land at a profit is likely to be liable 
for tax on that profit. On the other hand if a market gardener had 
bought and sold the land after using it in his business then it is 
unlikely that any amount would be taxable. In Australia the proceeds 
from sale of property will be regarded as income if the property is 
regarded as trading stock of a business (s.25). It does not follow that 
if the property is not trading stock profit on sale will not be taxable. 
If the proceeds from sale are regarded as capital in nature the profit 
on sale might still be assessable. The first limb of s.26(a) brings to
tax the profit on sale of property where it was acquired for the purpose
10of resale at a profit. The decision in William's Case, however, shows 
how liability to tax from the application of this provision was avoided. 
Williams was a real estate agent who was advised that he would be liable 
for tax if he sold property he had acquired. Instead, he transferred 
his interest in the property, by way of unsolicited gift, to his wife. 
She later sold it for a profit and the Commissioner of Taxation sought 
to assess her on that profit but his attempts failed. The property was 
not a business asset nor was it acquired for the purpose of resale at
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a profit. The Full High Court decided that acceptance of the gift by 
Mrs. Williams could not be regarded as an acquisition of property with 
a purpose of profit making. In fact the Chief Justice would not accept 
that an unsolicited receipt of a gift was purposive in any relevant 
sense. Thus application of s.26(a) was avoided. Consequently, if the 
realisation of an asset by one member of a family could result in tax 
being payable steps could be taken to avoid tax by transferring ownership 
in that asset to another family member. Tax will be avoided if the 
donee retains the property for a period of at least twelve months. Since 
Nillican's Case legislation has been introduced, in the form of S.26AAA 
to tax profits on disposal of property which is held for less than 
twelve months. However, if both the donee and the donor hold the 
property for at least twelve months before disposing of it then repeti­
tion of the steps undertaken in William's Case can still result in tax 
avoidance.
Taxpayers owning natural resources such as sand or timber can also
11avoid tax provided care is taken. In S t a n t o n ' s  Case the taxpayer 
avoided tax on money received from a sawmiller because he entered into 
a contract which gave the sawmiller "the right to enter land" rather 
than "the right to cut down specific quantities of timber".
Individuals who enter into restrictive covenants or who give up 
their amateur status also have the opportunity to avoid tax. Provided 
these individuals enter into agreements which clearly specify that any 
monies received are for loss of a capital asset, and that alone, then 
the amounts are likely to be regarded as capital.
Companies which have ceased to fulfil a useful purpose for their
proprietors and which have accumulated capital profits can be exploited
12in other ways. In Gibb's Case shareholders avoided tax by arranging
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to receive their shares of capital profits on winding up rather than 
as dividends of an on-going concern. No tax was payable in these 
circumstances because s.47 of the Act only extends to liquidation dis­
tributions which were "income" in the hands of the company. Liquidation 
distributions paid out of "capital profits" were not assessable even 
though distributions out of those profits prior to liquidation would 
have been taxed in the shareholders' hands. Thus shareholders of private 
companies who defer their need for capital profits can avoid tax by 
using the scheme outlined in Gibb's Case.
13The decision in MaLaurin's Case indicates further scope for tax 
avoidance through conversion of income into capital. In that case the 
taxpayer received a lump sum in full settlement of a claim for damages 
resulting from a fire which had commenced on an adjoining property.
Damages claimed included an amount" for loss of income but when settlement 
was reached the taxpayer agreed to receive a single sum for all claims.
The Court decided that, in the circumstances, no part of the sum received 
was income. The amount received was accepted under a compromise as a 
single undissected amount and was regarded as consisting entirely of 
capital. It should be emphasised that advantage can only be taken of 
the decision in McLaurin's Case if the fact situation is substantially 
similar and this may not always be the case. Similarly, where a taxpayer 
is allowed an abatement to any payment of a capital nature rather than 
receive compensation of a revenue nature he can "convert income into
14capital". This was evident in an English decision involving a steamship 
company which, shortly after acquisition, placed a motor vessel in the 
hands of repairers for overhaul. The time stipulated for overhaul was 
exceeded and the owners claimed damages for loss of profits. It was 
decided that the amount received was income but Lord Sands explained 
how this result could have been avoided: viz. if the owners had accepted
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an abatement to the cost of repairs the amount of the abatement would 
have been regarded as capital.
Over the last few years a number of other tax avoidance schemes, 
converting income into capital, have been successful, e.g. "trust 
stripping", "Curran schemes" and the like. These have not been outlined 
in this part as representing opportunities for tax avoidance because 
remedial legislation has been enacted (see Table 4.5).
4.3.2 Form of Receipt
Receipts which are income by nature remain income irrespective of 
the form of receipt. Thus, it does not matter whether wages, rent or 
interest are received periodically or by way of a lump sum. However, 
not all items which are income for tax purposes are income by nature. 
Sometimes amounts such as retirement pensions are regarded as income 
because of the form of receipt. In these circumstances it is possible 
to avoid tax by taking steps to alter the method of receipt. However, 
some tax might be payable because s.26(d) requires that 5% of a lump sum 
received in consequence of retirement must be included in a taxpayer's 
assessable income. Whether tax is paid depends upon whether the taxpayer's 
taxable income (for the 1982/83 financial year) exceeds $4,462. Thus 
if a taxpayer retires early in the financial year and the only amount 
of assessable income he has is the amount caught under s.26(d) no tax 
will be payable unless the lump sum exceeds $89,240 (i.e. $4,462 t 5%). 
Further, where income can be deferred and paid in consequence of retire­
ment only 5% will be subject to tax under s.26(d) rather than the whole
15amount under s.25(l). For instance, in Reseck's Case the taxpayer 
successfully argued that severance pay, based on the number of shifts 
worked, was taxable under s.26(d) even though it was also income under 
s.25(1). Section 26(d) does not extend to lump sum payments of annual
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leave or long service leave, though it does apply to lump sum super­
annuation payments, sick leave, bonuses, severance pay and gratuities.
4.4 EXEMPTIONS FROM THE TAX BASE
Exemptions to the tax base contribute to the level of tax avoidance. 
The most important exemption in Australia is the failure to tax capital 
gains. Other exemptions also exist and these include the omission to 
tax all ex-Australian source income derived by residents, the failure 
to tax all fringe benefits and all voluntary payments. These exemptions 
and some others are now discussed in some detail.
4.4.1 Ex-Australian Source Income Derived by Residents
Although the scheme of the Australian taxing statutes is to tax 
residents on world wide income it is possible to avoid tax on certain 
income by locating its source outside Australia. This results from the 
operation of s.23(q) which was introduced, apparently with the intent 
of preventing double taxation of ex-Australian source income derived by
Australian residents. In fact its operation can result in no tax being
16paid at all. This was highlighted by the decision in French's Case 
which emphasised that income was exempt from tax under s.23(q) provided 
it was "not exempt from tax" in the source country. French had worked 
temporarily in New Zealand and the income he earned was subject to tax 
there. However he did not earn sufficient income for the year to attract 
any tax. The question of whether any tax had been paid does not seem to 
be decisive under s.23(q). Rather the crucial question was whether the 
income was "exempt from tax" in the source country. The Court decided 
that the income was not exempt from tax in New Zealand and was therefore 
exempt from tax under s.23(q).
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Taxpayers can still exploit s.23(q) but they must be able to locate 
the source of income outside Australia. This will not be possible for 
all types of income; for instance, royalties which are outgoings of an 
Australian business are deemed to have an Australian source. Wages and 
salaries have their source of income where the work is done. Thus 
employees who wish to take advantage of s.23(q) must work outside 
Australia. Arrangements can also be made for interest and rental income 
to have an ex-Australian source. However, s.23(q) does not apply in
17all cases where such income is derived. The following example shows
how s.23(q) can result in tax avoidance.
Example 4,6
X, an Australian taxpayer, derives wages and salary of $10,000 and has 
investible funds which will realise rental income of $5,000 p.a. He 
wants to minimise his tax burden. Below is a comparison of tax payable 
on the assumptions that the property income has an Australian source 
and an ex-Australian source. It is assumed that the rental income is 
derived in the New Hebrides and that income tax in that country is 
payable only where taxable income exceeds $5,000.
Tax Payable on Jncxemental Pxopenty Income J9S2JS3
Au&t.Souxce Ex-Aa&t.SouAce 
Income Income
Aust. tax on salary of $10,000 $1,699 $1,699
Aust. tax on property income 1,534
Ex-Aust. tax on property income - -
$3,233 $1,699
Tax avoided = $3,233 -$1,699 = $1,534
Non-residents can also avoid Australian tax by taking steps to 
ensure that the source of income is outside Australia. If care is taken 
the source of income can be located outside Australia even if the income
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results, in part, from work done in Australia. For instance, in
18
Mitohum's Case a film star from the United States received Afl6,675 
from an Australian firm mainly as a result of work done in Australia 
producing, directing and acting in a film. Though the work had been 
done mainly in Australia the Court decided that Australia was not the 
source of the income. Enough steps had been taken to ensure that the 
source of the income was outside Australia: payment was to take place 
outside Australia, the contract was entered into outside Australia, 
and some of the work was done outside Australia. Other non-residents 
also avoid tax by closely following what was done in Mitohum's Case.
4.4.2 Receipt of Certain Voluntary Payments
Courts have consistently excluded gifts from the conception of 
income within the meaning of s.25 -of the Act. This has allowed some 
taxpayers to receive certain amounts without tax being payable. For 
instance, in one case, a solicitor received All0,000 from a grateful
19client and successfully argued that the amount was not taxable. In
another case a gift of 20,000 shares in a public company from its
20founder to a former employee was also held to be not taxable. The 
fact that the donor gave the taxpayer the shares in recognition for past 
services was not decisive. The character of gifts was determined from 
the standpoint of the recipient and whether the gift related to any 
income producing activity on his part:
What is decisive, in my opinion, is the fact that it is 
impossible to relate the receipt of the shares by Hayes 
to any income producing activity on his part.
This test is also relevant in determining whether prizes, awards, 




Fringe benefits are only regarded as income if they are paid in 
relation to an income-earning activity on the part of the employee. 
However, under s.26(e) of the Act, such benefits may be subject to tax 
as a special class of assessable income. This section applies to benefits 
whether given in cash or kind and whether given directly or indirectly 
in relation to employment or services rendered. Though fringe benefits 
may be subject to tax under either s.25(1) because they are income, or 
s.26(e), scope still exists for tax avoidance. It is doubtful whether 
s.26(e) extends to tax fully all benefits given by a taxpayer's employer 
to family members or whether it extends to tax fully all benefits 
accruing to the employee which he receives as part of his employment.
Further opportunity for avoidance exists because the amount subject 
to tax under s.26(e) is the value to the taxpayer of the benefit received. 
However, there are no clear cut rules for determining this value and 
taxpayers have always been able to give reasons why a market value should 
be discounted. Fringe benefits have also given taxpayers the opportunity 
to evade tax either through deliberate undervaluation or deliberate 
omission of the value of the benefits from their annual returns.
4.4.4 Deferment of Income
Other defects in the Act allow some taxpayers to defer tax. For 
instance, the Act does not require professional practices to include 
the value of work in progress in net income for the year. Revenue is 
not recognised until the work has been completed and transformed into 
a recoverable debt. Professional practices can defer tax by postponing 
completion of work until after the end of the year of income. In many 
cases this may simply mean that all work is done except for invoicing.
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Dividend income can also be deferred where one or two holding 
companies are interposed between the company generating the income and 
the ultimate recipients. Table 4.4 shows how this is done where two 
holding companies are used.
TABLE 4.4



















*The Table assumes that company XYZ derives income during the year ended 30 June 1983."
Provided the holding companies pass the dividends on then no tax 
will be payable by them on the dividends and the individual shareholders 
will have an additional two years before they will be required to pay 
the tax. Deferral of dividend income has a number of advantages. Given 
the time value of money it means that the real burden of taxation is 
reduced. It also allows for greater flexibility in choice of the 
ultimate recipients of the dividend income. Where shareholders' incomes 
fluctuate from year to year dividends can be released to shareholders 
when their incomes are low. The passing of time might also allow for 
new tax avoidance schemes to come to light or additional shareholders 
to be found. In the meantime, the proprietors of the companies can have 
full control over and use of the funds involved.
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Taxpayers who carry on business and who recognise income on a
cash basis rather than on an accrual basis also defer income, sometimes
22indefinitely. The decision in Henderson's Case demonstrated one way 
of doing this. Henderson was a member of a firm of accountants which 
had for many years lodged its returns on a cash or receipts basis. 
Although this meant that tax on accounts receivable was deferred the 
Commissioner accepted returns on this basis. For the year ended 30 June 
1965, the firm lodged its return on an earnings basis omitting accounts 
receivable at the beginning of the year. These amounted to $179,000  
and as returns for previous years had been based on a cash basis it 
meant that this change, if successful, would avoid tax ever being paid 
on the amount of the accounts receivable. The Court felt that it was not 
proper to consider previous assessments and decided that the correct 
basis of assessment was an earnings basis.
In  respect o f  schemes contemplated under th is  heading, taxpayers  
must now consider the  provisions o f  S.82KK which l i m i t  the deduction  
otherwise a v a i la b le  where all o f  the  fo llow ing  conditions are met, viz:
(i) a loss or outgoing is incurred by the taxpayer
after 19 April 1978 to an associate of the taxpayer;
(ii) the loss or outgoing is deductible; and
( i i i )  the deduction, ap art  from the operation  o f  S.82KK, 
would be an a llow ab le  deduction to the taxpayer in  
one year o f  income and not assessable as income to the  
assoc iate  u n t i l  a l a t e r  year o f  income.
One of the effects of this provision is to prevent schemes which involve 
arrangements under which interest, while not paid to an associate, was 
accrued and would otherwise be deductible. N.B. The interest would 
not be regarded as income of the associate until a later year when the 
interest was paid. The provision also prevents schemes which involved
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the payment in advance for goods or services that were to be provided 
in future years. Because payment had been made the taxpayers would 
claim deductions for the expense but because the goods or services 
were not provided by the end of the year of income the associate would 
not have treated the receipts as income. Application of S.82KK to such 
schemes means that the deduction for the taxpayer (for the interest 
expense, the goods or services etc) is deferred until the relevant 
amount is paid to the associate, i.e. until that amount is regarded as 
being derived as income.
4.4.5 Deductions for Gifts
Over recent years there have been a number of instances where 
taxpayers have exploited s.78 of the Act - the section providing deduc­
tions for certain gifts. For instance, s.78(l)(aa) allows a deduction 
in respect of gifts of a value of $2 or more of property to, inter alia^ 
public libraries, public museums or public art galleries in Australia.
The deduction allowed is the value of the gift having regard to valuations 
made by persons accepted as proper valuers and registered with the 
Department of Home Affairs. One scheme, exploiting this provision, 
which received publicity involved a group of businessmen who made a gift 
of a pre-Columbian art collection to the National Gallery of Victoria.
The collection was purchased for about $1 million but was valued for 
purposes of s.78(l)(aa) at three times its cost. Following the publicity 
the Government moved to block similar occurrences for gifts made after 
15 October 1981.
Another example of exploitation of the gift provisions is evident
23in FCT V Coppleson, The taxpayer, a medical practitioner, on advice 
from his financial adviser purchased 39,990 shares of $1 each in his
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family company and within two days transferred ownership of those 
shares, by way of gift, to a public hospital. The Court allowed the 
taxpayer's appeal though it did limit the amount of the deduction to 
$24,000. The fact that the taxpayer was motivated, to some extent, 
to reduce his tax burden was not sufficient reason to deny him the 
deduction.
4.4.6 Use of Exempt Status of Certain Bodies and Associations
Section 23 of the Act exempts from tax the income of certain bodies 
and associations, e.g. (i) s.23(e) exempts the income of a religious, 
scientific or public educational institution; (ii) s.23(f) exempts the 
income of a trade union or the income of an association of employers; 
and (iii) S.23F exempts the income of particular superannuation funds. 
However, it seems that there have been several tax avoidance schemes 
which have exploited the exempt status of certain of these bodies. 
According to a press release by the Treasurer on 24 June 1980, a number 
of schemes have been used including the following:
A person assigns rights to income to an exempt body and 
receives in return a capital sum that is, by only the amount 
of the 'fee' payable, less than the amount of the income.
A person with a crop ready for harvesting (or cattle about 
to be sold) enters into partnership with an exempt body, . 
which pays to the person a capital amount for its 75 per cent 
interest in the partnership. The special provisions of the 
income tax law that apply to variations of interests in 
trading stock and related property are used to transfer the 
crop (or cattle) to the partnership for a relatively small 
amount fortax purposes, so that when the partnership sells 
the produce, the exempt body's 75 per cent share of the 
partnership's tax profit is received tax free.
A person enters into successive partnerships with an exempt 
body. The person has a 99 per cent interest, and the exempt 
body a 1 per cent interest, in the first partnership. This 
partnership buys and sells cattle, most of which are traded 
at little or no profit for a relatively small price. The 
acquisition of these cattle is claimed to give a relatively 
low average cost to much more valuable beasts that the
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partnership has bought and owns when, as part of the tax 
avoidance arrangement, the partners go into the second 
partnership, in which their profit shares are reversed.
The Government has since enacted a new Division (Division 9C) to prevent 
schemes which divert income to these organisations or funds and the 
maximum marginal rate (60# in the dollar, for 1982/83) now applies to
such diverted income. Schemes which diverted income prior to 24 June
1980, however, were not affected.
4.4.7 Trading Stock Provisions
Normally, when trading stock is disposed of otherwise than in the 
ordinary course of business, the market value of that stock is assessable, 
But for partnerships where one or more persons retain a continuing 
interest of at least 25% in the stock, s.36A(2) allows the stock to be 
transferred at cost. These provisions have been the foundation of tax 
avoidance. In a press release, 30 January 1981, the Treasurer gave 
details of one scheme:
A primary producer has cattle that are worth $525,000,
but the cost of which for tax purposes is $50,000. The
taxpayer enters into a livestock trading partnership with 
a company which the promotional matter describes as 'having 
the capacity to absorb large amounts of assessable income'.
The taxpayer has a 25 per cent interest in the partnership 
and the company 75 per cent. The partnership then buys the 
cattle from the taxpayer for $500,000 and sells them for 
$525,000. After selling expenses of $25,000 it is left in 
a break-even cash position.
However, an election is lodged under section 36A(2) of the 
Income Tax Assessment Act with a view to the cattle being 
treated as having been sold to the partnership for $50,000.
That means that the partnership has a tax profit of $450,000 
($525,000 sale price less deemed cost of $50,000 and selling 
expenses of $25,000). The profit is allocated to the taxpayer 
($112,500) and the company ($337,500).
The taxpayer's tax position is then - again according to the 
promotional matter - that he has assessable income of $112,500 
which is to be reduced by commission and management fees of 
$40,000 paid under the scheme to another company associated
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with the promoter. The taxpayer's assessable income is 
further reduced by normal operating expenses of $50,000 
leaving a balance of $22,500 on which tax of $7,000 might 
be paid.
The taxpayer's actual financial position is in marked 
contrast. Against receipts of $500,000 from the sale of 
the cattle to the partnership there are the previously 
mentioned operating expenses of $50,000 and the commission 
and management fees of $40,000. When further reduced by 
the tax of $7,000 the taxpayer has a net profit of $403,000.
25The Government has since introduced legislation to counter these 
schemes but the traditional use of s.36A(2) has not been affected.
Such schemes are further evidence that the existence of exemptions 
provides scope for avoidance.
4.4.8 Expenditure Recoupment Schemes
All of the expenditure recoupment schemes including those involving 
marketing of films, acquiring copyrights, purchasing consumable supplies, 
carrying out market research, paying commission for collecting assessable 
income, paying fees for the growing and care of trees and paying fees 
for procuring sound recordings are further instances of avoidance 
resulting from exemptions in the tax base. Though the Government has 
introduced legislation to prevent these expenditure recoupment schemes, 
it does not alter the fact that the more provisions there are providing 
exemptions from the tax base or providing special allowances, rebates 
or deductions, the more scope there is likely to be for tax avoidance.
The 61st Report of the Commissioner of Taxation summarises many 
of the blatant, artificial or contrived schemes for which remedial 
legislation has been introduced. These schemes are outlined in Table
4.5 and include official estimates of the tax deductions (or tax expen­
ditures) claimed as well as the tax reduction sought. The total claims 
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of losses from such schemes, amounted to A$2,543m (approx. stgxl,500m).
4.4.9 Concessional Tax Treatment for Life Assurance Premi ums and Proceeds
Section 82H of the Act was introduced in 1950 to provide, subject 
to specified maxima, allowable deductions for life assurance and super­
annuation fund premiums. This concession, converted to a rebate of tax 
(S.159R) from 1 July 1976, was coupled with s.26(i) which exempted from 
assessable income any reversionary bonus on a policy of life assurance. 
These provisions have been exploited over the years and have required 
amendment in order to prevent further avoidance of tax. Tax avoidance 
schemes included:
(i) taking out life assurance policies, paying premiums for 
only a few years, claiming tax deductions for the amounts 
paid and then cancelling the policies. Taxpayers would 
receive a refund of almost all of their contributions 
and not lose the benefits of deductions at marginal rates 
of up to 66.7%;
(ii) taking out short term policies which were promoted on 
the basis that significant tax free gains would be 
derived within a relatively short period either by
surrendering or obtaining a loan against the policy or
by receiving regular payments of bonuses. This type of 
scheme provided negligible death cover and an annual 
return at a guaranteed rate.
To prevent such schemes amending legislation has been introduced. 
Firstly, since 1 January 1973 premiums for life insurance have not been 
subject to concessional treatment where they relate to short term (i.e. 
less than ten years) policies. Secondly, since 27 August 1982, bonuses 
and other proceeds of certain short term (i.e. less than four years)
life assurance policies will now be subject to tax.
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4.5 ADEQUACY OF THE ANTI-AVOIDANCE PROVISIONS
4.5.1 Section 260
Since 1915 when income tax was first imposed by the Commonwealth 
the Act has attempted to prevent tax avoidance by containing a general 
anti-avoidance provision. From 1936 to 1981 that provision was s.260 
which, in essence, provided that every contract, agreement or arrangement 
which had the purpose or effect of avoiding tax was void, as against 
the Commissioner. The purpose of the section was, according to paragraph 
(c), the prevention of tax avoidance. However, in a strict sense tax was 
avoided whenever an arrangement did not attract every possible future 
liability and it was clear that the legislature could not have meant 
the section to operate in that way. To do so would have brought s.260 
into conflict with other sections of the Act. The Courts recognised 
this potential conflict and restricted the operation of the section.
But this meant that the Courts were not able to apply the usual rules 
of statutory interpretation to the section. Alternative rules had to be 
found and this was a major problem:
The very wide scope of section 260 and its place in the Act 
produces a paradox which is critical to the interpretation 
of the provision. Since section 260 is a back-up provision 
which necessarily overlaps the more specific provisions of 
the Act, it must live in an uneasy compromise with.those 
provisions.
The most significant attempt to find an alternative expression of 
what was intended by s.260 was the "test" laid down by the Privy Council
27in Newton's Case:
In order to bring an arrangement within the section, you must 
be able to predicate - by looking at the overt acts by which 
it was implemented - that it was implemented in that particular 
way so as to avoid tax. If you cannot so predicate, but have 
to acknowledge that the transactions are capable of explanation 
by reference to ordinary business or family dealings, without
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necessarily being labelled as a means to avoid tax then 
the arrangement does not come within the section. ^8
Unfortunately this test was not capable of being translated into criteria 
for determining whether arrangements ought to have been struck down.
The section was still law when this thesis was commenced but was repealed 
on 27 May 1981. The High Court suggested s.260’s repeal as early as 1957 
but, apparently, it was not until much later that the Government saw 
the same need. In June 1979 the Treasurer said, in Parliament, "that 
he hoped to be able to produce the first draft of a new s.260 during 
the Budget Session. He noted that the Government has been working
29extensively on this section." In his speech, on 27 May 1981, intro­
ducing s.260's successor the Treasurer stated why he thought s.260 
had failed:
(i) The language of s.260 was too wide and uncertain.
(ii) It did not permit the purposes of the persons entering 
into an arrangement to be enquired into.
(iii) It did not provide a power or procedure, once an
arrangement was struck down, to reconstruct a taxable 
situation.30
4.5.2 Part IV A
Section 260's replacement. Part IVA, encompasses sections 177A-G, 
which in broad terms, apply if there is "a scheme" which produces a "tax 
benefit" and it could be concluded, having regard to eight specified 
matters, that the purpose of the scheme was to obtain the "tax benefit". 
In those circumstances in which the provisions apply the Commissioner is 
required to make such adjustments as are necessary to cancel the tax 
benefits sought. As yet there have not been any Court cases involving 
Part IV A notwithstanding the Treasurer's warning that the Government
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intends to rely heavily on it:
That the Government intended to rely heavily on new Pt. IV A 
to strike down tax schemes as they emerge 'but not to the 
exclusion of taking ad hoc action if we think it is necessary'.
Mr. Howard went on to say -
It is my understanding that the broad approach would be - 
fairly early in the piece - to see the effectiveness of 
Part IVA tested. If a particular scheme were discovered 
and it was thought likely that that was struck down by Part 
IVA, then Part IVA would be used against that scheme. But 
if it transpired that it were not effective, then obviously 
the Government would have to give' consideration to ad hoc 
action. But we did not spend 2'i years and obtain a lot of 
advice to draft a new anti-avoidance section not to try its 
effectiveness. We believe that it will be effective in 
respect of the sort of artificial schemes that we have seen 
over the past few years and it will be invoked against those 
schemes. Obviously, if it is not held by the courts to be 
effective, we will have to look to ad hoc action. 31
To assess whether the section might be effective two investigations 
could be made. First, the terms of the legislation itself could be 
analysed to see whether there are any apparent defects and secondly, 
the opinion of tax agents could be sought to see whether they think the 
legislation will have its intended effect. Hereunder are the results 
of the first such investigation. The results of the second investigation 
are given in Chapter Six (6.5).
4.5.3 The Terms of Part IVA
[a] MaayUng the. Wô d "Scheme,"
Section 177A defines a "scheme" as:
"(a) any agreement, arrangement, understanding, promise or 
undertaking, whether express or implied, and whether or not 
enforceable or intended to be enforceable, by legal 
proceedings, and 
(b) any scheme, plan, proposal, action, course of action 
or course of conduct" and shall include any "unilateral 
scheme, plan, proposal, action, course of action or course 
of conduct".
Post 27 May 1981 commentary on Part IVA does not suggest any basic
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weakness with this definition. It seems to be sufficiently wide to 
catch almost anything a taxpayer does. Given the history of the 
previous anti-avoidance provision (s.260) it also seems unlikely that 
any significant problems will arise with this definition. The equivalent 
in s.260 was the phrase "any contract, agreement or arrangement" and 
that did not create any real difficulties. Reference to s.l77A(a) shows 
that these words are reproduced in Part IV A as the opening words of 
the definition of a "scheme". The definition is then expanded to cover 
other matters including unilateral actions taken by the taxpayer as 
well as transactions with others.
[b] Meaning the TeAm "Tax Benefit"
Section 177C provides that there will be a "tax benefit" where:
(a) an amount is not included in a taxpayer's assessable 
income, and/or
(b) a deduction is allowed from the taxpayer's income, where 
that amount or deduction would be, or might reasonably 
be expected to be, included in or disallowed from his 
assessable income if the scheme had not been entered 
into or carried out.
Two qualifications exist regarding this definition. Firstly, s.l77C(2) 
provides that where the tax benefit arises from a scheme involving 
"the making of a declaration, election or selection, the giving of a 
notice or the exercise of an option, expressly provided for by the Act, 
the scheme will fall outside the ambit of Part IV A". Secondly, 
s.l77E(l) extends the meaning of the term "tax benefit" to include a 
dividend stripping operation or a scheme having substantially the 
effect of a dividend stripping operation. These qualifications aside, 
the primary definition of a "tax benefit" is likely to give rise to 
problems if only because of the vague way in which it is framed. The
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use of the words "might reasonably be expected" pose hypothetical 
questions which must involve some degree of uncertainty.
Another defect in the definition of "tax benefit" is that it does 
not extend to tax avoidance schemes resulting from exploitation of 
provisions relating to rebates, credits, averaging of income, public 
company status, exempt income or withholding tax. This defect has 
been seized upon already by some taxpayers as evidenced by further 
anti-avoidance legislation introduced, effective from 9 February 1982, 
to prevent tax avoidance schemes involving rebates for calls on shares 
in afforestation companies and rebates for monies paid on shares in 
petroleum exploration companies.
(c) UattoAA to Whtc-h RegoAd mu&t be PcUd
Section 177D provides that there are eight matters to which 
regard must be paid before any conclusions are drawn about the "scheme" 
in question. These matters are:
(i) the manner in which the scheme was entered into or 
carried out;
(ii) the form and substance of the scheme;
(iii) the time at which the scheme was entered into and the 
length of the period during which the scheme was 
carried out;
(iv) the result in relation to the operation of this Act
that, but for this Part, would be achieved by the scheme;
(v) any change in the financial position of the relevant
taxpayer that has resulted, will result, or may reasonably 
be expected to result, from the scheme;
(vi) any change in the financial position of any person who 
has, or has had, any connection (whether of a business, 
family or other nature) with the relevant taxpayer.
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being a change that has resulted, will result, or may 
reasonably be expected to result, from the scheme;
(vii) any other consequence for the relevant taxpayer, or for 
any person referred to in sub-paragraph (vi), of the 
scheme having been entered into or carried out; and
(viii) the nature of any connection (whether of a business, 
family or other nature) between the relevant taxpayer 
and any person referred to in sub-paragraph (vi).
Where, having regard to these eight matters, it would be concluded 
that the taxpayer or any other person who entered into or carried out 
the scheme or any part of it did so for the sole and dominant purpose 
of enabling the taxpayer to obtain the tax benefit, then Part IVA 
applies. Though the conclusion required by S.177D will be based on the 
facts in each particular case there is no indication in S.177D, or 
elsewhere in Part IVA, as to which of the eight matters ought to be 
decisive. Nor is there any indication of the weight to be attached 
to each matter.
According to a Second Commissioner of Taxation:
- Regard must be had to all - not just to number (iv) - the tax 
consequence criterion.
- The matters listed are of varying kinds3 and obviously do not have 
equal weight - you can't for example, because there are eight of
them, attach a 12^ per cent mark to each.
- Matters (i) to (iii) , manner, form and substance and timing are 
important - form and substance is very important - hut are in the 
nature of items that help to set the saene, to provide the atmosphere 
of the thing, to get into realities.
- The next three - matters (iv) to (vi) - involve money questions -
the tax saving for the taxpayer, how much he or she is otherwise in
pocket or out of pocket, and the same for connected persons.
- In other words, (iv) to (vi) direct attention to the tax and non-tax 
economic realities of the scheme in question and, I think it fair to 
say, call for a contrast between them.
- Matter number (vii) calls attention to those consequences of the 
scheme for the taxpayer and connected persons that do not simply 
involve a change in tax and other financial circumstances. For
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example, the fact that a scheme has protected a person's assets 
from creditors or from a wife with whom he is in dispute would 
help to explain a transfer of assets. It would usually operate 
in the person's favour.
- Finally, item (viii) directs that all these things be viewed in the 
light of the nature of the connections - business, family or other - 
of the taxpayer and the persons whose financial position is changed 
as a consequence of the scheme. For example, in a family arrangement 
one has to look at things in the context of 'family'. 32
Another difficulty with s.1770 was outlined by Frankel QC, who 
queried the use of the words "... it would be concluded ..." He asked 
who is to have regard to the eight matters specified in S.177D and who 
is to do the concluding. Is it the Commissioner, the Courts or perhaps 
a "reasonable man". Frankel believed this could lead to protracted
33argument and litigation and that this could be Part IVA's fatal flaw.
id] PuApo-6e. 0  ̂Obtcuining a "Tax Benefit"
Once the eight matters are considered. Part IVA will apply if it 
would be oonaluded that the purpose of the scheme was to obtain a tax 
benefit. Traditionally sections enquiring into taxpayers' purposes, for 
example s.26(a), have resulted in a great deal of litigation. While the 
Courts have looked at taxpayers' actions to determine their purposes 
rather than their words there have been results which are hard to under­
stand. If similar problems are to be experienced with Part IVA then the 
use of the word "purpose" might, later, be seen to have been unfortunate.
One other factor which will make a taxpayer's task a little more 
difficult in contesting Part IVA applications is the use of the word 
"concluded" in the phrase "it would be concluded". In the normal course 
of events the Commissioner will make assessments under Part IVA and then, 
following s.190(b), the taxpayer will have to show that it would not be 
concluded. The burden of proof on the taxpayer is, therefore, heavier 
than would otherwise be the case.
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4.5.4 Anti-Avoidance Provisions and International Transactions
Section 136 of the 1936 Income Tax Assessment Act, and equivalent 
sections in previous Acts, have attempted to prevent tax avoidance 
where Australian businesses have been controlled by non-residents. 
Specifically where such a business was carried on and produced either 
no taxable income or less than the amount which, it appeared to the 
Commissioner, might have been expected to be produced, then the Commis­
sioner was authorised to determine the taxable income and the tax payable 
thereon. Prima facie, the section ought to have been a powerful one 
but it, like s.260, proved to be defective. The defects became patently
obvious in 1980, following the decision i r \  f C T  v C o r m o n w e a l t h  A l u m i n i u m  
34
Corp. Ltd, though the Asprey Committee had documented a number of
35defects five years earlier. The defects included the fact that s.136
(i) did not apply to taxpayers who were Australian 
residents;
(ii) did not apply to non-resident taxpayers other than 
companies;
(iii) applied only to non-resident companies whose day to day 
operations were controlled by non-residents;
(iv) applied only to income from a business (i.e. it did not 
apply to interest or dividend income); and
(v) it did not apply unless some income was derived, e.g. 
it did not apply to interest free loans.
To overcome these, and other defects a new division. Division 13, 
was introduced with effect from 27 May 1981. This, coincidentally, is 
the same date as Part IVA became effective. Division 13 is similar in 
many respects to Part IVA, although the former is confined to 
international agreements. However, unlike Part IVA the legislation to 
give effect to Division 13 was not introduced into Parliament until 
24 March 1982.
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Section 136AD is the operative section of the new division and
it authorises the Commissioner to determine a taxpayer's taxable income
and tax liability on the basis of arm's length consideration being paid
in respect of all intematioruxt agreements. An agreement is an inter-
36
national agreement if:
(a) a non-resident supplied or acquired property under an 
agreement otherwise than in connection with a business 
carried on in Australia by the non-resident at or through 
a permanent establishment of the non-resident in 
Australia; or
(b) a resident carrying on business outside Australia supplied 
or acquired property under the agreement, being property 
supplied or acquired in connection with that business.
The main principle behind this definition is to deem an agreement an 
international agreement if a person has the capacity to move profits 
out of Australia. If such a capacity exists then Division 13 applies. 
But like Part IVA a case involving Division 13 is yet to come before 
the Courts to see whether this Division will have its intended effect.
4.5.5 Summary of the Adequacy of General Anti-Avoidance Provisions
The new anti-avoidance legislation. Part IVA, has yet to be 
considered by the Courts and its likely impact is therefore uncertain.
In this part of the thesis an analysis of the terms of the provision 
suggests it does have some weaknesses despite the lengths to which the 
Government is reported to have gone in its drafting. Two things will 
impinge upon its success. Firstly, and most importantly, will be the 
attitude of the Courts towards the new provisions and toward tax 
avoidance. Secondly, will be the attitudes of the accounting and legal 
professions towards tax avoidance. Evidence can be gathered on both 
of these aspects to predict the likely effectiveness of Part IVA. Some
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indication of the Courts' attitude is evident in recent decisions.
The mood of the Australian Courts, particularly the High Court, 
seems to have changed. When Sir Garfield Barwick was Chief Justice 
the approach taken in interpreting statutes was a strictly literal 
approach. This seemed to have paved the way for many tax avoidance 
schemes which exploited loopholes in particular provisions. The
37 38 39decisions in Curran's Case, MuVien's Case, Slutzkin's Case, CridZand's
40 41Case and Westrader's Case are some examples of this. The change in 
mood received the following editorial comment:
In the last few years there has been a marked tendency 
to forsake rigorous reasoning for decisions, which 
perhaps, accord with perceived social or moral priorities.̂ ^
Further, it was suggested that "this process is recognisable not only 
in the High Court but also in the Federal Court and, to a lesser degree,
43in some State Supreme Courts."
44The recent decision of the High Court in the Cooper Brookes' Case 
is typical of the present mood. In its tax return the company claimed 
a deduction for prior years' losses. Both the taxpayer and the Commis­
sioner agreed that if the relevant provision, s.80C(3), was given a 
literal interpretation the taxpayer would be entitled to the deduction. 
However, in the circumstances, the Court departed from a literal inter­
pretation to give effect to what it thought was clearly intended by the
45legislature.
This change of emphasis by the Court will be strengthened by (i) 
the insertion of s.lSAA into the Acts Interpretation Act which, in 
effect, provides that:
in the interpretation of a provision of an Act, a 
construction that would promote the purpose or object
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underlying the Act (whether that purpose or object is 
expressly stated in the Act or not) shall be preferred to 
a construction that would not promote that purpose or
object. The section further provides that it shall not be
construed as authorising the consideration of any matter or
document not forming part of the Act,
and (ii) the new approach taken by the House of Lords in tax avoidance 
cases. On 12 March 1981 the House of Lords rejected two appeals over
47"off the peg" tax avoidance schemes. The decision in Ramsay v CIE 
has been reported to be "one of the most significant Revenue cases (in
48the United Kingdom) since the last war". Already the House of Lords 
decision has been referred to, with approval, by the Federal Court of
49Australia. In llbery's Case two members of the Federal Court agreed 
that the principle in Ramsay's Case, of treating "off the hook" tax 
avoidance schemes, as fiscal nullities, was equally applicable in 
Australia as it was in the United Kingdom:
It is our opinion that what their Lordships have said is as 
apt for the Australian legislation as it is for that in 
force in the United Kingdom. It follows that if, contrary 
to our opinion, the expenditure was incurred in gaining or 
producing assessable income, the arrangement pursuant to 
which it was incurred should be treated as fiscally a nullity, 
and thus not resulting in an expenditure incurred in gaining 
or producing the taxpayer's assessable income. ^0
Finally, some mention should also be made about other anti-avoidance 
legislation which the Government has introduced. Part IVA and 
Division 13 have not been the only legislative attacks on tax avoidance. 
Sections 82KH-KK and S.82KL have also been introduced to prevent 
particular tax avoidance schemes. These sections though they received 
Royal Assent on 13 March 1979 and 28 November 1979 respectively, 
operated from the day following their announcement dates, namely 
19 April 1978 and 24 September 1978. Section 82KL has been amended 
since its introduction to ensure that tax avoidance schemes, similar 
to those originally countered, are also prevented. For instance. Act
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No.19 of 1980 was introduced to deny deductions, arising out of tax 
avoidance arrangements, involving certain bad debts. When this Act 
was passed it, like similar amendments to S.82KL, was made retrospective 
to 24 September 1978 - the date the Treasurer first announced the 
provision. In those circumstances in which S.82KJ and S.82KL apply 
their effect is more devastating than would be the effect of Part IVA. 
The sections operate to deny deductions which the taxpayers had sought. 
The Commissioner has no power to mitigate this effect. He has such a 
power when Part IVA applies. Further, where either Part IV A or 
S.82KH-KL could apply then, pursuant to S.177B, it is the latter which 
operates. That is, the more potent of the two alternatives applies, 
but it should be stressed that the provisions of S.82KH-KL are limited 
to a very specialised type of tax avoidance scheme. Perhaps the most 
significant aspect of S.82KL is the Government's willingness to extend 
it to schemes not subject to previous announcements. For instance, on 
4 August 1980, the Treasurer said that the following types of expenditure 
recoupment schemes would be affected by S.82KL (with effect, of course, 
from 24 September 1978):
(i) production or marketing of films or acquisition of 
a copyright of licence on a film;
(ii) operation of gold mines;
(iii) purchase of consumable supplies; and
(iv) carrying out of market research.
When the legislation to prevent these schemes was introduced, on 
7 May 1981, it covered these four schemes and five others which were 
not subject to the earlier announcement. These five new schemes were:
- the cost of acquiring a licence in a copyright subsisting 
in computer software;
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- commissions paid for collecting assessable income;
- costs in growing, care and supervision of trees;
- expenditure for increasing the value of shares in a company 
held as trading stock; and
- expenditure for the production of a master sound recording 
or procuring the production of a master sound recording.
The extension of the legislation to cover these schemes shows, perhaps, 
the Government's resolve to stamp out tax avoidance resulting from 
expenditure reooupment schemes. The likely effectiveness of the 
Government's general anti-avoidance provisions. Part IVA, is, at present, 
still uncertain.
4.6 THE EFFICIENCY WITH WHICH LEGISLATIVE DEFECTS ARE REMEDIED
Efficiency of remedial legislation can be considered in two parts. 
First, the speed with which action is taken to plug loopholes and 
secondly, the effectiveness of that action. If judgment is to be made 
on the efficiency of the Australian Tax System to plug loopholes 
information is required about several things including the date on which 
tax avoidance schemes were brought to the attention of the legislature, 
the date remedial legislation became effective and the extent to which 
those schemes have been discouraged. Unfortunately information is only 
available on one of these, viz. the date remedial legislation became 
effective, and analysis in this part is limited accordingly. Some 
general observations can be made. The first concerns the administrative 
process by which the legislature usually becomes aware of tax avoidance 
schemes.
If a taxpayer is involved in a tax avoidance scheme it might be 
two years before the legislature acts to prevent it. Claims for
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deductions resulting from such schemes made during the year ended 
30 June 1982 might relate to transactions carried out as early as 
1 July 1981. If lodgement of returns is delayed these claims might not 
come to the attention of the Tax Office until March 1983. Further time 
might elapse before assessments are made and/or the Treasurer is informed 
Delays might then occur before he announces remedial legislation. In
all up to two years can elapse from the date of the original trans-
siactions. This is unsatisfactory and can result in avoidance by others.
52The delays in legislating against "Curran Schemes" is a particularly 
pertinent example. Newspaper reports estimate the revenue lost from 
this scheme was between A$400 million and A$1,000 million. The scheme 
was carried out in the 1968-69 tax year yet remedial legislation was not 
effective until 16 August 1977. Transcripts of the Court's decision 
were available in 1974. The only more blatant instance of legislative 
neglect was the failure, until 1981, to repeal s.260. The deficiencies 
of this section have received comment earlier in this chapter. The 
Courts brought the inadequacies of s.260 to the Government's attention 
as early as 1957 when Justice Kitto said:
Section 260 is a difficult provision, inherited from 
earlier legislation, and long overdue for reform by someone 
who will take the trouble to analyse his ideas and define 
his intentions with precision before putting pen to paper. 53
Following the 1982 Commonwealth Budget the Treasurer, in late 
August 1982, announced that there might be, in future, attempts to make 
improvements in this area. He was reported to have stated that he
intended to convene a conference with various State and 
Territory officials to discuss the question of tax 
avoidance and to examine any specific proposals from 
Tax or Corporate Affairs Commissioners aimed at improving 
tax law and tax collection and recovery. 54
Subsequently, on 27 September 1982, the Treasurer convened a meeting
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in Sydney of Commonwealth, State and Territory treasurers, or their 
representatives. In a joint statement the treasurers are reported to 
have said that
... having regard to the importance of information in 
preventing avoidance practices, a committee of appropriate 
Commonwealth, State and Territory officers be asked to 
report by December 1st [1982 ... to recommend ...] appropriate 
legislative measures to maximise exchange of information ... 55
[N.B. This meeting, therefore, seems to have failed to have achieved 
the Commonwealth Treasurer's expectation of coming up with joint legis­
lative proposals to prevent loss of tax revenue.]
4.7 SUMMARY
The purpose of this chapter was to determine the extent to which 
the Australian Tax System provides-taxpayers with the opportunity to 
avoid income tax. A review of the literature suggested that this could 
be done by evaluating tax avoidance opportunities in five main areas. 
Each of these areas was, in turn, considered and it was found that:
(a) Non-wage and salary earners seem to have considerable scope 
for avoidance of tax by splitting income. Business income can be split 
through companies, partnerships, trusts and excessive payments for goods 
supplied or services rendered. Property income can be split by gifts 
of capital or deeds of assignment. Taxpayers are not limited to any one 
means nor are they limited to the means outlined. Whether or not these 
means of splitting income were ever intended by the legislature to be 
available is difficult to determine. Certainly the Asprey Committee 
viewed many of them with disapproval, particularly because they were not 
available to all taxpayers. In particular, wage and salary earners or 
sole traders are disadvantaged. Table 4.6 compares the tax burdens
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assuming four different business structures and three different income 
levels.
TABLE 4.6
Tax Payable under Alternative Business Structures1982-83
Business Income Business Income Business Income $20,000 $50,000 $100,000
Tax  ̂ Tax  ̂ Tar  ̂ 2̂/"
tÿtSiz
Sole Trader $3,954 100% $19,744 100% $49,744 100%
Company 4,164 105 15,432 78 39,424 79
Partnership 3,397 86 14,434 73 41,413 83
Trust 2,440 62 12,999 66 37,433 75
In almost all instances the sole trader pays the greatest amount of tax 
and tax is avoided if one of the other three structures is adopted. The 
exception is at the lowest income level where, under the assumptions 
adopted, more tax is payable if a company structure is used. This can 
be avoided if salary levels are increased (e.g. to $15,000 and $5,000 
respectively).
Except, perhaps, for some professional practices there is nothing 
preventing most family businesses from being carried on by trustees, 
partnerships or companies. However, tax avoidance through income 
splitting is not available to persons who derive income by way of wages 
or salary. Such persons are taxed in the same way as sole traders but 
unlike sole traders do not have the opportunity to elect an alternative 
business structure. This inequity was recognised by the Asprey Committee 
which recommended various changes to restore equity. In particular the 
Committee was opposed to those situations in which a person split income 
but still had power to control the disposition of it.
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(b) A number of means are still available for taxpayers to 
convert potential income receipts into capital. The process is not 
strictly one of conversion of income into capital but of taking steps
to ensure that an amount, when received, is capital not income. Whatever 
steps have to be taken must be taken before the amounts are due to be 
received. Where property is disposed of opportunity exists to avoid 
tax. This may involve switching ownership of that property from one 
family member to another. If the property is a natural resource, 
potential income receipts can be converted into capital by ensuring 
that the agreement provides for payment for loss of a capital asset 
rather than payment per unit of the natural resource. Shareholders 
and retiring employees also have the opportunity to avoid tax if they 
defer receipt of particular payments until after the company has been 
dissolved or until after retirement, as the case may be. Legislation has 
been introduced to prevent some schemes but until capital gains are 
brought within the tax base there will always be scope for avoidance of 
tax by converting income into capital. The absence of a tax on capital 
gain must, in part, be responsible for providing the opportunity for 
at least some of the tax avoidance in this area.
(c) There are a number of exemptions from the tax base which provide 
scope for avoidance of tax. Some of those discussed in this chapter 
emanate partly from lack of provisions in the Act and partly from defects 
in enacted provisions. The Act fails to tax all ex-Australian income, 
certain fringe benefits and prizes. Gifts and proceeds from casual sales 
do not attract tax at all. Where tax cannot be avoided it can, in some 
cases, be deferred, and given the time value of money this also results
in a loss of real resources for the Government. Not all exemptions from 
the tax base have been discussed in this chapter. Those which represent
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deliberate policy have been excluded, e.g. dependent rebates (s.l59J,K,L), 
concessional rebates (s.l59N), zone allowances (s.79A) and living away- 
from-home allowances (s.51 A). Schemes exploiting these provisions are 
generally evasion rather than avoidance. Some writers have argued that 
the above exemptions narrow the tax base and can lead to secondary 
evasion, i.e. taxpayers who are not entitled to the concessions may 
consider themselves to be treated unfairly because others are entitled 
to the benefits. Consequently, they adjust their tax burdens by evading 
tax so as to restore the perceived inequity.
(d) The anti-avoidance provisions have not been effective in 
preventing tax avoidance. In particular, s.260 did not prevent blatant, 
artificial or contrived schemes which exploited loopholes in other 
provisions of the Act. The section has only recently been replaced,
by Part IV A and this new section is yet to be considered by the Courts. 
The Government has expressed its resolve to apply this new provision at 
an early date and to take follow up action if it is necessary. Whether 
the new provision will be effective will depend, to a large extent, 
on the approach of the Courts. Present indications are that Part IVA 
will be given wider application than its predecessor but only time will 
tell.
(e) Insufficient information is available to determine how 
efficiently the Australian tax system plugs up loopholes in the Act.
What evidence is available does not support the view that it is efficient. 
For instance, the legislature was extremely slow in replacing s.260 
and was slow in introducing legislation to prevent "Curran Schemes".
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Thus, it appears that the Australian tax system has provided 
considerable opportunity for tax avoidance. This opportunity has not 
been equally available to all taxpayers with wage and salary earners 
having had least opportunity. The new anti-avoidance legislation should 
reduce the scope for blatant, artificial and contrived schemes of tax 
avoidance. However, while the rate scale remains steeply progressive, 
while capital gains go untaxed, while there are exemptions to the tax 
base and while tax laws are unnecessarily complex, there will always be 
scope for some taxpayers to avoid tax.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
A S U R V E Y  ON T A X  E V A S I O N
5.1 SURVEY OBJECTIVES
Tax evasion occurs not simply because some taxpayers have the 
opportunity to evade tax. It requires a desire or motivation on the 
part of the taxpayer to evade as well as the opportunity to do so.
Research into evasion has often tended to confuse these two influences.
An evaluation of the Australian tax system considering how it contributes 
to evasion by providing opportunities for would-be evaders was made in 
Chapter Three. Here it is proposed to outline a way of determining
factors which might motivate Australian taxpayers to evade tax by
1
omitting income. To achieve this purpose it is necessary to obtain 
information from those taxpayers themselves. Unfortunately, survey 
research elsewhere on tax evasion has met with very low response rates 
because of the sensitivity of the topic. In this study it is proposed 
to obtain information from two different populations: first, a sample
of taxpayers from the general population; second, a sample of convicted 
evaders. The same questionnaire will be distributed to samples from 
both populations and the replies will be analysed and compared so that 
various hypotheses concerning taxpayers' motivations for evading tax 
can be tested. An attempt will also be made to see whether various 
background characteristics of evaders and non-evaders can be distinguished
Traditional methodology will also be applied to the responses 
received from the general population. This will enable the hypotheses 
to be tested a second time and will enable the methodologies to be 
compared. The hypotheses to be tested are those set out in Chapter Two,
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Table 2.3. For convenience that table is summarised in Table 5.1.
TABLE 5.1






(i) Perceptions that tax rates are too high.(ii) Perceptions that the tax system is unfair.(iii) Perceptions that the Government spends taxpayers' money unwisely.
(i) Basic predisposition away from the State and the law in general.(ii) Influence of groups on individual behaviour, particularly the number of evaders known by a taxpayer.
(i) Tax administration too coercive, e.g. tax enforcement too oppressive or too obvious.(ii) Tax administration perceived to be ineffective.
The questionnaire was also used to determine taxpayers' attitudes 
to some related issues as well as to determine four background charac­
teristics of respondents. As with many surveys free space was provided 
to allow respondents to express their views on matters pertaining to 
the survey. Given in Table 5.2 are the question numbers and the 
reason(s) each question was asked.
5.2 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
5.2.1 Sample Size
From the outset it was evident that the only possible means of 
conducting a nationwide survey was by way of mail questionnaire. The 
geography of Australia was only one of the potential problems faced.
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TABLE 5.2
Purpose of Each Question in Tax Evasion Questionnaire
Question(s) Purpose(s)
l(a)-(b) To test the "exchange relationship" hypothesis.2(a)-(b)
6(a)-(c) test the "social orientation" hypothesis.
4(a)-(c) To test the "administrative control" hypothesis..
3 To determine respondents' attitudes to small scaleand large scale evasions.
5 and 8 To determine respondents' knowledge about aspects ofthe tax system, in particular penalties for evasion and rates of tax.
7 To determine respondents' "tax ethic" for small scaleand large scale evasions and to compare it with their ethic for another property crime.
9 To determine respondents' orientation to commit smallscale and large scale* evasions of tax.
10 To determine respondents' perceptions of their chancesof successfully evading tax on small and large amounts of income.
11 To determine background characteristics of respondents.
A shortage of time, limited research funds and lack of research assistance
prevented other forms of data gathering, especially personal interviewing,
2from being undertaken. The amount of funds available also limited the 
size of the mail questionnaire.
A sample of 500 from the general population was used and this 
sample was the maximum size possible given available resources. However 
the use of Chebyshev-type inequalities indicated that a sample of this 
size was likely to provide reasonable estimates of the population propor­
tions. Technical assistance was solicited in using the Camp-Meidell
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Inequality to show that the probability of the actual sample proportion 
being more than 2.5% removed from the population proportion was at most
30.3555. To reduce the probability to 0.05 would have required a sample 
size of 3554 - seven times greater than that which could be funded.
When it is remembered that the sample from the general population was 
to be matched by a sample, of equal size, from the population of convicted 
evaders, it meant that the survey would have required a mailing of over 
seven thousand questionnaires, seven thousand advance letters and several 
thousand follow up letters, a task far beyond the resources of this 
researcher.
5.2.2 Survey Population
One of the methodological problems encountered in carrying out
surveys is deciding from whom to collect the information; i.e. deciding
upon or defining the population. Moser and Kalton suggest that in doing
so "it is useful to distinguish between the population for which the
results are required, the target population^ and the population actually
!+covered, the survey population". They also suggest that "ideally the 
two will be the same, but for practical reasons there will usually be
5some differences between them." This survey was no exception and it 
was soon apparent that the survey population and target population 
differed.
What would have been desirable would have been target populations 
comprising:
(i) all taxpayers who, at the time of responding, evaded tax; and
(ii) all taxpayers who, at that same time, did not evade tax.
However, for various reasons given hereunder, the sample populations 
comprised:
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(a) taxpayers who had been oonvioted for evading tax and whose names appeared, as a result thereof, in Schedule 1 ofthe 60th Report of the Commissioner of Taxation 1980-81; and
(b) persons whose names appeared on the Commonwealth Electoral Rolls at 30 November, 1981.
Other attempts to construct population frames failed. Both the
Commissioner of Taxation and the Australian Bureau of Statistics were
asked to provide information for this purpose but both declined to do
so. The latter, by letter dated 5 June 1981, advised that they did not
have the requested information. The former, by letter dated 30 September
1980, advised that the secrecy provisions of the Income Tax Assessment
6
Act 1936 precluded the disclosure of the information sought. It was 
hoped that the Commissioner of Taxation would provide a fuller sample 
of evaders as well as a sample of taxpayers other than evaders. Alter­
natively, it was hoped that the Australian Bureau of Statistics would 
provide a random sample of taxpayers from the general population.
The target populations and the survey populations differed in at 
least two important respects. First, the survey population of "evaders" 
was one of some of the evaders who had evaded tax. This was inevitable 
because the only available list of names of evaders was that in Schedule 1 
of the Annual Report of the Commissioner of Taxation and this list 
comprised the names of only some of the evaders. A taxpayer's name 
appeared in this list only where:
(i) the taxpayer had understated the taxable income;
(ii) the taxpayer did not voluntarily make a full and truedisclosure of the understated taxable income;
(iii) the amount of additional tax under s.226(2) exceeded $1,250and the total additional tax was more than 25 per cent ofthe increased tax resulting from the investigation; and
(iv) the case had reached finality in the sense that thetaxpayer had exhausted all rights of objection and appeal.
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The list of names, therefore, did not include all taxpayers charged 
additional tax under s.226(2), nor did it include taxpayers who had been 
charged additional tax under other sections of the Act. In fact, as 
Table 5.3 shows, the list contained less than 1% of the names of tax­
payers who had been charged additional tax.
TABLE 5.3
Imposition of Additional Tax for Various Evasions ofIncome Tax for the Period 1 July, 1979 to 30 June, 1980
Section Number of Additional Tax
of Act Taxpayers Charged$m
S.226 (1 ) 125,637 17.23
s.226 (2) 42,718 69.00
s.223 34,117 2.08
s.227, 230 & 231 442 0.20Other 13,493 1.95
(a) Total Number Charged . 216,407 $90.47m
Number of taxpayers whose names appeared in the list 
Less Corporate taxpayers, and Deceased individuals 7727





[N.B. b ^ 100 a ^ 1 216407 * ^1° " 0-67%]
Though the list of names contained less than one percent of tax­
payers who were charged additional tax it contained the names of evaders 
who
(i) were charged under the most important section imposing penalties. In fact, according to Table 5.3, over 75% of all additional tax charged was charged under s.226(2); and
(ii) were charged, on average, more tax than other taxpayers were charged. Under s.226(2) the average of additional tax charged for taxpayers whose names appeared in Schedule 1 was approx. $4,000* each whereas the average, from Table 5.3, was approx. $1,600** each.
[* $6,335,989 V 1557 ** $90,463,786 . 216,407]
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The second major difficulty with the survey population was that 
it contained only the names of taxpayers who had evaded tax and who had 
been caught and penalised for doing so. Such taxpayers once detected 
and penalised might no longer evade tax. Alternatively, they might 
continue to evade as some research suggests, especially where the under­
lying reasons remain or where the audit experience was unpleasant.
The target and survey populations for the general population also 
differed. Ideally one would have liked to draw a random sample from 
a general population of taxpayers who were not tax evaders. However, 
it was only possible to draw a random sample of persons whose names 
appeared on the Commonwealth Electoral Rolls. Although a person was 
not eligible to be enrolled if he had been convicted of certain offences 
tax evasion was not one of them. The electoral rolls could, therefore, 
have contained the names of both evaders and non-evaders. Table 5.4 
shows the total number of persons enrolled at 30 November 1981.
TABLE 5.4
Number of Persons whose Names appear on the Commonwealth of Australia's Electoral Rolls, as at 30 November, 1981
e/Territory Number %
A.C.T. 135,965 1.47N.S.W. 3,258,560 35.27N.T. 55,443 0.60QLD. 1,391,155 15.06S.A. 851,521 9.22TAS. 269,050 2.91VIC. 2,498,595 27.05W.A. 777,935 8.42
9,238,224 100.00
[Source: Commonwealth Electoral Rolls]
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Another difficulty with the Commonwealth Electoral Rolls was that 
they could not have been used to produce a strictly random sample
7because rolls for individual electorates were made up at different dates. 
Thus it was possible for the names of individuals who moved from one 
State to another, to have appeared on two rolls. However, it was 
considered that the divergences were likely to have been slight.
5.2.3 Pilot Survey
Survey questions were pretested with a pilot survey conducted in 
March/April 1981. Limited resources restricted the pilot survey 
sample in two ways: first, the sample size was limited to one hundred
and second, the population frame was confined to New South Wales residents 
As with the full scale survey, this survey was divided into two popu­
lations but the size of each was only fifty; i.e. fifty "evaders" and 
fifty "non-evaders". An eight page mail questionnaire was sent to a 
random sample from each group. Each group was further subdivided into 
two subgroups of equal size to test whether the response rate was 
influenced by offering only one of the subgroup an incentive to reply.
The chosen incentive was a biro and because the survey dealt with the 
"black economy" it was considered that the appropriate colour of the biro 
should be black! Of the one hundred questionnaires which were mailed 
eight were returned unopened leaving an effective mailing of ninety-two; 
from these, thirty-five responses were received as shown in Table 5.5.
TABLE 5.5
Number of Responses to the Pilot Survey on Tax Evasion
Incentive No Incentive Total 
"Evaders" 9 7 16"Non-Evaders" 2 1  5 19
23 12 35
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A chi-square test on the responses revealed no statistical difference 
between the two groups, i.e. between the number of responses from evaders 
and non-evaders. When the chi-square test was repeated to determine 
the influence of the incentive on responses it was found that the 
incentive made no difference to responses from "evaders" (x^ = 0.25) but 
did make a difference on responses from "non-evaders" (x^ = 4.26; with 
x^ 0.05 = 3.84151, d f =l). The relatively low response rate (38%) was 
worrying and ways of improving it, for the full scale survey, were
sought. In planning for the full scale survey it was decided to:
(i) draw samples of equal sizes from the two survey populations;
(ii) persist with the idea of offering both evaders and non­evaders a black biro as an incentive to reply even though itonly made a significant difference in responses from non­evaders;
(iii) shorten the questionnaire by omitting some questions not directly related to the-main hypotheses;
(iv) have the final questionnaire typed on foolscap sizedpaper and then have it photo-reduced to A4 size, to makeit appear smaller; and
(v) personalise all communications with respondents. In fact Erodos and Morgan® argue that personalising communications is the best, and perhaps the only, way to get a high response rate. With this in mind it was decided that allletters should be personally signed^ and that the firstname of each addressee be handwritten at the top of each letter.
Some changes were made to the questions asked in the pilot survey but 
an effort was made to limit the number of changes so that a second pilot 
survey was unnecessary. Changes were also made to remedy apparent 
defects in questions and to shorten question length.
Comments received from some of the "non-evaders" suggested the 
reason they did not evade tax was because they did not have the opportunity 
to do so. Had they had the opportunity to evade tax then they would, 
they said, have evaded it. This type of comment suggested that it might
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be as well to include questions asking respondents to indicate their 
perceptions of their opportunities for evading tax and their perceptions 
of their chances of success if they did evade tax. The addition of 
these questions might then help to explain some of the differences in 
the incidence of evasion should the three main hypotheses fail to do 
so. That is, the fact that some do not evade tax might merely reflect 
their lack of opportunity to do so and not the absence of motivational 
influences.
5.3 SURVEY RESPONSES
The same questionnaire was sent to samples (n = 500) from both 
populations, namely the general population (hereinafter referred to as 
"non-evaders") and convicted evaders (hereinafter referred to as "evaders"). 
It should, perhaps, be emphasised that individuals receiving the ques­
tionnaires were not aware that these two groups had been generated or 
that the author knew that they necessarily belonged to one of them.
All that individuals were told was that their addresses had been taken 
from the electoral rolls. This was in fact true. However, their names 
had been taken from different sources. Questionnaires were distinguished 
by the angle of the staple in the top left hand corner. All usable 
responses received within six weeks of questionnaire mailing were 
included in the results. Full details about responses from both groups 
are shown in Table 5.6.
Responses for each survey were classified by date of receipt with 
'late' responses being assumed to be those received after the follow-up 
letters were mailed. This enabled tests to be carried out to test for 
non-response bias. The 'late' response category was assumed to be an
191
TABLE 5.6






Total number of questionnaires ma i1ed 500 500
Number of questionnaires returned unopened 11 17
Effective mailings 489 483
Responses received 216 219
Responses not usable 9 14
Usable responses 207 205
Effective response rate
. usable responses TOO ^ .-yeffective mailings 1
accurate reflection of the likely responses from those who did not
10reply. Chi-square independence tests and analysis of variance tests, 
as required, were used to test for non-response bias and it was found 
that:
(i) on all thirty questions there was no statistically 
significant difference between early and late replies 
received from the "non-evader" group. That is, there 
was no non-response bias on any question for this group.
(ii) for twenty-seven of the thirty questions there was no 
statistically significant difference between early and 
late replies received from the "evader" group. That is, 
for almost all questions, there was no non-response bias. 
However, there was a significant difference, at the 5% 
level, between 'early' and 'late' responses on three 
questions.il Care was taken in analysing these questions 
and before inferences were drawn results were recomputed 
to take account of the bias. Fortunately, each question 
was only a component part of tests to be carried out.
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For instance, there was non-response bias on question 
10(i) but not on lO(ii) and lO(iii) and all three parts 
involved the same point. They differed only in degree, 
viz. 10(i) involved $100, lO(ii) $1,000 and lO(iii) $10,000. 
Surprisingly there was no non-response bias on questions 
which elicited responses on taxpayers' approval/disapproval 
for evasion practices. For instance, questions 3(a)-(c) 
asked taxpayers about their approval for small scale and 
large scale evasions and no difference was found in 
responses given by 'early' and 'late' respondents. Overall 
there was little reason to expect bias.
When the comparisons between responses from evaders (adjusted for non­
response bias) and non-evaders were made the results obtained were 
compared with those obtained from comparisons of the unadjusted data.
In only one instance was there a different result (see 5.4). Signifi­
cantly, there were no differences in the results obtained on questions
12relating to the three main hypotheses.
Compared with the pilot survey there was an improved response 
rate for the full scale survey. The improved response rate, an increase 
from 38% to 42%, was attributed to the changes made to questionnaire 
length and format as well as to offering the incentive to all persons sur­
veyed. A copy of the questionnaire is reproduced in full in Appendix 1 
together with the cell counts for each question. For simplicity the 
cell counts for evaders and non-evaders are given alongside one another.
5.4 POSSIBLE CAUSES OF TAX EVASION
One purpose of the survey was to determine whether there were any 
behavioural differences between evaders and non-evaders. According to
13Oppenheim behaviour has two components, viz. "a person's inner
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determinants such as temperament, attitudes, or character traits ...
14and all the environmental factors as perceived by the individual."
He further states that "an attitude scale may indicate inclinations 
towards cheating, but the respondent will probably act honestly if he
15thinks he will be found out."
Behaviour can, therefore, be loosely regarded as a function of 
attitudes and opportunity. This being so it was considered important 
to determine whether evaders and non-evaders gave different answers in 
relation to questions three and ten. These two questions were included 
in the questionnaire to determine taxpayers' attitudes to tax evasion 
and, what this author will call, their opportunity to commit it. The 
answers are given in Tables 5.7 and 5.8.
Chi-square tests of significance, at the 5% level, showed a statis­
tically significant difference of opinion on each of the "attitude" 
questions [q.3(a)-(c)] but on only one of the "opportunity" questions 
[q.lO(ii)], suggesting, perhaps, that attitudes were more important 
than opportunities in determining taxpayers' behaviour. For further 
analysis the information contained in Tables 5.7 and 5.8 was reorganised 
as shown in Tables 5.9 and 5.10.
[N.B. There was evidence of non-response bias on question 10(i). 
Consequently the raw data were adjusted to give new estimates of the 
population proportions. This was done by extrapolating the late 
respondent profile onto the non-respondents. When this was done and 
the responses of evaders were compared with those of the non-evaders 
there was a statistically significant difference between the responses 
of the two groups. The first element of Table 5.8, adjusted for non­
response bias, is shown in Table 5.8A.
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TABLE 5.7
Taxpayers' Attitudes to Small Scale and Large Scale Tax Evasions
Questions Answer s7o
Evaders Non-Evaders
3(a) How do you feel about someone, in circumstances similar to vour own, who omits $100 cash earnings from his income tax return?
Strongly approve 13 6Slightly approve 18 19Indifferent 41 37Slightly disapprove 21 23Strongly disapprove _ _ 7 15
Total 100 100
3(b) How do you feel about someone, in circumstances similar to your own, who omits $1000 cash earnings from his income tax return?
Strongly approve 8 3Slightly approve 10 12Indifferent 29 22Slightly disapprove 38 32Strongly disapprove 15 31
Total 100 100
3(c) How do you feel about someone, in circumstances similar to your own, who omits $10,000 cash earnings from his oncome tax
return? g^ro^gly approve 6 2




Taxpayers' Opportunities to Commit Small Scale and Large Scale Tax Evasion
Questions Answers %
Evaders Non-Evaders
10(i) Some people find it easy to successfullyhide income from the tax man whereas othersfind it hard. What chance would someone like yourself have of successfully hiding 
$100? A very good chance 35 37A good chance 13 20I have no idea 13 10A poor chance 15 15A very poor chance 24 18
Total 100 100
lO(ii) Some people find it easy to successfullyhide income from the tax man whereas othersfind it hard. What chance would someone like yourself have of successfully hiding 
$1,000? A very good chance 8 7A good chance 14 14I have no idea 6 17A poor chance 27 24A very poor chance 45 38
Total 100 100
lO(iii) Some people find it easy to successfullyhide income from the tax man whereas othersfind it hard. What chance would someone like yourself have of successfully hiding 




Taxpayers' Opportunities to Commit Small Scale and Large Scale Tax Evasion (Adjusted for non­response bias)
Questions Answers %
Evaders Non-Evaders
10(i) Some people find it easy to successfully hide income from the tax man whereas others find it hard. What chance would someone like yourself have of successfully hiding $100? A very good chance 30 37A good chance 9 20I have no idea 16 10A poor chance 21 15A very poor chance 24 18
Total 100 100
This recast result does not alter the finding in Table 5.8 that non­
evaders thought that they, on average, had a better chance to hide income 
of $100. It merely increases the gap between the two groups (from 9% 
to 18% - see Table 5.10).]
TABLE 5.9
Percentage of Taxpayers who "Disapproved" of Tax Evasion
Evaders Non-EvadersOmitting Earnings of$ 100 28% 38%1,000 53 6310,000 71 81
TABLE 5.10
Percentage of Taxpayers who had the Opportunity to Evade Tax
Evaders Non-EvadersOpportunity to Omit CashEarnings of $ 100 48%* 57%
1 ,000 22 2110,000 7 2
[This became 39% after adjusting for non-response bias.]
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Table 5.9 shows that for very small evasions, viz. omitting $100 
cash earnings, there was very little disapproval from either group.
Only 28% from the evader group and 38% from the non-evader group 
disapproved of this action. Table 5.9 also shows two trends emerging: 
firstly, at each of the three income levels, a greater percentage of 
non-evaders disapproved of others omitting income from their tax returns; 
and secondly, as the income level increased, an increasing percentage in 
both groups disapproved of omission of income.
As expected, as income level rose perceived opportunity to evade 
fell. This was evident for both evaders and non-evaders. Further, a 
greater percentage of evaders admitted opportunity to evade tax by 
omitting income of $1,000 and $10,000. Surprisingly, however, a smaller 
percentage of evaders admitted opportunity to evade tax by omitting 
small amounts of income of say $100. Perhaps evaders, in general, were 
more guarded in their admissions. But if this was so for $100 why was 
it not so at the $1,000 level and the $10,000 level? Alternatively, 
having been convicted they might now see less opportunity. But again 
why only at this level? Another important feature of Table 5.10 is the 
high proportion (57%) of non-evaders who thought that they could success­
fully hide cash earnings of $100 from the tax man. If Table 5.10 is 
a true indication of the opportunity for small scale evasions, it seems 
then that if taxpayers are prepared to take advantage of those oppor­
tunities small scale evasion could be widespread.
The attitudinal differences between evaders and non-evaders were 
also evident in answers to question 7(b) which asked how seriously 
different tax offences were regarded by respondents. The answers are 
condensed in Table 5.11.
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TABLE 5.11
Percentage of Taxpayers Who Did NOT Regard Tax Evasion as "Serious"
Evaders Non-Evaders
Evading tax o f   $100 68% 56%1 ,000 38 2310,000 16 6
Although there was a majority in both groups (68% and 56% respec­
tively) who did not regard small scale evasion viz. evasion of $100 tax 
as serious, there was a statistically significantly greater percentage 
of evaders who did not regard tax evasion as serious. Further, as the 
size of the offence increased the proportion in both groups, who did not 
regard evasion as serious decreased. That is, both evaders and non­
evaders regarded evasions of larger amounts as more serious than evasions 
of smaller amounts. However, there was no statistically significant 
difference between responses from evaders and non-evaders for evasions 
of tax at the two higher levels. Yet in both instances evaders regarded 
the offences less seriously than did non-evaders.
Findings about the three main hypotheses that were tested are 
given below. After that, in section 5.5, are findings about other atti­
tudinal questions and then, in section 5.6, there is a summary of comments 
received from both groups.
5.4.1 Findings about the "Exchange Relationship" Hypothesis
The exchange relationship hypothesis was tested with questions about 
respondents' perceptions of the level of income tax [Questions 1(a) and 
1(b)], whether they were satisfied with the way the Government spent 
taxpayers' money [Question 2(a)] and whether they were satisfied with 
income tax laws [Question 2(b)]. The questions and responses are repro­
duced in Table 5.12.
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TABLE 5.12
Answers to Questions Relating to the Exchange Relationship Hypothesis
Question Answers %
1(a) What do you think about the amount of income tax you pay compared with the amount you earn?
Evaders Non-Evadé
Much too high 57% 47%A little too high 32 38About right 10 13A little too low 1 1Much too low - 1
Total 100 100
1(b) What do you think about the amount of income tax you pay compared with the amount of Government services from which you, and any dependents you might have, personally benefit?Much too high 41 35A little too high 13 22About right 19 17A little too low 13 17Much too low 14 _ 9
Total 100 100
2(a) How do you feel about the way the Government in Canberra spends your money? Very satisfied 2 1Somewhat satisfied 19 17Indifferent 7 9Somewhat dissatisfied 41 40Very dissatisfied 31 33
Total 100 100
2(b) How do you feel about income tax laws in this country?Very satisfied 1Somewhat satisfied 11 16Indifferent 6 9Somewhat dissatisifed 37 36Very dissatisfied 45 39
Total 100 100
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The results showed that a majority of both evaders and non-evaders 
thought that tax rates were too high, both in relation to earnings and 
Government services received. In relation to earnings 89% of evaders 
and 85% of non-evaders thought that tax rates were too high, and in 
relation to Government services received 54% of evaders and 57% of non­
evaders thought tax rates were too high. Consequently, chi-square tests 
of significance, at the 5% level of significance, revealed that there 
w e r e w  statistically significant differences of opinions between
17evaders and non-evaders for questions 1(a) and 1(b). [N.B. Because
of the low cell counts in question 1(a) the cells were collapsed to 
form a 2 x 2  contingency table but again no statistical difference between 
the two groups was evident.i®]
Earlier research indicated that if tax rates were important in 
influencing taxpayers' behaviour, it was taxpayers' perceptions of those 
rates rather than the actual rates themselves. While questions 1(a) 
and 1(b) sought taxpayers' perceptions of tax rates the author was 
curious to see whether taxpayers knew the actual tax rates. Therefore, 
question 8 asked: "if your annual earnings were $20,000, and you earned
one more dollar how much of that dollar do you think the law requires 
should go in tax?" Both groups underestimated the rate. Evaders, on 
average, guessed 36.3% and non-evaders guessed 36.8%. Analysis of 
variance test between group means showed no difference in the answers 
given. Table 5.13, which summarises the results, shows that only about 
one-third in both groups were close to the correct answer {viz. 46%). 
Chi-square tests on responses, summarised in Table 5.13, showed there 
was no statistically significant difference between the answers given 
by the two groups (%^ = 8.745, df=4). But Table 5.13 showed that only 
37% from each group nominated the correct range (41-50%). If perceptions
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TABLE 5.13 
Taxpayers' Knowledge of Marginal Tax Rates
Marginal tax
Rate if earnin $20,000 p.a.
Tax Per Evaders Non-Eve
Dollar % %
Nil 12 15
or less 19 10
2H - 40<f 18 24
4 1 f - 5 0 f 37 37
Above 50# 14 15
100 100
of tax rates influence the level of evasion one wonders how much more 
evasion there might be if all taxpayers knew the exact rates of tax.
[N.B. Notwithstanding the care taken in wording the question, it is 
possible that respondents gave answers about the average rate of tax 
rather than the marginal rate. The average rate of tax was 26.8%. 
Respondents' perceptions about this average rate were excessive - by 
some 10 percentage points - perhaps reflecting their opinion that tax 
rates were seen to be high. ]
Table 5.12 shows that about three-quarters of respondents in both 
groups were dissatisfied with (i) the way the Federal Government was 
spending their money; and (ii) the income tax laws in Australia. Again 
chi-square tests on responses to both questions, 2(a) and 2(b), revealed
19
no statistical difference. If these views reflect those of the general
20population then it would seem that the great bulk (almost 90%) of
Australian taxpayers think, therefore, that tax rates are too high. Also,
21over 70% think that the Government spends taxpayers' money unwisely
22and almost 80% are dissatisfied with our income tax laws. Because of 
the similarity in responses between the two groups it was difficult for 
the "exchange relationship" hypothesis to distinguish responses from the 
two groups.
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5.4.2 Findings about the "Social Orientation" Hypothesis
The social orientation hypothesis was tested by questions seeking 
to determine respondents' basic predisposition to the State and its laws 
and the influence of groups on individual behaviour, particularly the 
number of evaders known to a respondent. The social orientation hypo­
thesis was tested with questions 2(c)-(d) and questions 6(a)-(c). The 
questions and responses are given in Table 5.14.
Evaders Non-Evaders
TABLE 5.14
Answers to Questions Relating to the SocialOrientation Hypothesis
_ , . Answers %Question
2(c) How do you feel about laws (other than tax laws) in this country?Very satisfied Somewhat satisfied Indifferent Somewhat dissatisfied Very dissatisfied
2(d) How do you feel about the way you have been treated in dealings with Government
Departments? satisfied
Somewhat satisfied Indifferent Somewhat dissatisfied Very dissatisfied
We all hear about people cheating on their income tax returns but some of us hear about it more often than others. If ten(10) people known to you were "offioially 




little (say omitting less than $100 earnings) lot (say omitting more than $1,000 earnings) great deal (say omitting more than $10,000 earnings)
8 135 3614 1932 3311 11
100 100








Chi-square tests of significance were applied to responses for 
questions 2(c) and 2(d) and these revealed a statistically significant
23 24difference on the first question but not on the second. However,
/ X 25with question 2(c) there was a cell count less than five in one space. 
Cells were collapsed to eliminate this low count and form a 2 x 2
contingency table. The chi-square test was then repeated, however no
26difference was found in the responses of the two groups. Further, 
when the initial statistically significant difference was closely 
examined, the direction of the relationship was opposite to that expected 
Prior theory suggested that if there was a difference then it should be 
non-evaders who were more satisfied with non-tax laws. This was not the 
case. Only 39% of non-evaders were satisfied with non-tax laws compared 
with 43% of evaders who were satisfied. Finally, it also seemed odd to 
find roughly the same percentage, about 40%, of both groups dissatisfied 
with non-tax laws. This bi-modal distribution was also evident for 
both groups for the question dealing with taxpayers' level of satis­
faction in dealings with Government departments. No simple explanation 
offers itself. Further enquiries need to be made.
Analysis of variance tests were applied to responses for question 6 
(the question dealing with the number of evaders known to respondents) 
and it was found that, at the 5% level of significance, there was a 
statistically significant difference between the means in two of the
27three cases. It was also found that, on average, evaders in each 
of the three cases thought they knew more evaders than did non-evaders. 
Though the difference was not statistically significant for very large 
evasions (omitting >$10,000 of cash earnings) it was statistically 
different for small (<$100) and medium (>$1,000) evasions. What was 
also somewhat surprising was the number of respondents from the general 
population, that is the "non-evader" group, who thought they knew others
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who omitted income at each of the three levels. Seventy-one percent 
of the general population thought they knew at least one person who 
omitted cash earnings of $100, 63% thought they knew of at least one 
person who omitted cash earnings of $1,000 and 46% thought they knew 
of at least one person who omitted cash earnings of $10,000. The respec­
tive percentages for evaders were 76%, 75% and 55%.
Evasion, particularly of small amounts, could be quite widespread, 
and even evasion of large amounts might also be relatively significant.
For example, based on the general population's responses to question 
6(c) it would seem that about 25% of people omit $10,000 of cash earninos 
from their income tax returns fx= 2.449) and about 40% omit at least 
$100 cash earninas (x= 3.756). But it should be emohasised that these 
estimates are based on resoondents' perceptions, about others' behaviour, 
and may not necessarily reflect reality.
5.4.3 Findings about the "Administrative Control" Hypothesis
The administrative control hypothesis argues that tax evasion is 
likely to be influenced by control systems which are too weak or too 
oppressive. In the survey questions 4(a)-(c), in effect, asked taxpayers 
how satisfied they were with aspects of income tax administration and 
tax enforcement activities of the Tax Office. The responses are 
summarised in Table 5.15. Because answers from respondents who indicated 
that the question was not applicable are excluded, the number of responses 
in each column varied. These variations do not show up in Table 5.15 
because the figures are shown as percentages.
Chi-square tests on three of the four questions revealed statis-
28tically significant differences at the 5% level of significance.
205
TABLE 5.15
Answers to Questions Relating to the Administrative Control Hypothesis
Question

























4(c) How satisfied are you with "official 









Only question 4(b), the question relating to provisional tax (a method 
of paying tax), showed no statistically significant difference. Of 
importance was the statistically significant difference obtained on 
question 4(c) relating to taxpayers' level of satisfaction with Tax 
Office enforcement activities. A majority of evaders (66%) were dis­
satisfied with official investigations of their tax affairs whereas only 
about half that number of non-evaders (37%) were similarly dissatisfied.
29As a result there was a statistically significant difference and a 
moderately positive relationship between the level of dissatisfaction 
with official investigation and classification as an evader.
Evaders also tended to be more dissatisfied with the time it took 
the Tax Office to process their annual returns and the way in which the 
Tax Office dealt with their annual return. Difference on both of these 
aspects [questions 4(a)(i) and (ii)] were statistically significant even 
though, in both cases, a majority of evaders were "satisfied" with Tax 
Office efficiency. The percentages for evaders on questions 4(a)(i) 
and (ii) were 62% and 52% compared with non-evaders 72% and 70% respec­
tively.
Almost three-quarters of both evaders and non-evaders were dissatis­
fied with the system of provisional tax and this similarity of opinion 
may have accounted for the lack of statistical difference between the 
two groups on this question. Some 75% of evaders who paid provisional 
tax were dissatisfied with that method of payment and only a slightly 
smaller percentage (73%) of non-evaders were similarly dissatisfied.
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5.5 APPLICATION OF TRADITIONAL ANALYSIS
The methodology used so far does not appear to have any precedent. 
The author is not aware of any other studies which have tested hypotheses 
by comparing answers given by convicted evaders with answers given by 
people from the general population. To verify the results so far 
obtained it was decided to retest the hypotheses with what the author 
will call 'traditional methodology*. Previous studies on tax evasion 
had taken samples from the general population and had tested various 
hypotheses between 'groups' generated from that sample. In essence, the 
groups generated have been those suspected of evading tax and those not 
suspected of evading tax. The criteria used to distinguish the two
groups have varied. In some cases it has been respondents' attitude to
30evasion (with those approving of evasion being suspected evaders) and 
in other cases it has been respondents' own estimates of their likelihood 
of committing evasions (with those indicating that they would evade
31being classified as evaders). Here it was decided to use both of 
these traditional approaches. The relevant questions used to classify 
taxpayers as "suspected evaders" and "suspected non-evaders" were 
questions three and nine and for convenience these questions are 
reproduced below.
The purpose of these questions was to solicit responses from 
individuals about their attitudes to tax evasion (question 3) and their 
orientation to commit tax evasion (question 9). Each question was 
divided into three parts and this allowed three tests for each of the 
'traditional methodologies" to be carried out. In all six tests were 
made. Respondents were classified as 'suspected evaders' where
(i) for question 3, they indicated that they either "strongly approved" or "approved" of the specified 
offence; and
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(ii) for question 9, they indicated that they would either "almost certainly omit" or "very likely omit" the specified amount of cash earnings.
Those not being so classified fell into the other group, i.e. "suspected
non-evaders". The findings relating to the three main hypotheses follow.
5.5.1 Exchange Relationship Hypothesis and the Traditional Analysis
The results of comparisons of answers from "suspected evaders" and 
"suspected non-evaders" on the exchange relationship hypothesis are 
given in Table 5.16. That table shows the chi-square values only where
TABLE 5.16
Exchange Relationship Hypothesis and the Traditional Analysis, Significant Chi-Square* Values
Attitudes to Tax Orientations to 
‘Evasions Commit Tax Evasions
Q.3(a) Q.3(b) Q.3(c) Q.9(i) Q.9(ii) Q.9(iii)Questions relating to the Exchange Control Hypothesis
1(a) - - - - - -
1(b) — — — — — —
2(a) - - — - - -
2(b) - - - 6.695 - -
[*Because of low cell counts cells were collapsed and 2x2 contingency tables were used.]
significant differences were obtained. Of the twenty-four possible 
sources of difference only one statistically significant difference was 
found. The contingency table which produced this difference is repro­
duced in Table 5.17 as a 2 x 2  contingency table. However, when the data 
were reduced in this way, and low cell counts made it necessary to do 
so, a problem arose. Table 5.17 shows a majority from both groups were
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TABLE 5.17
Analysis of Suspected Evaders and Non-Evaders and Satisfaction with Income Tax Laws
Suspected Suspected
Evaders Non-Evaders
Whether satisfied Yes 12% 27%with Tax Laws No 88 73
Total 100% 100%
dissatisfied with tax laws, however chi-square tests suggested that there 
was no statistically significant difference between the respective 
proportions. Further, the fact that only one of the twenty-four tests 
produced a significant result, at the 5% level, was of concern. This 
might suggest that the exchange relationship hypothesis was not important 
or alternatively it might suggest that the methodology was defective; 
for example selection criteria might not have adequately discriminated 
the two groups.
5.5.2 The Social Orientation Hypothesis and the Traditional Analysis
The social orientation hypothesis was tested by questions 2(c)-(d) 
and questions 6(a)-(c) and the results on these are given in Table 5.18. 
Again, although both traditional methodologies were used only two 
statistically significant results, at the 5% level of significance, 
were recorded. This time there were thirty sources of possible difference
The data which provided the two differences are shown in Tables 
5.19 and 5.20. Prior theory suggested that if there was to be difference 
between the two groups then there would be a smaller proportion of 
suspected evaders who would be satisfied with non tax laws. This in 
fact was the case as Table 5.19 shows. Some 23% of the "evader" group 
were satisfied with non tax laws whereas 44% of the "non-evader" group
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TABLE 5.18
Social Orientation Hypothesis and the Traditional Analysis, Significant Chi-square* Values
Attitudes to Orientations to
Tax Evasion Commit Tax Evasions
Q.3(a) Q.3(b) Q.3(c) Q.9(i) Q.9(ii) Q.9(iii)
Questions relating to Social Orientation Hypothesis_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
2(c) 7.030 - - - - -
2(d) — — — — — —
6(a) — — — — — —
6(b) - - — 13.084 - -
6(c) — — — — — —
[* For Q.6(a)-(c), 2 x 5  contingency tables were formed with the outpoints being 2,4,6, and 8. In all other cases 2 x 2  tables were formed.]
TABLE .5.19
Analysis of Suspected Evader and Non-Evader and Satisfaction with Non-Tax Laws
Suspected Suspected
Evaders Non-Evaders
Whether Satisfied Yes 23% 44%with Non Tax Laws No 77% 56%
Total 100% 100%
TABLE 5.20
Analysis of Suspected Evader and Non-Evader and Number of Persons Omitting more than $1,000 CashEarnings
Suspected Suspected
Evaders Non-Evaders
Number of Two or less 59% 58%Evaders Three or Four 18 14Known Five or Six 15 5Seven or Eight 4 11More than Eight 4 13
100% 100%
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were satisfied. When the other statistically significant difference 
was closely examined an anomoly arose as Table 5.20 shows.
The average number of people who "suspected evaders" thought would 
omit $1,000 cash earnings from their tax returns was 2.4 wheras for 
"suspected non-evaders" it was 3.2. An alternative test of significance 
was then carried out on all of the data. The ensuing analysis of
32variance test revealed no statistically significant difference at the 
5% level of significance. This seemed a more sensible result. Had there 
been a significant difference, the relationship involved would have been 
in a direction opposite to that prior theory would have suggested. 
Therefore it was decided that the result should be discarded. This 
meant that there was only one statistically significant difference on 
the questions relating to the social orientation hypothesis; one differ­
ence out of thirty possibilities!
5.5.3 The Administrative Control Hypothesis and the Traditional Analysis
Results of chi-square tests, at the 5% level of significance, on 
questions relating to the administrative control hypothesis are given 
in Table 5.21.
TABLE 5.21
Administrative Control Hypothesis and the Traditional Analysis, Significant Chi-Square Values
Attitudes to Orientations to
Tax Evasion Commit Tax EvasionsQ.3(a) Q.3(b) Q.3(c) Q.9(i) Q.9(ii) Q.9(iii)Questions relating to the Administrative Control Hypothesis
4(a)(i) - - 5.410
4(a)(ii) 9.731 7.037 17.333
4(b) — — — — — —
4(c) - - 9.855
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The most striking result occurred with the first of the traditional 
analyses on question 4(a)(ii) - a question relating to respondents' 
level of satisfaction with the way the Tax Office had dealt with their 
annual returns. A summary of the three contingency tables is given in 
Table 5.22.
TABLE 5.22
Analysis of Suspected Evaders and Non-Evaders and Satisfaction with the Way the Tax Office Dealt with Annual Returns
Percent Dissatisfied with Treatment 
Suspected Suspected
Evaders Non-Evaders
First Income Level ($100) 49% 24%
Second Income Level ($1,000) 52 27
Third Income Level ($10,000) 90 27
At each income level about one-quarter of the "suspected non­
evaders" were dissatisfied with the way the Income Tax Office had dealt 
with their annual return whereas, at each of the three levels, a 
statistically significantly greater percentage of "suspected evaders" 
were dissatisfied. The percentage of evaders who were dissatisfied 
rose from 49% at the first income level to 90% at the third income level, 
thus giving quite strong support for the administrative control* hypothesis 
The following conclusion was possible from the above results: taxpayers
who are dissatisfied with the way their annual return is dealt with by 
the Income Tax Office are more likely to evade tax than those who are 
satisfied with the way in which it is dealt. However, it has to be 
conceded that it is possible the causation might be the opposite way 
around, i.e. people who evade are more likely to be dissatisfied with 
the way their annual return will be assessed!
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With respect to the other two statistically significant results 
in Table 5.21 little can be said because both were accompanied by low 
totals for cell counts with the "suspected evader" group; ten (6% of 
sample) and eight (8% of sample) respectively, and with the latter the 
direction of the relationship was opposite that expected. Question 4(c) 
showed that 60% of "suspected evaders" were dissatisfied with the time 
the Income Tax Office took to deal with their annual return whereas only 
26% of "non-evaders" were similarly dissatisfied, confirming perhaps, 
that the efficiency with which the Income Tax Office deals with taxpayers' 
affairs might influence the level of evasion. However, it ought to be 
emphasised that question 4(c) was influential for only one of the three 
tests.
The only conclusive results from all of the traditional analyses 
was that the administrative control hypothesis received some support.
This was evident when respondents were classified into "suspected 
evaders" and "suspected non-evaders" according to their attitude to tax 
evasion. Each time taxpayers were so classified responses to question 
4(a)(ii), the question relating to taxpayers' satisfaction with the way 
the Income Tax Office dealt with their annual return, showed a statisti­
cally significant difference. Consistently the "suspected evader" 
group were more dissatisfied with the way they had been treated.
Unfortunately this result was not repeated when taxpayers were 
classified into the same two groups using orientations to commit 
evasions. This could carry with it the implication that the choice of 
methodology can influence results. Generally, the two traditional 
methodologies did not conflict but this was because neither produced 
significant results. Apart from the limited support from one of the 
methodologies for one of the three hypotheses the only other conclusion
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to be drawn from this section is that the traditional methodologies 
appear to be less satisfactory than that used in section 5.4.
In the next section of this chapter the writer returns to his own 
methodology, described in section 5.2, to analyse relationships concerning 
the background characteristics.
5.6 INFLUENCE OF BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS
Other studies have shown some significant differences between the 
background characteristics of evaders and non-evaders. In the evasion 
survey questions were asked to determine four background characteristics 
viz. age, employment status, income level and country of birth. The 
categories for which responses were solicited have been collapsed into 
2 x 2  contingency tables and the results are given in Table 5.23.
TABLE 5.23
Background Characteristics of Evaders and Non-Evaders
Evaders Non-Evaders
(a) Age - Under 40 23% 52%40 and Over 77 48
12QI ISSI
(b) Employment - Self Employed 43% 13%Status Not Self Employed 57 87
100% 100%
(c) Income - $17,894 or less 60% 77%Above $17,894 40 23
100% 100%
(d) Country - Australia 65% 81%of Birth Not Australia 35 19
100% 100%
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In all four cases chi-square tests, at the 5% level of significance, 
showed a statistically significant difference between responses from the
33two groups. Whether this means that there is a real difference 
between evaders and non-evaders is difficult to know. The results could 
merely reflect aspects of the Taxation Office's enforcement policy.
For instance they might concentrate on taxpayers who are over forty, 
who are self-employed, who have high incomes and who were born outside 
Australia. Those in the evader group tended to be older, to be self- 
employed, to have slightly higher incomes and to be more often born 
outside Australia. These differences carry with them many possible 
implications. For instance, have older taxpayers learnt more ways to 
evade tax?; have self-employed taxpayers greater opportunity to evade?; 
have income earners more reason to evade because they face higher 
rates of tax?; and have taxpayers.born in Australia greater commitment 
to the State? These possibilities and others were explored when the 
four background characteristics were compared with the main sets of 
questions for both evaders and non-evaders. For convenience the back­
ground characteristics and responses were reduced to 2 x 2  contingency 
tables. This meant that the ten cells were collapsed into four.
Inevitably some information was lost but the direction of statistically 
significant relationships was more readily apparent and the problem of 
low cell counts was eliminated. The results follow.
5.6.1 The Influence of Age
An analysis of the influence of age on answers to the main sets 
of questions is given in Table 5.24. Only statistically significant 
chi-square values are shown.
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TABLE 5.24
The Influence of Age on Respondents Answers, Significant Chi-Square Values
Values (df=l)
Questions relating to Evaders Non-Evaders
1. The Exchange Control HypothesisQ. 1(a) 5.9811(b) - 6.3662(a) - 4.4072(b)
2. The Social Orientation Hypothesis
Q. 2(c)2(d) - 12.3546(a)6(b)6(c)
3. The Administrative Control HypothesisQ. 4(a)(i) - 9.4134(a)(ii) 6.472 6.6814(b)4(c) - 11.239
4. Taxpayers' Attitudes to Tax EvasionsQ. 3(a) - 6.3773(b) - 9.3133(c)
5. Taxpayers' Opportunities to Commit Tax EvasionQ. 10(i) - 4.394lO(ii) 6.871 5.738lO(iii)
Inspection of the three relevant contingency tables for evaders 
showed that a smaller proportion of those aged 40 years and over
(i) thought that tax rates were too high (79% compared
with 92% for those under 40 years of age);
(ii) were satisfied with the way the Income Tax Office
dealt with their annual returns (36% compared with 57%
respectively); and
(iii) thought that they had no opportunity to omit $1,000 
cash earnings from their annual returns (65% compared 
with 82% respectively).
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Age tended to have more influence on responses received from non­
evaders with it being significant in ten instances, compared with three 
for evaders. Again inspection of the relevant contingency tables was 
made and these revealed that a smaller proportion of those aged 40 years 
and over
(i) thought that tax rates in relation to their earnings 
were too high (48% compared with 65% for those under 
. 40 years of age);
(ii) were satisfied with the way the Government in Canberra 
spent taxpayers' money (13% compared with 24% for 
those under 40 years of age);
(iii) were not satisfied with the way they had been treated 
in dealings with Government Departments (49% and 73% 
respectively);
(iv) were not satisfied with the time it took the Income Tax 
Office to deal with their annual return (17% and 37% 
respectively);
(v) were not satisfied with the way the Income Tax Office
dealt with their annual return (21% and 39% respectively);
(vi) were not satisfied with "official investigations" by 
Income Tax Officers of their income tax affairs (57% 
and 87% respectively);
(vii) approved of taxpayers omitting $100 cash earnings from 
their annual return (17% and 33% respectively);
(viii) approved of taxpayers omitting $1,000 cash earnings 
from their annual return (7% and 22% respectively);
(ix) indicated they had the opportunity to omit $100 cash earnings 
from their income tax return (50% and 64% respectively); and
(x) indicated they had the opportunity to omit $1,000 cash 
earnings from their income tax return (14% and 28% 
respectively).
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5.6.2 The Influence of Employment Status
When the influence of employment status was considered respondents 
were classified into two groups, viz. "self-employed" and "not self- 
employed". These categories were not defined and respondents were left 
to their own devices to determine which category applied to them.
While this was not entirely satisfactory, alternative approaches would 
have made the question too long and too complex, the results for both 
samples are given in Table 5.25. Again only statistically significant 
chi-square values are given.
TABLE 5.25
The Influence of Employment Status on Respondents Answers, Significant Chi-Square Values
Values (df=l)
Questions relating to Evaders Non-Evaders
1. Exchange Control HypothesisQ. 1(a) - 16.112
1(b)2(a)2(b)
2. Social Orientation HypothesisQ. 2(c)2(d)6(a)6(b) - 9.8486(c)
3. Administration Control HypothesisQ. 4(a)(i)4(a)(ii)4(b) -4(c) 4.475
4. Taxpayers' Attitudes to Tax EvasionQ. 3(a)3(b)
3(c)
5. Taxpayers' Opportunities to Commit Tax EvasionQ. 10(i) lO(ii) lO(iii)
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Surprisingly responses from self-employed taxpayers gave statisti­
cally significantly different answers in only three instances, and only 
one of these was from the sample of convicted evaders. This latter 
difference related to the question on "official investigations" of 
taxpayers' income tax affairs. It was found that 13% of self-employed 
evaders were "satisfied" with this experience whereas 25% of those not 
self-employed were "satisfied" with it.
With respect to the sample from the general population it was 
found that questions 1(a) and 6(b) produced significantly different 
responses. In relation to the first question, 58% of those who were 
"self-employed" thought that tax rates were too high whereas 88% of 
non self-employeds thought they were too high. Self-employed persons 
thought that they knew more associates omitting $1,000 cash earnings 
from their income tax returns than did their counterparts.
5.6.3 The Influence of Income
While employment status produced few significant differences 
income produced nine such differences. Of these, five related to the 
one set of questions viz. those concerning taxpayers' opportunity to 
commit small and large scale evasions. For evaders, differences emerged 
on all three questions [questions 10(i)-l0(iii)] and for non-evaders 
on two out of three. Table 5.26 provides a list of chi-square values 
where significant results were obtained.
For both groups there was a positive relationship between income 
and perceived opportunity to evade tax and at each level a greater 
proportion of those from the high income group thought they had the 




The Influence of Income on Respondents' Answers, Significant Chi-Square Values
Values (df=l)
Questions relating to Evaders Non-Evaders
1. Exchange Control HypothesisQ . 1 ( a )1(b)2(a)2(b)
2. Social Orientation HypothesisQ. 2(c)2(d)6(a) - 16.3616(b) - 9.7456(c)
3. Administrative Control HypothesisQ. 4(a)(i)4(a)(ii) 7.2904(b)4(c)
4. Taxpayers' Attitudes to Tax Evasion
Q. 3(a)3(b)3(c) 5.716
5. Taxpayers' Opportunities to Commit Tax EvasionQ. 10(i) 7.899 3.996lO(ii) 4.194 5.724lO(iii) 6.137
TABLE 5.27
Percentage of Respondents Who Said That They Had The Opportunity to Successfully Hide Cash Earnings
Evaders Non-Evaders
High Low High LcfW
Income Level Income Income Income Income
% % % %
$100 60 40 70 54$1,000 29 17 34 18$10,000 12 3 N.A. N.A.
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It was interesting to note that at the $100 level and the $1,000 
level the percentage from the general population who thought they had 
the opportunity to successfully hide cash earnings was higher than the 
corresponding percentage from the convicted evader group.
Evaders with high incomes tended to be less satisfied with the way 
the Income Tax Office dealt with their annual returns (41% were satisfied 
compared with 60% from the low income group, though this result might 
merely reflect the fact that they paid more tax. Also a greater propor­
tion of evaders approved of large scale evasions. Some 16% approved 
of taxpayers omitting income of $10,000 whereas only 6% from the low 
income group approved of this (an instance of peer group influence?).
The significant results, from the general population group, showed high 
income earners tended to know more small and medium scale evaders than 
the low income group.
5.6.4 The Influence of Country of Birth
As with employment status country of birth produced few statisti­
cally significant differences as Table 5.28 shows. Only four differences 
were obtained, three with the evader group and one with the general 
population. Inspection of the relevant contingency tables showed that 
in respect of the latter, 18% of the general population respondents who 
were born outside Australia were satisfied with non-tax laws whereas 42% 
of those born in Australia were satisfied. For evaders a greater propor­
tion of Australian born taxpayers considered tax rates were too high 
(for q.l(a) 93% compared with 81% and for q.l(b) 60% compared with 43%). 
This pattern was opposite to that expected! In relation to q.3(a) the 
direction of the difference was as expected but the difference was 
obtained on only one of the three parts of question 3. For q.3(a) 27%
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of Australian born evaders approved of small scale evasions compared
with 40% for those not born in Australia.
TABLE 5.28
The Influence of Place of Birth on Respondents'Answers, Significant Chi-Square Values
Values (df=l)
Questions relating to Evaders Non-Evaders
1. Exchange Control HypothesisQ. 1(a) 7.7621(b) 5.4292(a)2(b)
2. Social Orientation HypothesisQ. 2(c) - 7.2862(d)6(a)6(b)6(c)
3. Administrative Control Hypothesis
Q. 4(a)(i)4(a)(ii)4(b)4(c)
4. Taxpayers' Attitudes to Tax EvasionQ. 3(a) 4.0393(b)3(c)
5. Taxpayers' Opportunities to Commit Tax EvasionQ. 10(i) lO(ii) lO(iii)
5.6.7 Other Remarks About The Background Characteristics
Had there been time and space other aspects of the background 
characteristics could have been explored. For instance, responses of 
the two groups could have been compared holding the background
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characteristics constant. Thus when considering the first background 
characteristic (age), responses of the evaders aged under 40 could have 
been compared with responses of similar non-evaders. This procedure 
could have then been repeated for the seven other categories in Table 5.23. 
Although this would have meant another 104 calculations* (i.e. 8 categories 
times 13 questions) some important results could have been obtained. These 
further calculations were not made because the author did not believe 
that background characteristics alone could explain taxpayers' motives.
This aspect could be a fruitful area of future research. Not only 
could the four background characteristics obtained here be used, but also 
other Characteristics such as education, sex, marital status and political 
party preference. Some control mechanism could be used to exclude from 
the "non-evader" group those taxpayers suspected of being evaders. As 
well as considering the effects of background characteristics on 
respondents' attitudes one could also determine their effect on, or their 
relationship with, taxpayers' perceived opportunity to evade tax, 
taxpayers' fiscal knowledge etc. Some sort of model could then be 
developed showing the relationship and inter-relations between all these 
factors. Care would have to be taken, of course, to exclude the 
influence of any inter-relation between the background characteristics.
For example it is conceivable that age and income might be positively 
related, as might income and education. Unfortunately, all of this 
was beyond the scope of this thesis.
5.7 COMMENTS ABOUT TAX EVASION
5.7.1 General Comments
An attempt is made in this section to summarise some of the 
comments made about tax evasion. At the end of the questionnaire free
* This becomes 208 calculations if the original categories rather than the collapsed categories ^re used.
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space was provided to allow respondents to express their feelings about 
tax evasion. They were prompted with the following preamble:
Use this space to tell me more about your feelings on the 
questions asked in this survey. For instance, you might 
like to tell me why you think people feel justified in 
evading tax or how some people can evade tax but others 
cannot.
About two-thirds of those who responded made comments and this 
provided almost two hundred and seventy additional sources of information. 
About the same number from each group made comments; however, the 
comments received from evaders tended to be longer and more forcefully 
put. No attempt is made to summarise all the comments. Only those 
relevant to the main thrust of this thesis are considered. Apart from 
the strength of their feelings evaders tended to have a different attitude 
towards income tax and tax evasion. It was not easy to pinpoint this 
difference nor was the difference evident between all evaders and all 
non-evaders. Many non-evaders appeared to hold the same views as evaders. 
If there was a difference it was that evaders tended to justify their 
evasions whereas non-evaders believed that "honesty [was] the best 
policy". For instance, the following seem to depict the difference the 
writer saw:
EvadoA
Having been investigated and ordered to pay $11,000 for 
income not declared I naturally feel strongly. As a 
journalist who works hard and spends long hours doing 
extra work it is felt there is no encouragement to do 
extra work if it all goes in tax. Therefore we all tend 
to want to cheat and take the risk.
Mon-EvadeA
It is a fact of life that nobody likes to pay tax and I am 
no different to the next person; but I am aware of my 
social responsibility.
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Some comments made by non-evaders were obviously with tongue in 
cheek. One non-evader said "I would never cheat on my income tax return; 
that is if I ever had one." Differences between the two groups were 
also evident in the perceived effects of tax evasion as the next two 
comments show:
EvadoA
I have evaded tax, was investigated and fined. I have been 
working since to pay it off. Meanwhile my business has 
dropped, my incentive gone, my staff dismissed. I'm in debt. 
For the last three years the Taxation Department has received 
92-1/2% less than I paid when business was good. They have 
'killed' a very good source of income.
Non-Evad2A
I am against people evading tax in large amounts because they 
in turn are the reason that our tax rates are so high.
Both groups expressed grave concern on two issues: firstly, the
lack of opportunity for wage and salary earners to evade tax and 
therefore the consequent shift of the weight of tax burdens; and 
secondly, the deleterious effects of high rates of tax on the incentive 
to work. Though the next two comments come from evaders the comments 
reflect the views of many respondents in both groups:
I think the average wage and salary earner believes he 
is carrying more of the tax burden than the professional 
man because he has less chance of claiming business 
deductions. If he were in the same position he would 
probably do the same thing, but while the discrepancy 
exists so does the resentment.
Very few staff under me will work any overtime ... when 
I ask them, invariably they say ... 'sorry but not for 
54 cents in every dollar I earn'. There is no inducement 
for the average wage and salary earner to earn as much as 
he can because of the extortionately high rate of income tax.
Both groups of respondents also agreed that greatest opportunity 
to evade tax existed with self-employed persons, independent tradesmen.
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farmers and "cash businesses such as milkbars, fruitshops and other 
retail shops". Apart from failure to declare all income received, 
respondents also believed these people made either "fictitious claims 
for depreciation, heating and petrol" or "overstated deductions for 
travelling expenses, entertainment and telephone".
The remaining comments are summarised under the headings of the 
three main hypotheses that were tested by the survey with the addition 
of comments about various reform proposals.
5.7.2 Comments about the Exchange Relationship Hypothesis
By far the greatest number of comments made related to the exchange 
relationship hypothesis. This was true for both evaders and non-evaders. 
Evaders, in particular, justified their actions because they saw tax 
rates were too high, because they believed high income earners had more 
opportunity to avoid tax and because they felt the Government wasted
taxpayers' money. The following comments from evaders are typical of
those received. The numbers in square brackets indicate the number of 
evaders who made similar comments.
EvadoÂ  ’ aomimnti about tax Aotâ
Lower income earners should feel justified in evading tax 
because they pay the majority of it anyway. Companies and 
large income earners have more loopholes from which to 
[avoid] tax. [39]
I think people are justified in trying to evade income tax 
for the simple reason that the present tax scale is too 
high. [21]
I think taxation is too high, it takes away the incentive 
to work and forces a lot of workers to try to dodge their 
taxation responsibilities. [14]
Some people feel cheated by the Government. What do they 
do with all the money? [14]
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I think people would not try to evade paying tax if they 
thought the Government was handling the spending of public 
money efficiently. [12]
Those who complained about waste In Government spending specified 
areas which caused most complaint. These included too many public 
servants who were paid too much for doing too little, and who received 
excessive superannuation payments on retirement; too many 'freeloaders' 
on social security pensions; too many other abuses of social welfare 
schemes and too much spent on 'useless armaments'.
At least ten respondents did not agree that payment for working 
overtime should be taxed. As one put it: "if you work overtime and
save I reckon the tax scale should be reduced ... taxing overtime leads 
people to become dishonest and cheat." One respondent even referred 
to the taxation of overtime as 'leg^al slavery'. Taxation of another 
source of income also seemed to cause a great deal of resentment. The 
views of sixteen convicted evaders are summarised in the following 
comment:
People saving in banks and building societies should not 
pay tax on interest earned because they have already paid 
tax when they earned the money in the first place.
Other inequities in the tax system also caused concern. Few 
taxpayers approved of provisional tax. One respondent believed that 
this method of payment of tax was the 'real killer'. Another, a "non­
evader" (?), said that if he "didn't evade some tax he wouldn't be able 
to pay his provisional tax". Among reasons given by non-evaders for 
tax evasion were:
It is usually the small income earner that gets caught
evading tax - not the large one ($50,000 plus) that avoids
tax and deserves to be caught. [21]*
The Government wastes millions so why not cheat a little 
wherever possible. [18]
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People who work hard are justified in evading some tax 
because tax rates are too high. [17]
How can they justify taking it from you for overtime? [11]
Wage and salary earners are carrying the Australian tax 
burden as opposed to businesses and rural industries. [8]
From discussions with others I gather that undeclared
income is their way of registering dissatisfaction with
the tax system and the general state of Government policy. [4]
People feel justified in evading tax to maintain living 
standards. [4]
There is one tax law for people on low incomes and another 
for those on high incomes. [4]
[*N.B. Numbers in square brackets again represent the number of 
respondents who expressed similar views.]
5.7.3 Comments about the Social Orientation Hypothesis
Very few comments were received from either group about the 
hypothesis the author refers to as the social orientation hypothesis. 
Judging from the four comments which were received, at best, this could 
only be the cause of some secondary evasion. The four comments were:
Italians form companies so why shouldn't we. (an evader)
If one were to study the annual publication of tax evaders 
one would note that they mainly have foreign names.
(an evader)
Government staff are not friendly and do not try to help.
(an evader and two non-evaders).
5.7.4 Comments about the Administrative Control Hypothesis
Apart from the exchange relationship hypothesis most comments 
concerned the administrative control hypothesis. Most comments were 
received from those who had been convicted of tax evasion and these 




In 1979 I went before the Taxation Board of Review.
Officially I lost the case. I believe the hearing was 
rigged ... I have heard of another case of trickery used 
to try to get payment from a taxpayer.
The investigation is arranged so that you must be found 
guilty.
I think the tax system is biased ... all they have to do 
is to assess you and you have to prove to them that you are 
right, ... if you are wrong, surely, they have to prove it 
not you. I think they have too much power.
Try dealing with the Taxation Office - write a letter of 
complaint on a tax assessment, they don't bother replying.
Just fine you for late payment of excess tax at 10%.
Still try to get an answer and when you do it says see 
part xyz of section abc subsection q of some bloody Income 
Tax Act which of course they don't send you ... If the 
Taxation Department sacked all those without manners and those 
who were incompetent then people would be a lot happier.
I don't mind paying tax but I expect service ...
In my opinion fines for evading tax are not uniform - from 
one who knows!
The saddest part about taxation is that people who work 
hard are sometimes penalised and only some are caught.
I don't think the tax people investigate the big man as 
much as they should. They are too busy chasing the small 
people for a few dollars.
Fewer comments were received from non-evaders and those comments 
which were received had a mixture of purposes.
Non-EvadeA6 ' Comme,yvU
Taxation Departments should be fully staffed with expert 
inspectors.
You tend to get a little upset with Government Departments 
when your accountant sends your tax return in and you don't 
hear or see anything for twelve months. Especially when you 
are counting on the money ...
I personally believe it doesn't harm to evade paying a small 
amount of tax but I was once called to the Taxation Board of 
Review to verify my deductions against my income and at the 
time I worked in the Taxation Department. It wasn't a pleasant 
experience even though they could find no fault with my return.
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I feel dll deductions should be classified and not left to 
individual assessors to judge ... If the present haphazard 
system continues discontent will surely escalate.
5.7.5 General Comments about Tax Reforms
Reform proposals were more forthcoming from the evader group.
Five wanted income tax to be replaced by some form of indirect tax 
while a similar number preferred income tax to be retained but with 
a single proportional rate of tax. Others felt indexation of the tax 
rates should be reintroduced or that alternative taxes such as wealth 
tax, death duties, turnover tax and even poll taxes should be considered. 
With respect to penalties one evader suggested that "the Tax Department 
should differentiate between tax evaders. First offenders should attract 
lesser penalties as some people misinterpret the law."
The main reform proposal suggested by non-evaders, five of them, 
was the introduction of a flat rate tax. Others suggested a shift from 
income tax to resources taxes in the mining industry.
5.8 SUMMARY
Comments made by evaders suggested that the exchange relationship 
was the most important hypothesis explaining why taxpayers felt justified 
in evading tax. Among the feelings of those who made comments were that 
they were not getting value for their tax dollar, that tax rates were 
too high, that the Government did not spend taxpayers' money wisely, 
that the burden of taxes fell disproportionately on low income earners, 
that the rich avoided tax by employing tax specialists and that other 
aspects of the tax system caused inequities. There was ample quantitative 
support to verify these claims; for instance. Table 5.7 showëd:
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(i) 89% of evaders thought that tax rates were 'too 
high' in relation to the amount they earned;
(ii) 54% of evaders thought that tax rates were 'too 
high' in relation to the amount of Government 
services that they received;
(iii) 72% of evaders were dissatisfied with the way the 
Federal Government spent taxpayers' money; and
(iv) 82% of evaders were dissatisfied with our income tax 
1 aws.
However, in section 5.4.1 when responses from the general population 
were compared with those received from evaders, there was no statistically 
significant difference between the two groups on any of the four 
questions. This was so because there was also widespread belief among 
the general population that taxpayers' terms of trade with the Government 
were unfavourable. Table 5.7 also.showed that:
(i) 85% of the general population thought that tax rates, 
in relation to earnings, were 'too high';
(ii) 57% of the general population thought that tax rates, 
in relation to Government services received, were 
'too hi g h ';
(iii) 73% of the general population were dissatisfied with 
the way the Government spent taxpayers' money; and
(iv) 75% of the general population were dissatisfied with 
our tax laws.
Because the chi-square tests revealed no difference in responses 
between the two groups the first reaction was to suggest that the exchange 
relationship hypothesis did not explain why evaders evaded tax. However, 
after analysing the comments received one was left with the distinct 
impression that this was the major cause of most tax evasion. Therefore, 
an alternative interpretation of the null hypothesis about the exchange
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relationship was required. The author felt it could be this: that
there were just as many evaders in the sample from the general 
population as there were in the sample of convicted evaders!
The suggestion that many of those in the general population evade 
tax (rather than the alternative possibility that there were just as 
few evaders in both groups) was, to an extent, borne out by the answers 
to question 9 which asked "when completing an income tax return, what 
do you think someone like yourself would do about cash earnings from 
a part-time job if they amounted to (i) $100, (ii) $1,000, and (iii) 
$10,000?". Responses indicated no difference between the percentage of 
evaders who said that they would omit the specified amounts and the 
percentage from the general population who would omit them as Table 5.29 
shows. [N.B. There is always some doubt whether these stated intentions 
would, if the opportunity arose, be translated into actual behaviour.]
TABLE 5.29
Percentage of Taxpayers who Said That TheyWould Omit Cash Earnings from a Part-time Job
Amount of
Cash Earnings Evaders Non-Evaders
$100 65% 69%$1,000 24 26
$10,000 6 6
Answers to question 10 revealed that the orientation to commit 
tax evasions, suggested by Table 5.29, might have been translated into 
taxpayer action because a substantial proportion of both groups said 
they had the opportunity to successfutty hide income from the tax man. 
The results of answers to question 10 are summarised in Table 5.30.
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TABLE 5.30
Percentage of Taxpayers Who Said That They Could Successfully Hide Income from the Tax Man
Amount Evaders Non-Evaders
$100 48% 58%
$1 ,000 22 21 $10,000 7 2
Given widespread opportunity to evade and given a high degree of 
association between intention and action it could be concluded that 
small scale evasion could be widespread!
Comments from both groups did not suggest that the social orien­
tation hypothesis was significant as a cause of tax evasion. However 
analysis of variance tests on answers to question 6 showed that evaders, 
on average, knew more evaders than did non-evaders. Prior theory 
suggested that people learned how to evade from those who are successful 
and that peer group pressure can influence behaviour. The results 
obtained tended to support this view and it seems that this hypothesis 
might explain some seoondary evasion, if not some primary evasion.
The third hypothesis produced significant difference in responses 
for three of the four questions. The only question not producing any 
difference related to provisional tax. But this seems to have been 
caused by the fact that roughly the same majority (about 75%) in both , 
groups were dissatisfied with this method of tax payment.
With respect to the other questions the most important, according 
to comments received was question 4(c). It suggested that taxpayers' 
level of satisfaction with the way they had been treated by the Tax Office 
during official investigations might be an important influence on future 
levels of tax evasion. Some 65% of evaders who were investigated by the
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Income Tax Office were dissatisfied with the way they had been treated 
whereas only 37% of non-evaders were dissatisfied. The difference is 
perhaps explicable, no-one likes to be caught for doing wrong. But 
the comments received indicated that it was the way taxpayers were 
treated that caused resentment. This could result in further evasions. 
Responses and comments on this question and analysis of administrative 
practices, in Chapter Three, suggests that if evasion is to be reduced, 
then a full-scale review of Tax Office practices and procedures should 
be carried out.
This chapter is closed with the following comments: firstly
from one evader - "the payment of tax is voluntary; those who want to 
pay it will and those who don't, won't." Collection of tax in the long 
term requires the co-operation of taxpayers. If a tax system is to 
succeed then it must be equitable,‘it must be administered fairly and 
above all it must be seen to be equitable and administered fairly. 
Secondly, there now seems to be evidence, in Australia, that tax evasion 
is move than "a rich vein of anecdotes without necessarily being a 
quantitative phenomenon of quantitative significance", as Dilnot and
34Morris suggest for some European countries.
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE
1. It was necessary to limit the survey to this one aspect of tax 
evasion otherwise the questionnaire and this chapter would have 
been far too cumbersome. Ideally, if time, space and money had 
permitted the same hypotheses could have been tested with respect 
to other aspects of tax evasion, e.g. overclaiming on deductions 
or rebates and non-payment of tax by the due date.
2. I wish to acknowledge the assistance of the Taxation Institute's 
Research and Education Trust which provided a grant of $2,000 
for this purpose.




where n = sample size
N = population size 
IT = confidence limit 
X = tolerance limit
from Chebyshev's theorem, and for his help in applying the Camp- 
Meidell Inequality. Reference to this Inequality can be found in
H. Freeman, Introduction to Statistical Inference  ̂ Reading, Massa­
chusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1963, at p.4.
4. C.A. Moser and G. Kalton, Survey Methods in Social Investigation^ 
London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1979, at p.53.
5. Tbidy p.53.
5. Section 16(2) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 as amended
provides that an officer shall not either directly or indirectly 
divulge or communicate to any person any such information acquired 
by him. There are some exceptions to this - see s.16(4) of the 
same Act.
7. At 30 November, 1981 the Commonwealth Rolls were made up as follows
Dates to which Commonwealth Electoral Rolls
were made up
State or
Territory Main Roll Supplementary Roll
A.C.T. 19 September 1980 n.a.
N.S.W. 31 July 1981 28 August 1981
N.T. 19 September 1980 n.a.
QLD. 4 August 1980 (a) 19 September 1980
S.A. 19 September 1980 n.a.
TAS. 12 August 1980 n.a.
VIC. 30 March 1981 28 August 1981
W.A. 1 August 1980 (b) 19 September 1980
(a) Except for the electorate of McPherson which was made up 
to 27 January 1981.
(b) Except for the electorate of Curtin which was made up 
to 21 January 1981.
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8. P.L, Erodos and A.J. Morgan, Professional Mail Surveys y New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1970, p.102.
9. This required over three thousand signatures and three thousand 
'first names'being written.
10. A.N. Oppenheim, Qxiestionnaire Design and Attitude Measurement 
(London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1979) states that late 
respondents and non-respondents are roughly similar.
11. Non response bias was evident at the 5% level of significance as 
follows :
Question X^ Value df
1(a) 9.727 3
4 (a)(ii) 14.270 4
10 (i) 11.335 4
0.05, 3>7. 8147) = 0.05]
12. For each of these three questions, for which there was non response 
bias, new estimates of the population proportions were obtained.
This was done by extrapolating the 'late respondent' profile to the 
non-respondents. When this was done the chi-square values for 2x2 
contingency tables, comparing responses from evaders and non-evaders, 
provided the following results:
Q u e s t i o n  V a l u e  R e s u l t
1(a) 0.02 No significant difference*
4(a)(ii) 15.72 Significant difference*
l0(i) 18.69 Significant difference**
* i.e. same result as obtained from unadjusted data.
** N.B. different result than that obtained from unadjusted data.
Further comments incorporated in 5.4.
13. A.N. Oppenheim, op, o i t .
14. Ib id y  p.153.
15. Ib id y  p.153.




where the critical value at df=4 was 9.4877.
17. Chi-square values of 6.150 (df= 4) and 8.427 (df =4) respectively 
were obtained and P(X^q 4 > 9.4877) = 0.05.
18. The two categories were "Too High" and "Not Too High" and the chi- 
square value obtained was 1.802 where p(x^Q 1 > 3.841) = 0.05.
19. Chi-square values of 1.089 (df=4) and 4.481 (df=4) respectively
were obtained and the critical value was 9.4877.
20. Evaders (184) and non-evaders (173) combined as a percentage of 
total responses (412).
21. Evaders (149) plus non-evaders (149) as a percentage of the total (412)
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22. Evaders (169) plus non-evaders (152) as a percentage of the 
total (412).
23. For question 2(c) the value obtained was 10.405 (df=4) where
the critical value was 9.4877.
24. For question 2(d) the x^ value obtained was 2.555 (df= 4) where
the critical value was 9.4877.
25. But W.J. Conover, Practical Non Parametric Statistics y  New York: 
John Wiley & Sons, 1970 suggests that where at least 20% of the 
cells have counts of five or more the test is still a good 
approximation; at p.152.
26. The columns in the 2x2 table were evaders and non-evaders and the 
rows 'satisfied' and 'not satisfied'. The x^ value obtained was
1.052 and the critical value for df=l was 3.8415.
[N.B. The satisfied group included those who were 'very satisfied' 
or 'somewhat satisfied' whereas the 'not satisfied' group contained 
the other three categories.]
27. The results obtained were:
Q.6(a) F value obtained 10.91 (df=l, 410); critical value 3.841.
6(b) F " " 16.70 " " " " 3.841.
6(c) F " " 1.34 " " " " 3.841.
[N.B. 'Welch' and 'Brown-Forsythe' statistics were obtained to see 
whether unequal variances within groups made any difference. These 
made no difference to the answers obtained above, i.e. there was 
a statistically significant difference on 6(a) and 6(b), but not on 
6(c).




and in all cases the critical value (df=4) was 9.4877.
29. A x^ value of 9.538 was obtained where the critical value (df=4) 
was 9.4877.
30. For instance see Y. Song & T.E. Yarbrough, "Tax Ethic and Taxpayer 
Attitudes: A Survey", Public Administration RevieWy Sept/Oct 1978, 
pp.442-452.
31. For instance see M.W. Spicer and S.B. Lundstedt, "Understanding 
Tax Evasion", P u b l i c  F i n a n c C y  1976, pp.295-305.
32. Analysis of variance analysis test was carried out and the F value 
obtained was 3.55 and for df=l,203 at p=0.05 the critical value 
was 3.841.
33. Chi-square values of 36.928, 45.791, 14.059 and 13.890 respectively 
were obtained and the critical value with one degree of freedom was 
3.841.
34. A. Dilnot and C. Morris, "What Do We Know about The Black Economy", 
Fiscal Studies y  Vol.2, No.l, March 1981.
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CHAPTER SIX 
A S U R V E Y  ON  T A X  A V O I D A N C E
6.1 SURVEY OBJECTIVES
Two main purposes were served by the survey on tax avoidance.
First, it helped determine what tax agents thought most influenced tax­
payers to undertake tax avoidance schemes and second, it helped determine 
how tax agents felt about various reform proposals. At the outset it 
should be stated why tax agents were surveyed and not taxpayers. The 
reason was quite simple: it lay in the meaning of the term "tax
avoidance", which can have different meanings for different people.
In the context of this survey tax avoidance meant reduction in one's 
tax liability by blatant, artificial or contrived means. It was felt 
that tax agents would be in the best position to understand this meaning 
and to know what might have motivated taxpayers to undertake avoidance 
of this type.
The precise meaning of the term "tax avoidance" in this survey was 
explained at the front of the questionnaire:
The aim of this survey is to find out more about tax 
avoidance which, for the purpose of this survey y means 
"reduction of one's tax liability by means which are 
within the letter of the law but against its spirit".
Such practices
* take advantage of loopholes in the tax laws;
* are carried out by complex legal manoeuvres;
* appear to be somewhat artificial; and
* depend for their success on some degree of secrecy.
The survey was pretested by means of a pilot survey and two questions 
were asked to see whether tax agents were aware of what was meant by the 
term "tax avoidance". Tax agents were asked whether they knew how a 
typical tax avoidance scheme worked. Responses showed that 90% had
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heard of the scheme and 70% knew how the scheme worked. Ideally, one 
would have liked to have surveyed taxpayers who had engaged in tax 
avoidance schemes to see why they had participated. However, it was 
quite impossible to know which taxpayers had participated. No official 
lists of names of tax avoiders are published and attempts to generate 
such lists by asking taxpayers about their income tax activities were 
considered to be quite fruitless. As an alternative, it was thought 
that tax agents might be a valuable source of information. In many 
instances tax agents either implemented such schemes or advised their 
clients whether or not they should carry them out. Therefore it was 
decided that tax agents probably were in the best position to know what 
was meant by the term "tax avoidance" and to know what might have 
motivated some taxpayers to engage in it.
Suggested reforms often fail because they are quite impractical.
On other occasions they fail because they do not have popular or pro­
fessional support. Therefore, if suggestions are to be made about how 
tax avoidance can be reduced then some attempt must be made to see whether 
potential reforms are practical or whether they have such support.
The tax avoidance survey attempted to address these issues as well as 
the motivational basis of tax avoidance. The questionnaire is reproduced 
in full in Appendix 2. The reason for asking particular questions is 
given in Table 6.1.
6.2 SURVEY METHODOLOGY 
6.2.1 General Methodology
As with the survey on tax evasion it was evident that the only 
possible way of conducting a nationwide survey was by way of mail
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TABLE 6.1
The Purpose of Questions in the Tax AvoidanceSurvey
Question(s) Purpose(s)
6 To determine what tax agents think most influencestaxpayers to engage in tax avoidance.
7 To determine what tax agents think most oftendiscourages taxpayers from undertaking tax avoidance schemes.
1, 2(b)-(f) To determine tax agents attitudes to various matters,3,4,5 including the tax system and its administration, taxavoidance, relations with the Income Tax Office and various reform proposals.
8 To determine the possible influence of high rates oftax on the incentive of professional people to work.
9 To determine the background characteristics ofrespondents.
questionnaire. Using the same statistical means used in the tax
1evasion survey, it was found that to reduce to 5% the probability of 
the actual sample proportion being more than 2.5% removed from the 
population proportion would have required a sample size of over 6,000.
The resources available limited the sample to a maximum of about one 
thousand. The survey population consisted of a random sample ( n = 1 ,000)
of tax agents in Australia who at 30 June 1981 were shown in the
2Gazette as being registered, under S.251J of the Income Tax Assessment 
Act y as tax agents. Approximately one in every twenty-five agents was 
included in the survey. They were sent a four page questionnaire, an 
explanatory letter and two incentives to reply. The first incentive 
was the offer of a copy of the results and the second a biro. A follow- 
up letter was sent two weeks after the questionnaire was mailed. Limited 
funds did not permit the sending of advance letters or second follow-up 
letters. Relevant details about the pilot survey follow in 6 . 2 . 2 .
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6.2.2 Pilot Survey on Tax Avoidance
Survey questions were pretested by means of a pilot survey 
conducted in March/April 1981, however limited resources restricted the 
pilot survey in two ways. Firstly, the sample size was only one hundred 
and secondly, the population frame was limited to tax agents who were 
registered in New South Wales, [N.B. The full-scale survey involved 
one thousand tax agents from all over Australia.] The pilot sample was 
divided into two groups to see whether offering an incentive to reply 
would make any difference in response rates. A black biro was included 
in fifty envelopes but not in the others. Responses from those receiving 
this incentive were greater than those not receiving it. At the 5% 
level of significance a one-tail test produced a 'z‘ value of 1.7645
whereas a value less than 1.645 ought to have been obtained if there
3was to be no difference.
Group total responses were
 The result then was statistically significant.
TABLE 6.1 A
Responses for the Pilot Survey on Tax Avoidance
Incentive No Incentive
Group Group Total
Total mailings 50 50 100
Number returned unopened 3 6 9
Effective mailings 47 44 91
Usable responses_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 34_ _ _ _  24_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 58_
Response rate: i.e.
usable responses 100 74% 53% 64%effective mailings ^ 1 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
The overall response rate was 64% and this was considered to be most 
satisfactory. A significantly higher response rate was expected in the 
full scale survey because all tax agents selected in the sample were 
to be sent a biro with their questionnaires. [N.B. In fact when the full
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scale survey was conducted there was no difference. The overall response 
rate was almost exactly the same!]
The main questions in the pilot survey were questions four and five 
which sought tax agents' views on two things, viz, why taxpayers went 
in for tax avoidance and what was likely to discourage them. The 
questions and responses are given below:
Q.4 In your opinion, why do taxpayers most want to engage 
in tax avoidance schemes?
Answers
They think the amount of tax they pay
in relation to the amount of money they
earn is too high. 48
They are persuaded by people selling the 
schemes that they will be better off. 1
They want to emulate others who have
successfully engaged in tax avoidance
schemes. 2
They are dissatisfied with the way the 
government spends taxpayers' money. 1
They are dissatisfied with the treatment
they have received from the Tax Office and
want to get even. 6
Total 58
Q.5 Which of the following do you think would most often 
discourage taxpayers from undertaking tax avoidance 
schemes? Answers
The costs associated with implementing
those schemes. 11
The possibility of a protracted legal battle 
with the Tax Office over those schemes. 24
The complexity of the scheme. 5
The expectation that benefits will only 
be temporary. 12





Responses to question four showed that the vast majority of respondents 
(80%) thought that high tax rates were the chief influence on taxpayers' 
behaviour. In view of the importance of this question it was decided 
to provide some new alternatives in the full scale survey and to move 
the first alternative in question four lower down the order. Similarly, 
with question five, it was decided to move the most popular answer to 
a position lower in the order. Other minor changes were made to some 
questions and a new set of questions was added because the new anti­
avoidance legislation was introduced after the pilot survey was carried 
out. Of particular interest was whether tax agents:
(i) approved of the new provisions;
(ii) thought the new provisions would be effective in 
preventing tax avoidance; and
(iii) felt taxpayers would, as a result of the new provisions, 
be more willing or less willing to engage in tax 
avoidance.
The additional questions were not pretested by way of a second pilot.
6.3 SURVEY RESPONSES
Only responses received within fifty days after the questionnaires 
were mailed were included in these results. Of the 1,000 questionnaires 
sent out thirty were returned unopened and 590 responses were received. 
Only 10 of these responses could not be used making the effective
hresponse rate 60%. Responses were classified by date of receipt with 
'late' responses being assumed to be those received after the follow-up 
letters had been mailed. This enabled tests to be carried out to see 
whether there was any bias in the results because 40% of the population 
had not replied. The 'late' respondent category was assumed to be an
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accurate reflection of the likely responses from those who did not
5reply. A chi-square independence test was then used to test for 
non-response bias. It was found that, for all questions, there was 
no statistically significant difference between the responses from the 
'early* and 'late' categories. This evidence suggested that there was 
no bias in the results because of non-response from 40% of the population
The number of tax agents requesting a copy of results was 341 or 
almost 60% of those who responded to the survey. This perhaps reflects 
the topical nature of the subject area as much as interest in the 
research itself.
6.4 REASONS GIVEN FOR TAX AVOIDANCE
The two main questions in the- full scale survey were questions 
six and seven which asked tax agents "why they thought taxpayers went 
in for tax avoidance" and "what they thought would most discourage 
taxpayers from undertaking tax avoidance schemes". The questions
offered a number of alternatives which had been modified as a result
6of answers given to similar questions in the pilot survey. Question6 
and the responses to it are reproduced below.
A number of those marking "Other" as the reason for avoidance in 
question six considered that the cause was a combination of the alter­
natives specified. A vast majority, almost three-quarters, felt that 
it was simply a matter of tax rates being too high. This was consistent 
with the results obtained from the pilot survey and supports the 
"exchange relation" hypothesis (Table 2.3). In fact, question six 
contained three alternatives which related to the exchange hypothesis 
{viz, alternatives one, three and five) and these accounted for 84%
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Q.6 In your opinion, why have taxpayers most wanted to 
engage in tax avoidanoel
Number ^
They have thought the tax laws have
been unfair. 39 7
They have wanted to emulate friends
they have known who have successfully
engaged in tax avoidance. 30 5
They have been dissatisfied with the
way the government has spent taxpayers'
money. 16 3
They have been dissatisfied with the 
treatment they have received from the 
Income Tax Office and have wanted
to get even. - -
They have thought the amount of tax they
have paid in relation to the amount of
money they have earned has been too high. 428 74
Other (please specify) 67 11
580 100%
of responses. The alternative relating to the social orientation 
hypothesis (viz. alternative two) received 5% of responses and the 
alternative relating to the administrative control hypothesis received 
no support at all.
When the respondents' background characteristics were compared with 
their answers to question six, it was found that there was no difference 
in answers because of professional membership or because a tax agent 
was actively engaged in taxation practice. However, there was a statis­
tically significant difference of opinion according to the number of 
years respondents had been registered as tax agents. Table 6.2 shows 
the analysis of these two variables.
Though both groups considered high tax rates to be the major cause 
of tax avoidance respondents who had been registered for ten years or 
more were more prepared to suggest alternative reasons than were
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TABLE 6.2
Analysis of Most Likely Causes of Tax Avoidance and Number of Years Registered as a Tax Agent
No, of Years Registered
Less Then Ten Years
Ten Years •or More
Tax Rates Too High 80% 68%
Some Other Reason 20% 32%
100% 100%
respondents who had been registered for less than ten years. But 
because of the low cell counts for individual categories this finding 
was not pursued further. The relevance of this difference is not 
altogether clear. If tax agents, who have been registered for ten years 
or more, were better judges of taxpayers' motives then the difference 
could suggest that there might be more to tax avoidance than high tax 
rates.
Specific questions relating to two of the three hypotheses in 
Table 2.3 were asked to see whether further insights into the causes of 
tax avoidance could be obtained. The answers given to these questions 
are summarised in Table 6.3.
In Chapter Two (2.4.11) Hulme was quoted as saying that self- 
employed taxpayers were likely to engage in tax avoidance through fear 
not greed - fear that when their income earning life was at an end they 
would be disadvantaged because they would not have the benefit of super­
annuation or retirement payments. He argued that more adequate tax 
concessions were presently required. This would allay their fears and 
consequently reduce their need to avoid tax. Hulme's views in this 
regard are supported by the answers to Question 2(c). Almost three- 
quarters of all tax agents agreed that self-employed taxpayers did not
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TABLE 6.3
Responses to Specific Questions Concerning Two of the Three Hypotheses about Tax Avoidance
1. Exchange Relationship Hypothesis
Q.2(c) Could you indicate the extent of your agreement/disagreement with the statement: "Self-employed taxpayers do not have adequate tax allowances for superannuation or retirement benefit contributions".
Number %
Q.3(a)
Strongly agree 321 55Slightly agree 104 18Neither agree nor disagree 46 8Slightly disagree 66 12Strongly disagree 43 7
Total 580 100
Could you indicate the extent of your approval system of paying tax by way of provisional tax. for the
Strongly approve 138 24Slightly approve 179 31Neither approve nor disapprove 68 12Slightly disapprove 88 15Strongly disapprove 107 18
Total 580 100
2. Administrative Control Hypothesis
Q.l Over the last ten years do you think that relations between the accountancy profession and the Australian Income Tax Office have improved or deteriorated?
Q.4(a)
Improved a great deal 68 12Slightly improved 166 28About the same 149 26Slightly deteriorated 112 19Deteriorated a great deal 63 11Unable to answer 22 4
Total 580 100
How satisfied have you been with the time it takesthe Income Tax Office to process annual returns?




Q.4(b) How satisfied have you been with the time it takesthe Income Tax Office to make decisions on objections lodged against assessments?
Number %
Very satisfied 29 5Somewhat satisfied 89 15Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied 86 15Somewhat dissatisfied 201 35Very dissatisfied 175 30
Total 580 100
Q.4(c) How satisfied have you been with the time it takesthe Income Tax Office to deal with other correspondence on income tax matters?
Very satisfied 25 4Somewhat satisfied 124 21Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied 103 18Somewhat dissatisfied 200 35Very dissatisfied 128 22
Total 580 100
have adequate tax allowances for superannuation or retirement benefit 
contributions. Of course it does not necessarily follow that these 
inadequate allowances have led to tax avoidance. What it does indicate 
is one specific matter which might influence taxpayers' perceptions 
about their terms of trade with the Government. [N.B. Similar support 
was not apparent for Hulme's other contention that the system of 
provisional tax contributed to tax avoidance.] If tax agents' opinions 
about that system of payment of tax reflected taxpayers' views, then 
only about one-third of taxpayers disapproved of it.
In relation to the administrative control hypothesis it 
seemed that two aspects of Tax Office procedures could have caused 
taxpayer dissatisfaction: namely, the time it took the Tax Office to
process taxpayers' objections and the time it took the Tax Office to
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process general correspondence from taxpayers. Only 20-25% of tax 
agents were satisfied with these activities compared with 55-65% who 
were dissatisfied. Strongest support from the questionnaire seemed 
to be for the simple proposition that taxpayers engaged in tax avoidance 
because they thought the amount of tax they paid in relation to their 
earnings was too high. This finding, if true, is not altogether sur­
prising because it is often alleged that tax avoidance schemes are only 
available to high income earners and high income earners face high tax 
rates. It follows then that those who engage in tax avoidance are those 
who face high tax rates and such rates are bound to influence the tax­
payers' decisions.
When the pilot survey results strongly supported the above 
proposition it was decided to add a new question to the full-scale 
survey to determine whether the strength of the suspected relationship 
between tax rates and tax avoidance could be confirmed. Such was 
question eight and the answers received are reproduced below:
Q.8 What do you think most professional people would most likely 
do when their income reaches the level where they have to 
pay the maximum marginal rate of tax (i.e. sixty cents in 
the dollar). They would:
Number %
Continue to work as before 10 2
Work more to counteract the effect of 
tax on their income 8 1
Limit their income by working less 47 8
Continue to earn, but look for ways of 
reducing their tax burdens by legal means 453 78
Continue to earn but seek ways of evading tax 57 10
Other (please specify) 5 1
Total 580 100
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Almost four-fifths of respondents claimed taxpayers would look for 
legal means to reduce tax once their incomes reached the maximum 
marginal rate of sixty cents in the dollar. Curiously the second most 
frequent answer was that taxpayers would seek illegal means of reducing 
their tax burdens. Those who argue that high tax rates affect 
individuals' incentive to work would receive no comfort from the findings 
from this question; at least in respect of professional persons on 
high incomes (viz. incomes greater than A$35,788 or stgf21,000). The 
alternative that taxpayers would "limit their income by working less" 
was ranked behind avoidance and evasion even though it appeared high 
in the list of alternatives. Only eight per cent of tax agents thought 
that taxpayers would most likely limit their income by working less.
More research needs to be done before any definite conclusions could 
be made about the effects of tax rates on incentive to work. But the 
findings here provide some food for thought.
6.5 THE FUTURE OF TAX AVOIDANCE IN AUSTRALIA
When tax agents were asked "what they thought would most often 
discourage taxpayers from undertaking tax avoidance schemes" a greater 
variety of influences seemed to be relevant. The answers to the 
relevant question were:





. The complexity of the scheme 108 19
. The expectation that benefits will only be temporary 64 11
. The belief that such schemes are morally wrong 58 10
. The possibility of protracted legal battles with the Tax Office 223 38
. Other (please specify) 56 10
Total 580 100
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The possibility of protracted legal battles with the Tax Office 
was the single most important (38%) influence,however the costs 
associated with the scheme a n d  complexity of the schemes were also 
frequently stated (31% when combined). This finding indicates that 
the Tax Office should, if they want to discourage taxpayers from under­
taking tax avoidance schemes, challenge such schemes whenever they arise. 
This may well be their policy and might explain why this is the influence 
most frequently stated by tax agents as most likely to discourage tax 
avoidance. If so, this policy should continue, not only because it is 
the Tax Office's duty but also because it appears to be working. It 
is also possible that this policy might have few undesirable side 
effects. As revealed by question E  n o  tax agent thought that taxpayers 
were mostly influenced to avoid tax because of the way they had been 
treated by the Tax Office. However, analysis of question 4 in the tax 
evasion survey showed that Tax Office administrative activities might 
be important (5.4.3).
Earlier in this chapter (6.2) it was mentioned that after the 
pilot study the legislature replaced its general anti-avoidance provision, 
s.260, with new legislation. Part IVA. As yet no case involving Part 
IVA has come before the courts and the likely effectiveness of this 
new legislation is not yet certain. Consequently, at attempt was made 
in this survey to determine what tax agents thought about it and whether 
they thought it would be effective in preventing tax avoidance. The 
relevant questions and responses are set out in Table 6.4. This table 
shows that a majority (59%) of tax agents approved of the new anti­
avoidance legislation (Part IVA) and only 16% disapproved of it. This 
support existed even though a majority of tax agents thought the 
Commissioner might use the legislation against some family transactions
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TABLE 6.4 
Tax Agents' Opinions About Part IVA
1. The Likely Effectiveness of Part IVA
Q.2(e) Could you indicate the extent of your agreement with the following statement: "The new section 260 willprobably be effective in preventing taxpayers from undertaking tax avoidance schemes".
Number %
Strongly agree 40 7Slightly agree 229 40Neither agree nor disagree 104 18Slightly disagree 136 23Strongly disagree 71 12
Total 580 100
2. The Likely Use of Part IVA
Q.2(f) Could you indicate the extent of your agreement with the following statement: "The Commissioner might usethe new section 260 against some family transactions which previously he did not challenge".
Strongly agree 93 16Slightly agree 284 49Neither agree nor disagree 113 19Slightly disagree 63 11Strongly disagree 27 5
Total 580 100
of Approval for Part IV A
Could you indicate the extent of your approval for"The new section 260 (i.e. Part I V A ) o f  the Act".
Strongly approve 138 24Slightly approve 205 35Neither approve nor disapprove 146 25Slightly disapprove 51 9Strongly disapprove 40 7
Total 580 100
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which previously he did not challenge. Item 2 in Table 6.4 shows that 
65% of tax agents agreed that this might happen. The surprising result 
was that concerning the likely effectiveness of Part IVA in preventing 
tax avoidance. Less than half (47%) of the respondents considered 
that Part IVA was likely to be effective. Some 35% thought that it 
would be ineffective and 18% were undecided. Given the publicity and 
aura surrounding the introduction of Part IVA, at this stage, one 
would have expected an overwhelming majority would have thought that 
the section would fulfil its role. At the very least one would have 
expected that if a majority doubted the likely effectiveness of the 
legislation they would be undecided rather than think it would be 
ineffective. The result on this question prompted further investigation 
An attempt was then made to determine the influence, if any, of the 
three background characteristics. It was found that there was a signi­
ficant relationship for two of the variables, professional member­
ship and whether tax agents were actively engaged in taxation practice. 
The significant results have been condensed to 2 x 2  contingency tables 
and are shown in Tables 6.5 and 6.6.
TABLE 6.5
Analysis of Professional Membership and Likely Effectiveness of Part IVA
Professional Membership
TotalInstitute* Non-Institute NoJ%) No. f%l
S'iîi"'-” S'UlilLJüiLJiï
Total 193(100) 387(100) 580
* Institute of Chartered Accounts of Australia.
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TABLE 6.6
Analysis of Engagement in Taxation Practice and Likely Effectiveness of Part IVA
Engagement in Taxation Practice
Actively Not Actively t t I 
Engaged Engaged ^ ^




203 (50) 201 (50)
No. (%)
66 (38) 110 (62) 269311
404(100) 176(100) 580
A chi-square value of 9.549 was obtained indicating a statistically 
significant difference of opinion [p(x^0.05* 1>  3.8415) = 0.05], with 
members of the Institute of Chartered Accountants more likely to think 
the legislation would be effective. In fact a majority of Institute 
members (55%) thought that Part IV.A would be effective whereas a 
minority of non-institute members (42%) thought it would be effective.
Why this should be so is difficult to know. Perhaps it has something 
to do with the Institute's own initiative to prevent tax avoidance.
As question five tells the Institute issued an exposure draft entitled 
"Proposed Statement of Taxation Standards". These standards, if accepted, 
would become mandatory and failure by members to comply could result 
in investigation and disciplinary action. One of the proposed standards 
provided that "a member shall not promote, or assist in the promotion 
of any schemes or arrangements which have no commercial justification 
other than the avoidance of tax through exploitation of the revenue 
laws" (Para. 28). [N.B. In June 1982, some months after the survey
was mailed, the proposed standards were, in essence, adopted as actual 
standards. Paragraph 28 of the draft became paragraph 25 but the wording 
of the proposed standard was unchanged.]
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The other background characteristic related to opinions regarding 
the likely effectiveness of Part IVA was the extent of tax agents' 
engagement in taxation practice. A majority (50.2%) of those actively 
engaged in taxation practice agreed that Part IVA would be effective 
in preventing tax avoidance and of those who did not agree 17% were 
undecided. The remainder (33%) thought Part IVA would not be effective.
For tax agents who were not actively engaged in tax practice only 38% 
thought that Part IVA would be effective, 20% were undecided and 42% 
did not think Part IVA would be effective. If it was reasonable to 
assume that those actively engaged in taxation practice would be better 
placed to comment on the likely effectiveness of Part IVA, then Part IVA 
just might be effective. However, if those not actively engaged in 
taxation practice are better placed to comment then Part IV A, like 
its predecessor, will fail in preventing tax avoidance.
Responses to question 2(a) are also relevant to discussion on the 
likely effectiveness of Part IVA. Question 2(a) asked whether tax 
agents agreed that "taxpayers were more willing to undertake tax avoidance 
schemes now than they were a year ago". The timing of the questionnaire 
requires emphasis before the answers to this question are given. Part 
IVA became operative on 27 May 1981 and the questionnaire was mailed 
approximately nine months after that date. In this time tax agents 
should have had time to consider and make judgments about the new 
legislation. Question 2(a) and the responses received are shown below. 
Again, somewhat surprisingly, a majority (52%) of tax agents agreed 
that taxpayers were more willing to engage in tax avoidance schemes 
'now' (viz. March/April 1982) than they were 'a year ago'. That is, 
they were more willing to engage in tax avoidance schemes since Part IVA's 
enactment than before it! Only about one third of tax agents felt taxpayers
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Q.2(a) Could you indicate the extent of your agreement/disagreement 
with the statement: ’’taxpayers are much more willing to
undertake tax avoidance schemes now than they were a year 
ago".
Number %
Strongly agree 142 25
Slightly agree 159 27
Neither agree nor disagree 79 14
Slightly disagree 118 20
Strongly disagree 82 14
Total 580 100
were less willing to engage in tax avoidance 'now'; the remainder, 
a mere 14%, were undecided. Perhaps it should be stressed that the 
question related to taxpayers' willingness to undertake tax avoidance 
schemes and not their actual behaviour. Still, the finding is surprising 
Again, with this question the two background characteristics of profes­
sional membership and engagement in taxation practice gave significant
7results. In both cases a minority of Institute members (38%) and a 
minority of those actively engaged in taxation practice (47%) agreed 
that taxpayers were more willing to undertake tax avoidance now than 
they were a year ago. For non-Institute members and for tax agents 
not actively engaged in taxation practice, the respective numbers were 
60% and 63%. The reason for the difference is debatable but the 
Government must be hoping that Institute members and those actively 
engaged in taxation practice are the better judges.
6.6 IMPLICATIONS FOR REFORM
One thing is clear: tax agents overwhelmingly supported the
Government in its bid to stamp out tax avoidance. Responses to 
question 3(c) showed that 83% of tax agents approved of the Government's 
apparent determination to stamp out tax avoidance. The question and
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answers were:
Q.3(c) Could you indicate the extent of your approval for
"the Government's apparent determination to stamp out 
tax avoidance".
Number %
Strongly approve 360 62
Slightly approve 120 21
Neither approve nor disapprove 49 8
Slightly disapprove 19 3
Strongly disapprove 32 __^
Total 580 100
A subsidiary purpose of the survey was to find out more about tax 
agents' views on various reform proposals; for instance, whether they 
thought the accountancy profession should be actively engaged in pre­
venting tax avoidance. Question 2(b) asked this matter of tax agents 
and a mixed reaction was obtained..
Q.2(b) Could you indicate the extent of your agreement with the 
following statement: "The accountancy profession should
be actively engaged in designing reforms to prevent tax 
avoidance".
Number %
Strongly agree 173 30
Slightly agree 109 19
Neither agree nor disagree 82 14
Slightly disagree 84 14
Strongly disagree 132 23
Total 580 100
Almost half (49%) of the tax agents agreed that the accountancy profes­
sion should be actively engaged in designing reforms but 37% disagreed. 
It was interesting to note that the two answers which received most 
responses were the two extremes, viz. strongly agree (30%) and strongly 
disagree (23%). Clearly this area is a contentious one.
Earlier in this chapter it was stated that the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants had already taken steps to help stamp out tax
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avoidance. They issued an exposure draft entitled "Proposed Statement 
of Taxation Standards". These proposals now adopted as standards are 
mandatory and failure of members to comply might result in disciplinary 
action. Tax agents were reminded of the significance of such standards 
and asked what they thought of one of the then proposed standards.
Q.5 What is your opinion of the draft standard in paragraph 28
viz. "a member shall not promote, or assist in the promotion 
of any schemes or arrangements which have no commercial 
justification other than the avoidance of tax through the 
exploitation of the revenue laws".
Number _%
strongly approve 234 40
Slightly approve 119 21
Neither approve nor disapprove 55 9
Slightly disapprove 74 13
Strongly disapprove 98 17
Total 580 100
A majority of tax agents (61%) approved of para. 28 in the draft 
standard and only 30% disapproved of it, the other 9% being undecided. 
Additional tests on the background characteristics suggested that they 
were not influential in determining tax agents' opinions. As the 
proposed standard would only apply to Institute members it could have 
been expected that professional membership might have influenced answers. 
But this was not the case. A majority of both Institute members (62%) 
and non-institute members (60%) approved of the proposed standard.
What was surprising was that the exposure draft, issued in September 
1980, had not become a standard at the time the survey was undertaken 
(March 1982). Nor had the other professional accounting body (The 
Australian Society of Accountants) taken the Institute's lead and issued 
a similar draft. Subsequently, in June 1982, both professional 
accounting bodies issued the same taxation standards (e.g. APS 6 for 
the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia). These standards
259
differed in some respects from the draft standards but paragraph 28 
of the draft was unchanged except that it became paragraph 25. The 
actual standards regarding "Tax Arrangements" are set out hereunder:
Tax A'lAang&myvU
23. A member has a duty to use professional knowledge to 
enable a client to obtain the most favourable tax 
position consistent with the desire of the client and 
the requirements of full disclosure and of the law 
generally.
24. The decision to enter into any tax arrangement must always 
be that of the client and a member must ensure that the 
client is fully informed of the details of the arrangement 
and its current and future ramifications including the 
risks and uncertainties, particularly in relation to 
possible changes in the law.
25. A member shall not associate himself with any arrangement 
which involves documents or accounting entries that are 
intended to misrepresent the true nature of a transaction 
or which depends upon lack of disclosure for its 
effectiveness.
25. A member shall not promote, or assist in the promotion 
of, any schemes or arrangements which have no commercial 
justification other than the avoidance of tax through 
exploitation of the revenue laws.
27. The prohibition that a member shall not promote schemes 
or arrangements does not preclude a member from advising 
his clients on such matters. The prohibition is particularly 
directed at the marketing of artificial and contrived 
schemes to the general public.
28. Without limiting the generality of paragraph 29 hereof 
a member shall not have any financial interest in any 
business organisation (whether incorporated or otherwise) 
which promotes tax schemes or arrangements, and a member 
shall not render any professional services to any such 
business organisation in which any near relative or 
dependant of the member has any financial interest.
[Statement of Taxation Standards, institute of Chartered Accountants 
in Australia, June 1982.]
Combining the answers to questions 2(b) and 5 it seemed that tax 
agents did not strongly support the view that the accounting profession 
should be actively engaged in reforms to prevent tax avoidance but if
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the profession did take action in this regard it would, nevertheless, 
receive the support of a majority of members.
In Chapter Four it was shown that two ways taxpayers have avoided 
tax was to split income with others (4.2) or to have converted potential 
income receipts into capital (4.3). Often the means adopted to achieve 
these ends were simple and were widely used. They did not tend to be 
blata^nt, artificial or contrived. However, they resulted in tax 
avoidance and the opportunities were not available to all taxpayers.
The Government has been aware of these forms of tax avoidance but has 
not taken action to prevent them. The writer was curious to know why; 
to know what tax agents thought about this type of avoidance; and to 
know what they thought about possible reforms to prevent them. But 
because this was only a minor purpose of the survey only two questions 
were asked. The first question sought tax agents' views on the use of 
trusts to carry on family businesses. [N.B. Trusts seemed to be the 
most efficient way of splitting income.®]
Q.3(b) Could you indicate the extent of your approval for 
"the use of trusts to carry on family businesses".
Number %
Strongly approve 221 38
Slightly approve 121 21
Neither approve nor disapprove 85 15
Slightly disapprove 62 11
Strongly disapprove 90 15
Total 580 100
Question 3(b) revealed that 59% of tax agents approved of the use of 
family trusts to carry on family businesses and only 26% of tax agents 
disapproved of their use. Yet responses to question 3(c) revealed 
overwhelming approval (83%) for the Government's apparent determination 
to prevent tax avoidance. Clearly use of trusts was not regarded as one
9of the types of tax avoidance which ought to be stamped out.
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The second question related to one possible reform to prevent 
tax avoidance resulting from the conversion of potential income receipts 
into capital receipts. Question 2(d) asked:
Q.2(d) Could you indicate the extent of your agreement with the 
following statement; "if tax avoidance can be prevented 
by the introduction of a capital gains tax then such a 
tax should be introduced".
Number %
Strongly agree 94 16
Slightly agree 93 16
Neither agree nor disagree 40 7
Slightly disagree 53 9
Strongly disagree 300 52
Total 580 100
Only about one-third of tax agents agreed that a capital gains tax 
should be introduced even if it could prevent tax avoidance. Signifi­
cantly, a majority (52%) strongly disagreed that such a tax should be 
introduced even if it would prevent tax avoidance. Two points need 
to be emphasised: firstly,that tax avoidance was specifically defined 
for respondents to confine their attention to those schemes which were 
outside the spirit of the law; secondly, as mentioned with the previous 
question [3(b)] tax agents overwhelmingly supported the Government's 
apparent determination to stamp out tax avoidance. One obvious conclusion 
to draw from this is that a capital gains tax would receive little 
support from the profession if such a tax was introduced. Tax agents 
would, presumably, strongly urge the Government to look for alternative 
means of preventing tax avoidance. However, without such a tax there 
would always appear to be scope for tax avoidance by converting potential 
income receipts into capital receipts.
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6.7 COMMENTS ABOUT TAX AVOIDANCE
Free space was provided at the end of the questionnaire for tax 
agents to write comments. About one-quarter of respondents (163/580) 
included comments with their answers to the questionnaire. Although 
it is not possible to list or even categorise all comments made, they 
provide valuable further information and some account of the comments 
is given in the following sections.
6.7.1 Comments about the Causes of Tax Avoidance
By far the most frequent comment was that tax rates were too high 
and that this caused much of the avoidance. Typical comments included:
There is a very strong feeling within the community that 
tax rates are too high and are stifling incentive, hence 
the attraction of tax schemes.
[N.B. It should be emphasised that although this comment was made it did not agree with the findings of questioneight (6.4) for professional persons.]
Most people with whom I have discussed this matter agree 
that should a more equitable tax scale be introduced 
incentive to work would return and the tax avoidance 
industry would slow down.
The Government will never stamp out tax minimisation 
while tax rates are so high.
These comments add force to the primary finding from question six,
viz, that taxpayers most wanted to engage in tax avoidance because
they thought the amount of tax they had to pay in relation to the amount 
they had earned was too high. Apart from tax rates other aspects of 
the tax system came under attack including what agents saw as the double 
taxation of company profits (i.e. the taxation of company profits and 
the taxation of distributions from them), the abolition of deductions 
in respect of dependants and certain concessional expenditure and the 
restriction of income equalisation deposits to primary producers. But,
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apart from tax rates, the aspects of the tax system which provoked the 
most comment were "provisional tax" and "income splitting". For 
instance:
Provisional tax is cruel on a small businessman who has 
been successful in the first year and needs that money 
to invest in his business.
and
I think everyone should be able to split their income 
with their wife for equity reasons. Wage and salary 
earners are worst done by.
Many saw the tax laws as being so complex and being in such a 
mess that "a complete rewrite was required". These typical comments 
strongly support the "exchange relation" hypothesis as a cause of 
tax avoidance in Australia and, in particular, high tax rates are the 
most significant element of this though other aspects of the tax system 
are also important.
Of the other two hypotheses - the "social orientation" hypothesis 
and the "administrative control" hypothesis - only the latter received 
any comment. However, it is not clear whether the comments received 
about Tax Office administration reflected tax agents' own views about 
their working relationship with the Tax Office or views of their clients. 
Some tax agents, though a minority, said that relations with the Tax 
Office had improved. They cited things such as establishment of regional 
offices, establishment of the tax agents liaison centre and direct 
telephone communications with assessors as factors which have helped. 
However, the majority of comments about the Tax Office were unfavourable. 
Among specific comments were:
The Department is obsessed with raising revenue, not 
applying the laws of the Act.
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I believe the problems associated with the Taxation 
Department to be one of inconsistency in that, depending 
upon the assessor, you may receive different results.
This indicates to me a lack of instruction within the 
Department.
Quantity and quality of Tax Office staff is disappointing.
The Taxation Department appears to be 'bloody minded' 
at times against the small taxpayer who cannot fight back.
... the Department is hounding the 95% of reasonable 
taxpayers instead of really persecuting (and prosecuting) 
the 5% who use highly complex and artificial tax avoidance 
schemes.
Tax agents also gave reasons for the Tax Office's approach over 
recent years. Some suggested it was a result of direct pressure from 
the Government. Others, including one tax agent who was employed for 
forty years by the Tax Office "believed that the Tax Office has 'got 
tough' as a result of increased tax avoidance".
Some support seemed to exist for the "administrative control" 
hypothesis because sooner or later tax agents' experiences in dealing 
with the Tax Office would filter on to their clients and affect their 
clients' behaviour. In any event, it seemed that there was scope to 
improve relations between tax agents and the Tax Office and the 
starting point could be a change of attitude by the Tax Office in respect 
of annual income tax assessments.
6.7.2 Comments on How to Best Discourage Tax Avoidance
Only a few comments were received about things which might 
discourage tax avoidance and these comments supported the findings of 
question seven, viz. that the possibility of protracted legal battles 
with the Tax Office was the influence most likely to discourage tax 
avoidance. Relevant comments included:
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One of the major factors discouraging tax avoidance is 
the abuse by the Tax Office of its powers re the imposition 
of penalties and claims for deductions.
and
The Tax Office tactic of delay combined with punitive 
legislation has discouraged new starters (for tax 
avoidance).
The impact of the new anti-avoidance legislation (Part IV A) 
seemed uncertain. This confirmed the answers given to question 2(e) 
where less than half of those responding thought it would be effective 
The following opposing comments were made by several agents:
Because of the new Part IV A there is now a definite 
reluctance by most people to enter 'contrived' schemes
and
Being presently assisting clients with schemes ...
I seriously doubt Part IVA's dynamic impact. It may 
be a paper tiger.
6.7.3 Comments about Reforms to Prevent Tax Avoidance
Quite a variety of tax reforms were suggested by tax agents, 
some of which were simply to improve the tax system but others were 
specifically directed at reducing tax avoidance. None of the reforms 
suggested was new but the degree of support for two particular reforms 
was surprising. The two reforms were a flat rate tax and the replace­
ment of income tax with some form of indirect tax:
I firmly believe that if we adopted an equitable tax 
system whereby everyone paid a flat rate of tax (of 
say 25%) there would be no need to avoid tax.
I believe that tax avoidance would be wiped out by the 
introduction of a flat rate tax.
I would like to see indirect taxation completely replace 
income tax because it would ... (reduce avoidance) 
catch the 'cash economy' ...
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Other comments were made about reforms to prevent avoidance. 
These included the introduction of a capital gains tax, the reduction 
of tax evasion and the curbing of Government spending:
Originally I was against a capital gains tax - but no 
longer - I believe the introduction of this tax would 
go a long way towards putting the Australian tax system 
on a more equitable scale.
It is my belief that if tax evasion were to be eliminated 
... there would be no need to avoid tax ...
The more money a Government collects - the more it will 
spend (like all of us!). It is the»expenditure side that 
needs reform.
6.7.4 General Comments about Tax Avoidance
Quite a diversity of general conments were made and only those 
repeated on several occasions are summarised here. The main comment 
seemed to be about tax agents' obligations and without exception tax
agents saw their first duty to their clients:
An accountant or tax agent's job is to legally advise his
clients how to pay the least amount of tax. For accountants
not to advise their clients in this manner is negligence on 
their behalf.
However, in fulfilling this perceived obligation tax agents and
accountants were seen to be placed in an awkward position vis a vis
the Tax Office:
The accountancy profession is often caught in a cleft 
stick. To satisfy the requirements of its clients the 
profession must advise on ways of reducing tax liability.
By so doing the accountants' role is therefore unfavourably 
regarded by the Government and the Taxation Department.
Other comments were made and these:
(i) reaffirmed support of the so-called 'Westminster
Principle' that every man is entitled to organise
his affairs so as to reduce his tax burden to the 
legal minimum;
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(ii) suggested which types of taxpayers went in for tax
avoidance, viz. high income earners and 'mid-Europeans'; 
and
(iii) suggested, or questioned, possible effects of tax 
avoidance.
For instance, the comments included:
The Government continually publicises the amount 'lost* 
through tax avoidance - but lost to whom? The majority 
of tax minimisation monies are retained in businesses 
as essential working capital, to maintain and create jobs ...
As more loopholes are being blocked people are now turning 
to evasion, especially non-professionals.
The current legislation discriminates against wage and 
salary earners. This has led to considerable inequity.
Unless the imbalance of the taxation system is overcome 
the consequences will be escalating wage demands and a 
growing incidence of tax evasion.
It was suggested that avoidance by some could lead to evasion by 
others. Yet earlier it was suggested that avoidance was, in some cases, 
brought on by evasions by others. If both perceived relationships are 
true then it means there is a vicious cycle with avoidance fuelling 
evasion and evasion fuelling avoidance. How this started is unimportant 
What is important is how to stop it before it gets out of hand.
6.8 SUMMARY
The single most important cause of tax avoidance, according to 
tax agents, was high rates of tax. Some 74% of tax agents gave high 
rates of tax as the reason they thought would most influence taxpayers 
to engage in tax avoidance (see 6.4). The maximum marginal rate of tax, 
in Australia, is sixty percent and it was, it seemed, taxpayers facing 
this rate who went in for tax avoidance. Taxpayers whose taxable income 
exceeds A$35,788 (i.e. approximately stgf21,000) paid tax at this rate
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on each dollar of taxable income which exceeded A$35,788. For the year
in question approximately six or seven per cent of taxpayers faced this
10rate. 'Paper schemes' often require complex legal documents to be 
drawn up and need accompanying opinions from legal experts specialising 
in revenue law. These cost money. Added to this are the fees of those 
who market the schemes and any necessary minimum involvement. (Minimum 
investment of A$20,000, or il2,000 stg, is not unusual.) Avoidance, 
though potentially open to all, has probably been practised by the few 
who have been the high income earners who face high marginal tax rates. 
Avoidance and high tax rates can be likened to the chicken and the egg 
- they go together but which came first is difficult to know.
In terms of the three hypotheses about tax avoidance the "exchange 
relationship" received, by far, the strongest support from answers 
given to the survey. There was aTso weaker support for the "admini­
strative control" hypothesis though much of the criticism directed 
against the Tax Office administration practices may indicate other 
problems and may have resulted from Tax Office reaction to tax avoidance 
Specific questions relating to the exchange relationship hypothesis 
suggested that perceptions of high tax rates by self-employed taxpayers 
might be reduced if those taxpayers were given more adequate tax 
allowance for superannuation or retirement benefit contributions (see 
Question 2(c) in Table 6.3).
According to tax agents the thing most likely to discourage tax­
payers from undertaking tax avoidance schemes was the possibility of 
protracted legal battles with the Tax Office. This answer was given 
by 38% of respondents whereas the second most significant answer, "the 
complexity of the avoidance scheme", was given by 18% of respondents 
(see 6.5). The message for the Tax Office was clear: if you want to
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continue to discourage tax avoidance then you must continue to contest 
tax avoidance schemes as you become aware of them.
Tax agents believed that their first duty was to their clients 
and it was the Government's responsibility to make tax laws and prevent 
tax avoidance. Tax agents approved of the Government's apparent deter­
mination to stamp out tax avoidance. Only 9% of respondents disapproved 
of the Government's determination whereas 83% approved (see question • 
3(c) in 6.6). Unfortunately, for the Government, there was a large 
proportion of tax agents who believed the recent anti-avoidance legis­
lation would not be effective in preventing tax avoidance. Some felt 
that as long as tax rates were high avoidance would always exist. Only 
47% of respondents agreed that the new anti-avoidance provisions. Part 
IVA, would be effective in preventing taxpayers from undertaking tax 
avoidance - 35% disagreed and 18% were unsure (see question 2(e) in 
6.5).
Of the reforms suggested those receiving greatest support were 
introduction of a capital gains tax, provisions to allow all taxpayers 
to split income and the introduction of a flat rate scale for income 
tax. But, it should be emphasised that capital gains tax was not 
favoured by the majority of tax agents even if it would reduce 
avoidance (see question 2(d) in 6.6). Quite a number believed we 
should start all over again and if this was to be the case then other 
taxes, particularly indirect taxes, should be considered.
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER SIX
N1. The formula n $ ----------- was used.
1+47tX2(N-1)
2. List of Registered Tax Aaents as at ZO June 1981, Commonwealth of 
Australia, No.Pll, Canberra 1981.
3. The pilot was split into two groups of fifty and responses received 
were:
Effect of an Incentive on Response Rates 
Re Pilot Survey on Tax Avoidance




As a percentage of effective mailings the response rates were: 
incentive 72%, no incentive 55%. When the null hypothesis was
set up as. : the proportions are the same Q1= Q2
: Q2 ^ Q1
it was shown that there was a statistically significant difference 
between these two proportions. For: Pz 1.645 = 0.05 it was found
that z = 1.7645.




5. A.N. Oppenheim, Q^estionnaire Design and Attitude Management, 
(London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1979) states late respondents 
and non-respondents are roughly similar - p.34.
6. See earlier in this Chapter at 6.2.
7. For professional membership = 48.844 when p(x^ 0.05, 12 > 21.026)
and for active engagement in taxation practice x^= 29.344 when 
p(X^ 0.05, 4 > 9.4877).
8. See Chapter Four at p.174.
9. This result was to be expected because of the way tax avoidance,
for purposes of the survey, was defined.
10. Source: Table 1, Taxation Statistics 1979-80, Parliamentary Paper
No.99/1981, Canberra: Commonwealth Government Printer, 1981.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
R E F O R M S  TO L I M I T  T A X  E V A S I O N  A N D  
T A X  A V O I D A N C E
7.1 REFORMS TO REDUCE TAXPAYERS' DESIRE TO EVADEAND AVOID TAX
Comments made in both the evasion and avoidance surveys suggested 
that some taxpayers might undertake one of these activities because 
others undertook the other. For example, wage and salary earners might 
evade tax on weekend earnings because they believed high income earners 
used legal devices to avoid tax on their income. Thus proposals which 
reduced avoidance might have implications for evasion, and vice versa.
In this chapter an attempt is made to separate those reforms which might 
limit the scope for evasion from those reforms which might limit the 
scope for avoidance. But first some comments are made about reforms 
to reduce taxpayers' desire to evade or avoid tax.
According to tax agents the main reason why taxpayers go in for 
avoidance is that they think tax rates are too high. In fact, 84% 
of tax agents believed this was the most likely reason. According to 
the evasion survey more than eighty percent of respondents believed tax 
rates were too high. These perceptions might be ill-informed but they 
remain the basis of taxpayers' opinions. It seems, therefore, that while 
taxpayers think tax rates are too high they will seek to avoid or evade 
tax. One simple means of reducing evasion and avoidance could be to 
reduce tax rates, perhaps more so with avoidance than evasion, particu­
larly at the upper end of the tax scale. It is often alleged that it 
is high income earners that engage in tax avoidance and while the 
maximum marginal rate is sixty per cent it is easy to understand why
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tax rates are thought to be so influential. Some attempt should be 
made to reduce the maximum marginal rate or to ensure that it only 
applies to very high incomes. At present it applies to taxable income 
in excess of A$35,788 (i.e., approx. £20,000 stg). This level should 
be raised substantially, at least to A$50,000 (i.e., approx. £30,000 stg) 
perhaps higher.
Consideration could be given to the United States proposal* (s.1348) 
which has been introduced into the tax code to limit the maximum 
marginal rate of tax on earned income to fifty percent. Given the 
responses to question 8 in the tax avoidance survey the proposal merits 
serious attention. Answers given to that question showed that 88% of 
respondents believed that professional people would most likely look 
for ways of avoiding or evading tax when their marginal rate of tax 
reached the present maximum of sixty cents in the dollar. Only 8% 
believed that they would limit their income by working less. If tax 
rates cannot be reduced immediately, then something needs to be done 
to convince taxpayers that the present level of taxes is justified. 
Something should also be done to reduce the perceived waste in Government 
spending. Annual tax returns could contain simple graphical repre­
sentations of the distribution of government spending. Media releases 
throughout the year could ensure that taxpayers are fully aware of Tax 
Office enforcement activities and key areas of Government spending. 
Programmes for secondary school students could also be initiated so 
that an appreciation, at an early age, of Government intervention in 
economic activity could be obtained. Unless taxpayers feel they are 
getting value for their tax dollars there will always be discontent 
with Government spending.
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Other suggested reforms to reduce evasion and avoidance follow.
These reforms should increase government revenue and should, at the 
same time, improve equity between taxpayers. Whether the suggested 
reforms are adopted is a matter for the legislature which should take 
into account these and other benefits as well as the costs of the 
proposed measures. No attempt is made here to specify other objectives 
or possible costs. At first sight it would seem the costs are likely 
to be small in relation to the benefits obtained. Further, it is not 
suggested that the proposed reforms, if adopted, would eliminate the 
need for future reform. Reform is likely to be an ongoing process. 
However, the proposed reforms, because they seek to remedy systemic 
weaknesses, are likely to minimise the need for future reforms.
In proposing reforms to the income tax system it is implied that 
this system will be retained as the major source of Commonwealth revenue. 
This assumption rests on the fact that, historically, income tax has 
been the major source of Commonwealth revenue and that tax reforms have 
been relatively minor, perhaps because small changes are more feasible 
administratively and more stable politically. One alternative which 
has not been considered as a means of reducing income tax evasion is 
a shift to indirect taxes as the major source of revenue.
Taxpayers ought to be given advance warning of any major changes 
in policies towards tax evasion. Consideration could also be given 
to a "tax amnesty" operating for a limited time before new, and hopefully 
tougher, measures were introduced to prevent evasion. It should also 
be emphasised that many of the reform proposals are offered without 
their being fully explored. Some are thesis topics in themselves, e.g. 
capital gains tax and flat rate tax. The overriding criterion used in 
selecting proposed reforms is their ability to limit tax evasion or
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avoidance. Compatibility of the proposed reforms with other criteria 
cannot therefore be assumed.
7.2 REFORMS TO REDUCE TAX EVASION
7.2.1 Reform of Tax Collection Procedures
If opportunities for evasion are to be limited tax should, as far
as possible, be deducted at source; that is, where the income first
emerges. This principle should be adhered to even though the recipient
does not ultimately enjoy the income but holds it or pays it over to
another person who is the beneficial owner. Empirical research by the
Internal Revenue Service in the United States confirmed that voluntary
1reporting was highest where tax is deducted at source. Where it is 
not practical to deduct tax at source, compliance should still be 
encouraged by requiring some form of information reports to be made to 
revenue authorities. In 1976 the highest areas of non-compliance by 
United States' taxpayers were payments to sub-contractors. A sub­
committee of the United States Senate was told that almost half of the
50,000 independent contractors had not reported any earnings for income
2tax purposes. If this is the case in Australia then overseas experience 
in preventing evasion in this area should be reviewed. For instance, 
since 1975, in the United Kingdom where a contractor makes a payment to 
a sub-contractor, payment is required to be deducted at source on the 
"labour content" of the payment. In addition contractors must supply 
details of all payments to the revenue authorities and sub-contractors 
must be registered otherwise payments to them are not deductible for 
tax purposes. Sub-contractors who are registered with the Board of 
Inland Revenue are issued with a card on which appears the sub-contractor's
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name, national insurance number, photograph and signature. Whether 
all these requirements are appropriate in the Australian context is 
difficult to determine. At least it should be possible to require 
instalments of tax either at a low rate, say 20% of gross payments 
made to sub-contractors or say, 35% of the labour content of the 
payments. Instalments should also be required from payments to enter­
tainers, sportsmen, free lance writers and others who derive income 
essentially from the supply of their labour, skill or expertise. The 
definition of "wages and salaries" in s.221A(l) of the Act needs to be 
extended to ensure that it applies in these cases irrespective of 
whether an employer/employee relationship exists. Instalments of tax 
should also be required in respect of all taxable fringe benefits. 
Schedules should be devised listing cash equivalents where benefits 
are given otherwise than in cash. Such a system has worked in the
3United Kingdom for certain fringe benefits since 1978.
Collection practices in the United Kingdom also indicate that it 
is administratively possible to collect instalments of tax from a
4variety of other types of income including interest, dividends, 
royalties, annuities and mining rents. Trust income and partnership 
income could also be taxed at source rather than in the hands of the 
recipients. Extension of the principle of deduction of tax at source 
would reduce the opportunities for evasion and may also encourage 
taxpayers to file returns, because instalment systems usually result 
in (slight) overtaxation. Taxpayers would therefore be encouraged to 
lodge their returns promptly to obtain a refund of the overpaid tax. 
Overtaxation has the added advantage that it reduces the psychological 
pain of paying tax. On the other hand overtaxation has its critics 
because it tends to be regressive; it may penalise the sick, those out
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of work, students or housewives who work on a temporary basis. It may 
also increase administrative costs.
Extension of the principle of deduction of tax at source will also 
improve equity between taxpayers by bringing tax payments into closer 
temporal alignment. Where it is not possible to extend this principle, 
the system of provisional tax, which presently exists in Australia for 
taxpayers not paying tax by instalments, should be changed. Payment 
of any surplus/deficiency on an assessment should be made immediately 
with provisional tax being paid by way of instalments. An instalment 
system has been introduced for companies and there seems to be no good 
reason why it ought not be introduced for those paying tax by way of 
provisional tax.
7.2.2 Reform of Record Keeping Requirements
One of the projects carried out by the United States Internal 
Revenue Service in 1979 showed that improved bookkeeping requirements
5and training in bookkeeping can greatly improve compliance. The 
inadequacies of the bookkeeping requirements in the Income Tox Assess­
ment Act 1936 have already been explained (3.4) and it must be conceded 
that they contribute to the extent of tax evasion in Australia. Small 
scale traders in particular need more guidance than given by phrases 
such as that contained in S.262A, viz. "every person shall keep 
sufficient records in the English language ... to enable his assessable 
income and allowable deductions to be readily ascertained ..." Specific 
instructions on the books of account that should be kept and the 
accounting procedures that should be followed must be given - either in 
the Act or in the Regulations. At the very least a series of questions 
should be asked to determine the adequacy of taxpayers' records and the
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appropriateness of the accounting procedures followed. If the Taxation 
Office is unable to specify what records ought to be kept then it should 
enlist the help of the accountancy profession. Investigations by the 
United States Internal Revenue Service showed that bookkeeping was 
worst in areas referred to as "informal activities". These were charac­
terised by one man operations and involved poor record keeping and weak 
internal control. In these areas taxpayers could be advised what records 
to keep and of how to keep them. If this proved to be unsatisfactory 
then additional measures might be required. United States experience 
suggests that some form of registration might be required, particularly 
where the business is labour intensive. For example, in areas such as 
child care, domestic services, private tutoring, building trades and 
servicing, cleaning and motor vehicle servicing.
Improved knowledge of income tax laws also improves compliance.
Again, United States' experience could be viewed. For some years a 
"Taxpayers' Services Program" has operated to assist taxpayers in this 
regard. Activities range from simplification of tax forms and guides, 
conducting courses in record-keeping and providing telephone and over 
the counter enquiry services. The programme goes as far as actually
completing income tax returns for certain taxpayers provided, of course,
6they supply the necessary information.
7.2.3 Reform of Resources Used to Detect Evasion
Revenue authorities have persistently maintained that improving 
the quantity and quality of resources used to detect evasion is the 
only way of having any significant impact on the level of evasion.
In the United States computerisation has permitted much of the improvement 
in quality control. As computerisation of the Australian tax system is
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in its infancy a review of developments in the United States practice 
should assist in improving the quality of resources used to detect 
evasion of income tax in Australia. Of particular interest is the 
development of audit techniques in the U.S.A. According to official 
estimates only 2% of individual tax returns in 1979 were subject to
7audit yet the audit programme is regarded as highly successful. Nearly
80% of returns selected required change and for every dollar spent on
audits about five were raised in assessments. Even so, it was considered
that the major payoff from the audit programme came from secondary
benefits, e.g. compliance from associates of those audited or from those
8aware of the audit programme's success. The main reason the audit 
programme was not more extensive was because, at the end of the year, 
there were still 700,000 uncompleted investigations. The success of 
this audit programme came from the methods used for selection of 
taxpayers for audit. Sampling techniques are used to generate coef-
9ficients for the probability of detecting evasion. The annual sample 
of returns subject to audit has the greatest probability of detecting 
evasion. Not all of the criteria which are used to generate these 
coefficients, nor the relative importance of each criterion, are publicly 
known but they include income level, nature of the income and whether 
income is subject to tax instalments. Taxpayers with multiple selection 
criteria have a greater chance of being selected for audit.
No evidence is available to suggest that the Australian Taxation 
Office is using discriminant analysis or any other predictive models 
to select taxpayers for audit. It would seem to be an efficient use 
of resources and a logical extension of present efforts to computerise 
the tax system. The Australian Tax Office should seek to determine 
characteristics of evaders and non-evaders. This could be done in the
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same way as the United States Internal Revenue Service developed its 
techniques. First, a random sample of taxpayers should be drawn and 
these should be thoroughly investigated. Compliance profiles of 
different classes of taxpayers should then be determined by using 
discriminant analysis. This information should then be used to select 
an annual sample of taxpayers for investigation.
The United States Internal Revenue Services' 1979 Interim Report 
also suggested that it was necessary to develop "follow-up" programmes 
for taxpayers who had been convicted for tax offences. Statistics 
indicated that, after conviction for tax evasion and as time elapsed 
taxpayers tended to go back to their old habits. In fact, after four 
years almost 40% of taxpayers, who had been convicted in 1972 for not 
lodging an income tax return, failed to lodge a return in 1976. In
addition it was found that only about 50% of taxpayers sentenced in
101972 were completely compliant over the next four years. This apparent 
potential for recidivism may indicate some systemic weakness as well as 
the need for monitoring the compliance of taxpayers after initial 
conviction.
The Planning Model Study also included a report which showed other 
administrative techniques which detect evasion. For example -
(i) The Catfish Project showed that where homogeneous groups 
exist ratio analysis can be developed for determining what 
income should be produced from a given level of inputs and 
what proportion of that income should be used on different 
types of expenses. This idea is not new. Groves^^ developed 
various means of verifying expense claims for two types of 
income over twenty years earlier.
(ii) The Carbon County Project indicated that often associates 
of non-compliant taxpayers had bad records of compliance and 
special attention might profitably be paid to this group.
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(iii) Generally, use of regional offices was an effective adminis­
trative starting point in detecting tax evasion in regional 
areas. Canada and the United Kingdom also make greater use 
of regional offices. Recently (1979) Canada recognised the 
potential of regional administration when, as part of a 
threefold campaign against tax evasion, the Department of 
National Revenue put four assistant deputy commissioners into 
the field to strengthen their regional administration.
New methods of detecting evasion might require more powers for 
revenue authorities to obtain information. If so, consideration should 
be given to S.20A-C of the Taxation Manojgement Act (UK) 1970. Section 
20A permits an Inspector of Taxes to require tax accountants convicted 
of particular offences after 1 July 1976, to deliver to him documents 
in their possession which relate to any of his clients' affairs, whereas 
S.20C establishes a procedure by which a tax officer can enter, by
force if necessary, and search premises where there are reasonable
12grounds for suspecting fraud. This section also permits officers to 
seize and remove anything that they reasonably believe might be required 
as evidence in subsequent proceedings.
The main problem of the Australian Tax Office at present is 
inadequate numbers of staff. Not only has this restricted the amount 
of enforcement activities but also it has affected morale among employees 
in the Tax Office. According to one newspaper report, taxation officers 
conducted work-to-regulations campaigns during the peak assessment period
13 ,in 1981 as a protest against staff shortages. (N.B. These campaigns 
intensified during 1982. Morale has further deteriorated as a result 
of extensive publicity given to tax evasion activities known as "bottom 
of the harbour schemes", which have gone unchecked since 1972 and have 
resulted in massive tax evasion.)
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7.2.4 Reform of Penalties for Tax Evasion
The review of empirical research (2.4) indicated that taxpayers' 
perceptions of the severity of penalties might be just as important as 
the absolute level of those penalties. Recommendations designed to 
improve the structure of penalties should therefore relate to both of 
these influences. Judging from responses to question 5 in the tax 
evasion survey, taxpayers have little knowledge of the penalties that 
can be imposed for evading tax. Question 5 and the responses received 
are given below:
Question 5
Some people have a good idea of the penalties for cheating
on their income tax but others have no idea. If a friend
asked what the penalties were, what would you say?
Evaders Non-Evaders
I have ... almost no idea 9% 19%
very little idea - 12 25
some idea 24 31
a fairly good idea 29 20
a very good idea 26 5
100% 100%
Neither group seemed to have a significant knowledge of the 
penalties for evasion. Barely half the evaders (55%) had a "fairly 
good idea" or a "very good idea" and only 25% of non-evaders had the 
same knowledge. Perhaps the evader group exhibited a better knowledge 
because they had been convicted and fined for evading tax and would be 
painfully aware of the penalties. However, even so, some 21% still 
had "very little" or "almost no idea". For the non-evader group 44% 
admitted to having "very little" or "almost no idea" of the penalties. 
Clearly something needs to be done about taxpayers' knowledge of or 
perceptions of the penalties if they are to influence taxpayers' 
behaviour. Taxpayers' perceptions of penalties could be enhanced by
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greater publicity. This could be achieved in several ways. Annual 
returns and information leaflets could contain a summary of the most 
common offences and the penalties for those offences. Taxpayers could 
also be reminded by media releases during the year. Media releases 
could also include details of anti-evasion campaigns or successful pro­
secutions. Where funds to encourage compliance are limited then a 
formula could be worked out to balance resources spent on actual 
enforcement activities and resources spent on publicity. If compliance 
is a behavioural problem, tax reforms to reduce evasion must take 
taxpayers' psychology into account. Not only should penalties exist, 
they must be seen to exist.
Penalties should also be commensurate with the offence. In the 
United States and Canada penalties are fixed as a percentage of tax 
evaded and for more serious cases of evasion, for example where there 
has been a deliberate attempt to defraud, the percentage is higher than
14the one usually applicable. Where penalties are expressed as fixed 
percentages they are imposed with uniformity. Penalties expressed in 
fixed dollar amounts, like most of those imposed in Australia, lose 
their real value over time unless they are updated to take account of 
the effects of inflation.
More work needs to be done on the nature and effect of penalties,
15for as Silberman suggests they have many aspects which require con­
sideration. He found that in some cases penalties may have no effect; 
for example, on those who are already morally committed to conformity 
or on those who perceive the threat of punishment as inconsequential. 
Further, Silberman states "studies on the effects of certainty and 
severity of punishment on crime rates consistently describe weak, 
although significant, negative associations between certainty of
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punishment and crime rates, and no association between severity of
16punishment and crime rates, except for homicide. This does not mean 
that tax penalties are unimportant; rather, it emphasises a threshold 
below which they are likely to be ineffective and above which they 
will have effect particularly if it is fairly certain they will be 
imposed on taxpayers who evade tax. It also emphasises the relationship 
between probability of detection and level of penalties. Silberman's 
work offers two avenues for further research: first, finding the
thresholds for particular tax offences; and second, finding alternative 
means of improving compliance. The practices of the United Kingdom 
Board of Inland Revenue could usefully be studied. The Board has attempted 
to avoid confrontation with taxpayers; very few offences result in
17criminal prosecution and civil prosecutions are reserved for only the 
more serious cases of fraud or evasion. Generally alleged evaders are 
encouraged to co-operate in exchange for lower pecuniary penalties.
If the structure of penalties is not to be changed then, at least, 
more publicity should be given to tax enforcement activities. Non­
evaders will be comforted that offenders are being caught and would-be 
evaders might be discouraged from evading tax. A starting point might 
be the establishment of a Public Relations Department within the Taxation 
Office. Its function, among other things, would include making nationwide 
press releases about penalties and enforcement activities.
Consideration could also be given to a system of "negative penalties" 
or rewards. For instance, both the United Kingdom and the United States 
offer rewards for information which leads to the prosecution of tax 
evaders. In the United Kingdom, s.32 of the Inland Regulation Act 1890, 
though little used, allows the Commissioners to pay amounts to persons 
who inform the Board of any offence against the Act or who assist in the
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recovery of any fine or penalty. Unfortunately, the maximum which can 
be paid without the consent of the Treasury, has been left at its 
original (1890) level of £50. The United States practice of paying 
informers a fixed percentage (10%) of the "delinquent tax" seems to be 
a superior method of reward as it offers an incentive geared to the 
severity of the offence disclosed. Another aspect of United States' 
law which deserves mention is the remission of possible criminal pro­
ceedings against taxpayers who make a voluntary disclosure of their 
evasions. Back taxes must be paid in full together with the penalties, 
but the knowledge that criminal proceedings will not be taken against 
them acts as the incentive to declare their past evasions. Similarly, 
s.102 of the Tax Management Act (UK) 1970 allows Inspectors of Taxes 
to accept voluntary disclosures of evasions from taxpayers, to mitigate 
fines and penalties and to stop criminal proceedings being initiated.
While some changes to the structure of penalties ought to be 
immediate, widereaching changes should not be made until further research 
has been carried out. This research should, among other things, explore 
the relationship between penalties and taxpayers' behaviour. It could 
be that high penalties and low probability of detection might be a 
better deterrent than low penalties and a high probability of detection. 
But until further research is carried out we will not know.
7.3 REFORMS TO LIMIT TAX AVOIDANCE
7.3.1 Reforms to Limit the Opportunity for Income Splitting
Income splitting with family members was criticised for several 
reasons not least because it lowered the tax burden of the family without 
altering its income. Control and disposal of income often remained with 
thie family member whose efforts produced it but ownership of the income
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was split so that tax was avoided. Tax avoidance in Australia in this 
way is possible because of features of the Australian tax system. 
Firstly, the tax system imposes tax on income of individuals rather 
than on the income of a family unit, and secondly, the rate structure 
is characterised by a zero rate on the first slice of income ($4,462 for 
1982/83) followed by a progressive graduated scale. Table 4.1 showed 
that the tax avoided when income was split with others could be as high 
as sixty cents in the dollar. The actual amount depended on several 
features including a taxpayer's age, income, residential status and 
marital status. It was not suggested that tax avoidance necessarily 
took place because the tax rate was progressive but rather that the 
progressive scale ensured benefits for those who wanted to and who found 
ways to split income with others. If the opportunity for tax avoidance 
through income splitting is to be limited either the tax paying unit 
or the tax scale would have to be changed. Alternatively, individual 
income splitting devices would have to be separately dealt with. The 
latter, apart from being the most complex, has the defect that it can 
only operate after each device has been exposed. As the legislature 
becomes aware of particular devices it can enact laws which attempt 
to prevent them. This approach does not prevent tax avoidance until 
devices are outlawed and it does not discourage the search by taxpayers 
for alternative income-splitting techniques. It is also likely to 
increase the complexity of tax laws and such complexity might be a 
source of further avoidance opportunities. The simplest means of 
limiting the opportunity for tax avoidance through income splitting is 
by adopting a proportional tax rate. Alternatives are likely to be more 
complex and are unlikely to be neutral towards different business 
structures.
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In Australia, a proportional tax rate of about 28% would, in
1979/80, have raised the same amount of tax as the existing progressive
18scale. Whether a proportional tax scale results in more or less 
government revenue will depend on several factors, including the rate 
which is set, but the most significant difference between a proportional 
tax and a progressive tax is not the amount of tax it raises but the 
alleged effect it has on income distribution. However, the effect 
that a proportional tax has on the distribution of income is difficult 
to assess because it depends as much on the amount of Government goods 
and services received as it does on the amount of tax taken. Adoption 
of a proportional tax may be no more than an explicit recognition of 
the incidence of tax for the majority of Australians. Based on house­
hold incomes of 1966-67 Bently, Collins and Rutledge concluded that 
"the incidence of all taxes [in Australia] combined is regressive at 
the lower household income levels, broadly proportional over the middle
19ranges of income and progressive at upper income levels." Other 
advantages of a proportional tax include -
(i) it is neutral towards different business structures;
(ii) it is mathematically simple and would, therefore, be 
easy to administer; and
(iii) it has a less expansionary effect on total government 
revenue.
The case for a proportional tax system is so appealing that it is 
worth reconsidering why progressive tax structures exist. Presumably 
countries have progressive tax structures because the public want them. 
However, Blum and Kalvern argue that
... most people [are] interested only in the level of their 
own taxes and not in the ratio of that level to the tax
burden on others with different incomes.. 20
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and that
... the progression issue is so far beyond the reach of
public opinion that it is futile to talk of comparing expert
opinion and public opinion. 1̂
Progression is also justified on "ability to pay" but this concept 
rests on several assumptions which are yet to be empirically tested.
If it is possible to show that taxpayers have a diminishing marginal 
utility of income then it should also be possible to specify the degree 
of progression implied. Until there is more than intuitive support 
for these basic assumptions it is possible to support progressive,
proportional or regressive taxes depending on the type of sacrifice
assumed: equal marginal sacrifice, equal absolute sacrifice or equal
proportional sacrifice. Musgrave notes that there tends to be agreement 
among ability to pay writers that marginal utility of income declines
as one moves from very low to medium income but that there is less
22agreement for the higher income ranges. He concluded that it was 
evident "that we lacked the information to apply any one of these three 
equity concepts [equal marginal sacrifice, equal absolute sacrifice and
23equal proportional sacrifice] in an objective fashion."
Another reason put forward in favour of progressive taxes is that 
they redistribute income and wealth but if this is an important objective 
it should be possible to specify a rate structure that will produce a 
desired effect. Furthermore, if the income tax alone is progressive 
inequities in wealth may more than offset the redistributive effects 
of the progressive income tax. If the income tax system alone is 
progressive existing inequalities in wealth will be maintained because 
it retards the accumulation of new fortunes. Whatever the desired 
distribution of income and wealth the result can be obtained under any 
system. What a government does with money it raises is equally as
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important as how it was raised. Under a proportional tax system low 
income earners can receive a higher proportion of goods, services and 
subsidies from the government than high income earners. The result 
achieved can be exactly the same as under a progressive tax system 
where benefits are distributed more evenly. In either case, the 
resultant distributions are based on political preferences; they have 
no logic about them. Gaps in the tax base, and avoidance and evasion 
opportunities further affect the equity of income distribution. Other 
arguments against progressive taxes include:
(i) unless there are special rules within the tax system then
taxpayers with income, subject to seasonal or other fluctuations, 
are harshly treated. The income of authors, inventors, ship 
builders, construction firms, primary producers and the like 
fall into this category. Their income may be the product of 
several years work and it seems unfair to tax it under a pro­
gressive scale in the year it is realised.
(ii) such a system requires careful definition of certain rules.
The questions of ''when is income derived" and "who derives 
that income" are critical under a progressive tax system.
It is only relevant under a proportional tax system if tax 
rates change.
(iii) the implications of policy changes may be obscured under a 
progressive tax system. Knowledge of less variables is 
required under a proportional tax system.
(iv) from the answers given to question 8 of the survey on tax 
avoidance (see 6.4), it seems that taxpayers facing high 
marginal rates of tax under a progressive rate structure will, 
most likely, be encouraged to undertake tax avoidance or 
evasion activities.
According to Kayek a proportional tax is more likely to be accept­
able to taxpayers than a progressive tax:
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It is the great merit of proportional taxation that it 
provides a rule which is likely to be agreed upon by those 
who will pay absolutely more and those who will pay 
absolutely less and which once accepted, raises no problem 
of a separate rule applying only to a minority.
The case then for progressive taxation is not convincing. Even 
Blum and Kalvern, who try to restate the case for a progressive tax 
system had the following to say about it:
The price the tax system pays for progression is thus high.
It produces a tax law of almost impenetrable complexity.
It invites a distorting attention to the tax aspects of any 
transaction. It affords an excessive stimulus to tax 
avoidance with perhaps incalculable consequences for taxpayer 
morale and the general respect for the law.
It is interesting to note that the Irish Commission on Taxation, 
which published its First Report in July 1982, favoured a proposal 
for levying income tax at a single and comparatively low rate - about 
25%. The Commission recommended that corporation tax be set at the
same rate and that income be redefined to include all net additions to
26spending power over time. In his conmentary on the Commission's 
proposals Sandford asks: "If income tax is levied on a proportional
basis all across the income ranges, how is progression to be retained
27in the tax system?" To answer this question he responds by saying 
that:
The Commission would argue that much of the present 
progressiveness is nominal, rather than real, because it is 
eaten up by tax reliefs, fringe benefits and forms of 
avoidance which particularly benefit the rich. Under the 
proposals, the elements of regressiveness would go.
The same opportunities for tax avoidance, through income splitting, 
would not exist if the individual was not the taxpaying unit. For 
example, if the family unit was selected then many of the income splitting 
devices presently used would be ineffective. However, since income tax
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was first imposed in Australia individuals have been called upon to pay 
tax on their own income. The Asprey Committee recognised this when it 
said "... women are playing an even greater role in the economic and 
other affairs of society, the withdrawal of this right would certainly
29be a retrograde step." They concluded that any change from the 
present system to a system of compulsory aggregation would be politically 
unacceptable. Further, trends in individual taxation in other OECD 
member countries suggest that a movement towards compulsory aggregation 
of incomes is unlikely. Not only do more OECD countries operate on the 
basis of individual taxation but there has been a trend away from joint 
taxation by Denmark (1970), Sweden (1971), Austria (1973), Finland 
(1976) and Belgium (1976). The main reason given is the growing impor-
30tance of the status and role of women. It therefore seems unlikely 
that Australia would move away from the present system of levying tax 
on the taxable income of individuals.
7.3.2 Reforms to Limit the Conversion of Income into Capital
The second area of tax avoidance opportunities was converting income 
into capital. Tax would not be avoided if all receipts, whether income 
or capital, were similarly taxed. The absence of a tax on capital gains 
must be responsible for much of the avoidance that occurs. In all OECD 
countries which tax capital gains, taxation is on the basis of realised 
gains but this, as Table 7.1 shows, provides further opportunities for 
tax avoidance.
If (i) equity is to be achieved between taxpayers deriving income 
and those benefitting from capital gains; (ii) present tax avoidance 
opportunities of converting income into capital are to be limited; and
(iii) the capital gains tax that is introduced is to be relatively free
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TABLE 7.1
Avenues for Avoidance of Tax Under SystemsTaxing Capital Gains as They are Realised
Features of Tax System
1. Taxation on disposal
2. Differential treatment of short term and long term gains
3. Allowing offsets for realised losses
4. Differential treatment of capital gains and (other) income gains
5. Exemptions from tax base of certain assets, transactions or gains by certain taxpayers
6. Exemption of "small" gains from the tax
7. Existence of "roll-over" provisions
Avoidance Opportunity
Circumventing definition of disposal e.g. conditional contract.Retention of asset and accumulated gain.
Realisation of losses in the short term and gains in the long term.
Invites speculators who face high marginal rates of tax to realise losses Assets may be immediately replaced with equivalent items.
Artificial transactions to escape the definitions altogether or to be taxed in the preferred manner.
Switching investment to favoured assets or transactions or allowing preferred taxpayers to realise the gains.
Splitting assets into small units or rapid turnover of assets so that gains do not exceed the threshold.
Adherence to provisions for losses but acquisition of marginally different assets for gains.
of avoidance possibilities, then capital gains must be taxed as they 
accrue. Any attempt to exempt or differentiate gains must be resisted 
if these goals are to be achieved. According to the Carter Commission 
"the complexity of the United States legislation is not the result of 
taxing capital gains, but rather is primarily a consequence of the 
United States decision to extend preferential treatment to capital gains". 
Canadian experience also suggests that where capital gains and income 
are distinguished tax laws tend towards complexity:
31
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The most critical factor in reducing the relentless search 
of the taxpayer and his professional advisers for new ways 
of moving retained earnings out of the corporation - a search 
that has resulted in the introduction of the most complex 
Canadian legislation - is to narrow the differential between 
the taxation of dividends and capital gains. The adoption of 
a broad concept of income for Canada would, in itself, greatly 
reduce the uncertainty and administrative difficulties of our 
present legislation.
In outlining its case for taxing gains as they accrued the minority 
report of the Radcliffe Commission highlighted disadvantages of the 
alternative. They argued that taxation of realised gains would tempt 
taxpayers to hold onto assets and to realise losses (but not gains) and
would cause inequities when gains were taxed in the year that they were
33realised. The Carter Commission also favoured taxation of gains as 
they accrued:
To be consistent with the principle of the comprehensive 
tax base net gains on assets should in principle be brought 
into income annually, whether the gains were realised or 
not. This would preclude tax postponement, and if time were 
provided to pay the tax on the gains, serious liquidity 
problems could be avoided.
Against this background it must be remembered that -
(i) an Australian Labor government failed, in 1974, in its 
attempt to introduce a tax on realised capital gains 
occurring after 17 September, 1974;
(ii) a majority of tax agents (61%) disagreed with the
statement that capital gains tax should be introduced 
if it would prevent tax avoidance (see 6.4);
(iii) some taxpayers might be entitled to accrued capital
losses even though they might have substantial wealth;
(iv) some might perceive it wasteful to have annual valuations 
and payment of tax on accrued gains when, at a later time, 
values might well fall and require refunds of tax to be 
paid; and
(v) others might see it as inequitable that assets might have 
to be realised to pay tax on accrued gains.
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No simple solution exists especially for the problems involved 
in valuation. Perhaps a system which permitted taxpayers' own valuations 
to be accepted could be adopted. Safeguards could be built-in to impose 
penalties for gross undervaluations. Random checks could also be made 
on the disposal of assets and taxpayers could be penalised where they 
were unable to provide satisfactory explanation for large residuals 
which had not previously been taxed.
Assets which were genuinely difficult to value could be accounted 
for on the basis of cost plus an adjustment by a predetermined index 
number. Where taxpayers were unable to pay tax on accrued gains the 
tax, together with interest, could be paid when the asset was disposed 
of. Whether liquidity is a real problem or not depends on the taxpayer's 
own circumstances. Overseas experience suggests that liquidity might 
not be a significant problem because taxpayers who have the largest
35gains are, generally, those who also have the highest incomes.
In making a recommendation about capital gains, clearly the author's 
first preference is that capital gains be taxed, without differentiation 
or exemption, as they accrue. This should improve equity and should 
reduce many of the present avoidance opportunities. Experience with the 
tax should help overcome valuation and liquidity problems which are 
the two main objections raised against the above proposals. However, it 
must be significant that all OECD countries which impose taxes on capital 
gains impose them on realised gains. If gains are not to be taxed as 
they accrue then they must be taxed as they are realised. This then 
is the author's second preference. It therefore ranks above the present 
position of having no explicit capital gains tax at all.
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7.3.3 Reforms to Reduce the Number of Exemptions to the Tax Base
The less exemptions there are to the tax base the fairer that 
base remains and the less opportunities for tax avoidance. This has 
been noted many times:
An income tax remains fair, however, only if it reaches all 
income, only if there are no preferences or loopholes through 
which some people can escape. The very integrity of the tax 
system is challenged today when many persons, especially 
those well off, are provided with readily available escapes.
These comments echo the sentiments of the Minority Report contained 
in the Radcliffe Commission who stated that:
When the base on which a tax is levied lacks precise 
definition the system is particularly exposed to the 
danger that successive concessions, designed to take care 
of special situations, will cause a progressive erosion 
of the tax base until its efficacy as an instrument of 
taxation is seriously weakened.
The Minority feared that the granting of concessions to one group 
would lead to the granting of concessions to others and, over time, 
this would lead to the tax burden being less equitably allocated. It 
seemed a far better policy, according to the minority, to have a much 
broader tax base and a lower rate of tax rather than the converse. The 
main purpose of comment here is to suggest ways of broadening the tax 
base. This includes, of course, taxing capital gains as they accrue, 
reducing scope for tax evasion and avoidance, and not providing deductions 
for such things as personal expenditures. Table 7.2 gives a summary of 
some of the changes which should be made to the Australian tax system 
to broaden the tax base. N.B. In July 1982 the Irish Commission on 
Taxation recommended that the Irish Government abolish most income tax
38reliefs presently existing in Ireland.
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TABLE 7.2
Changes Required to be Made to the Australian Tax System to Broaden Its Tax Base
Item
1. Capital gains, gifts Windfall gains. Inheritance Bequests, and Retirement Allowances (i.e. Golden Handshakes)
2. Property rates & taxes Hospital, medical & dentalexpensesLife assurance & superannuation contributions Education & self-education expensesFuneral expenses Calls on shares in afforestation companies Adoption expenses
3. Dependant rebates Zone allowances Housekeeper rebates Sole Parent rebates Health Insurance rebates Housing Loan MortgageInterest rebates Pensioner rebates
4. Living-away-from-homeallowancePrivate expenses of preparing tax returns Election expenses for candidates for State or Federal Parliaments Charitable gifts Home Insulation costs
Action Required
Include as assessable income
Exclude from range of eligible concessional rebates.
Exclude as rebate of tax.
Exclude from deductible expenses
Other aspects of the tax base which provided tax avoidance oppor­
tunities were outlined earlier (4.4) including the exemption from tax 
of certain ex-Australian source income derived by residents, the way in 
which fringe benefits were subject to tax and the ability of some tax­
payers to postpone the derivation of income. The first of these invites
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avoidance because the Act exempts residents from tax on most classes 
of foreign income which is subject to tax in the source country. To 
restore equity and reduce avoidance opportunities, all ex-Australian 
income derived by residents should be subject to Australian tax with 
a credit given for any ex-Australian tax already paid. But given 
Australia's commitment to seventeen or more double tax treaties this 
unilateral change seems unlikely. If rebatable dividends received by 
resident companies were also subject to tax in this fashion it would 
reduce the tax advantages to be gained from establishing companies in 
tax haven countries. Dividend income repatriated to Australia would 
then be fully taxed.
With fringe benefits the main difficulty, apart from ensuring the 
benefit is included as assessable income, is the problem of valuation. 
This could be handled in two ways:" either standard values could be 
prescribed or acceptable methods of valuation could be described by the 
Commissioner. The question of ensuring fringe benefits are taxed is 
a problem of evasion and can be minimised by requiring PAYE instalments 
of tax to be made. Remedies have already been suggested to prevent 
avoidance of tax from schemes which attempt to postpone income (4.4.4). 
Essentially these reforms require the Act to prescribe one mode of 
derivation of income for dll taxpayers, for example the accrual method.
7.3.4 Reforms to General Anti-Avoidance Legislation
Australia's general anti-avoidance provision from 1936 to 1981 was 
s.260 and this provision was replaced by Part IVA from 27 May 1981.
The effectiveness of the latter is yet to be determined. It is, there­
fore, not known whether any reforms ought to be suggested. Time will 
tell but, judging from tax agents' opinions (see generally 6.5) about
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the effectiveness of the new Part IVA, it is likely further changes 
will be required. Only 46% of agents responding to the survey on tax 
avoidance 'agreed' that "the new section 260 would probably be effective 
in preventing taxpayers from undertaking tax avoidance schemes." Of 
the remainder, 18% were undecided and 36% 'disagreed' with the statement. 
These doubts about Part IVA's likely effectiveness are strengthened 
when one looks at remedial legislation introduced after Part IVA was 
enacted. The Treasurer has introduced legislation to prevent exploita-
39tion of petroleum rebate provisions and more recently he has introduced
further legislation designed to prevent tax avoidance through trust
40stripping. One might ask why it was necessary to introduce additional 
legislation, particularly the latter, if Part IVA was regarded as 
an effective anti-avoidance provision. One might also question the 
merits of using general provisions to prevent tax avoidance. The Radcliffe 
Commission did not favour the use of general anti-avoidance provisions 
to prevent tax avoidance:
We do not favour a departure from the present system of
detailed legislative control of the various forms of tax
avoidance that are thought to be obnoxious. Whatever the 
advantages of a different system which would confine the 
positive law to some general statement of principle, we are 
satisfied that it would only cause harmful confusion if our 
present system were to be abandoned in favour of the other. ^^
The Radcliffe Commission's stand against replacing the established 
processes of trial and error by an all embracing general anti-avoidance 
provision rested on several grounds including the fact that they tended
to be "obscurely worded" and "drawn more widely than their original
purpose required". As a result individuals' tax liabilities were deter-
42mined "not by law but by the Special Commissioners". But there are 
problems with alternative approaches of preventing tax avoidance. For 
example, specific provisions, unless they are retroactive, will be
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effective only where the draftsmen can foresee the form all tax avoidance 
arrangements will take. Specific legislation is also extremely detailed 
and might therefore expose new avoidance opportunities.
Another alternative is the use of retrospective legislation. This 
has, generally, not been favoured in Australia though some use has been 
made of it. For example, when legislation was foreshadowed to stop 
expenditure recoupment schemes, which exploited s.67, the Treasurer 
announced that similar schemes, arising in the future, would also be 
legislated against from the first announcement date (24 September 1978). 
Since then the Treasurer has introduced further legislation (4 August 
1980) which has been effective from 24 September 1978. Retrospection 
in law-making has always been frowned upon and is precluded in respect
43of criminal law. One could argue that if the principle is appropriate 
for criminal matters then it should also be appropriate for revenue 
matters. Judicial disapproval of retrospection in respect of revenue 
matters can be traced back to 1870 when Justice Wiles said:
... prima facie of questionable policy and contrary to 
the general principles that legislation by which the 
conduct of mankind is to be regulated ought, when 
introduced for the first time, to deal with future acts 
and ought not change the character of past transactions 
carried on upon the faith of the existing law. 44
Retrospection robs the law of a degree of certainty as it makes 
actions illegal which were formerly legal. The advantage of retro­
spective legislation is that its immediate effect on tax avoidance 
schemes is quite precise. Tax avoidance schemes can, therefore, be 
outlawed and the outcome of remedial legislation can be predetermined, 
unlike general provisions or administrative control provisions where 
the outcome remains uncertain. The power, or fear of, possible retro­
spective legislation should not be underestimated. According to one
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report the announcement, in 1978, by the British Labor Government that
it would introduce retrospective legislation to prevent tax avoidance
45"killed the tax avoidance industry in that country". Recently, in 
Australia, the Australian Labor Party announced that it would introduce 
unlimited retrospective legislation to prevent tax avoidance if it was
46elected. At that time the Liberal Government, although they did not 
dismiss the possibility of retrospective legislation, indicated that
47they felt it unlikely to be necessary. Yet, only a month later, on 
25 July 1982 the Treasurer announced that retrospective legislation 
would be introduced in order to make liable, in prescribed circumstances, 
shareholders of certain companies which have gwaded' liabilities for 
company tax:
The Government has decided to bring before the next sitting 
of the Parliament special legislation to recover from vendor 
shareholders the coitpany tak that was evaded in 'bottom-of- 
the harbour' strips of untaxed coirpany profits, carried out 
before the Crimes (Taxation Offences) Act 1980 made such 
conduct a specific criminal offence under Commonwealth law.48
The amount of revenue lost through these schemes is unclear though the 
Treasurer has said that it is at least A$450 million^^(i.e. approxi­
mately stg £260m). But apparently loss of revenue is only one of the 
reasons given by the Treasurer for these measures:
In view of the revenue implications and having regard to 
the fraudulent nature of the scheme, the Government has 
concluded that, in the public interest, it must act to 
provide a simple and more certain avenue of recovery of 
the evaded company tax by way of the vendor shareholders 
who benefited from the scheme. 50
Some fear that if circumstances can arise where it is in the public 
interest to introduce retrospective legislation to prevent e v a s i o n  of 
tax then circumstances might also arise where it will be in the public 
interest to introduce retrospective legislation to prevent a v o i d a n c e  
of tax, if not by a Liberal Government then by a Labor Government.
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Where general anti-avoidance legislation is introduced it should 
be coupled with "clearance procedures" to protect bona fide transactions 
and to prevent delays in the implementation of new ventures simply 
because of the fear of being (unintentionally?) struck down. Further, 
overseas experience has shown that the introduction of anti-avoidance 
measures must be coupled with increased powers for the revenue authorities
51to obtain information where tax avoidance is suspected. As yet no 
new powers have been introduced into the Australian Act. If Part IVA 
is to be effective this shortcoming should be remedied immediately 
because, at present, the Commissioner's powers to obtain information
52are defective.
7.3.5 Reforms to Improve Efficiency of Legislative Remedies
Analysis of the efficiency with which legislative defects were 
remedied was split into two parts: first, the speed with which defective
legislation was amended, and second, the effectiveness of those 
amendments (4.6). Mainly because information on when defects come to 
the attention of the legislature was not available, comment was restricted 
to statements about the effectiveness of amendments. However, one of 
the most serious defects existing in Australian tax law is still to be 
remedied, namely the failure to tax capital gains. Other examples can 
also be given including the lengthy delays in preventing "Curran schemes" 
and the delay in introducing a new anti-avoidance provision. The 
original "Curran scheme" was undertaken in the 1968-69 tax year, yet 
remedial legislation did not come into effect until 16 August, 1977.
There were two developments over recent years which will improve 
anti-tax avoidance legislation: first was the establisnment, in 1978,
within the Taxation Office of a Compliance Division; the second was the
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appointment, on 6 December 1979, of a Taxation Advisory Committee.
The Compliance Division is responsible for planning and co-ordinating 
administrative activity, at a national level, in relation to tax 
avoidance schemes whereas the Taxation Advisory Committee is responsible 
for providing advice to the Treasurer on technical aspects of tax 
legislation. Members of this Committee are chosen with this particular 
responsibility in mind although they will also be required, on some 
occasions, to give policy advice to the government. Unfortunately 
little has been heard of this committee since Part IVA was introduced.
Another recent development, at the international level, which is 
likely to improve anti-avoidance legislation is the establishment in 
1977 of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's 
Committee on Fiscal Affairs. One of its working parties concentrates 
on tax avoidance and evasion and its work has concentrated on three 
areas:
(i) improving the flow of information between tax 
administrations in respect of particular cases;
(ii) improving exchanges of technical information between 
tax inspectors and auditors in the field of detecting 
tax avoidance and tax evasion; and
(iii) improving exchanges of information between tax
officials about recent legislative and administrative 
problems they have encountered.
If the Australian Tax Office participates fully in these exchanges 
considerable benefits are likely to be forthcoming as many of the recent 
tax avoidance schemes marketed in Australia, including "dividend 
stripping" and "pre-paid interest" schemes, had their origins in North 
America and Europe. The working party discusses each new tax avoidance 
scheme as it is discovered in a member country. First, details of the
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scheme are provided to representatives of each country and there follows 
a discussion of the practical, political and legal problems encountered 
so that other countries can learn from the experience of the country 
in which the schemes were discovered.
Doubtless other changes could also be made to improve the efficiency 
with which legislative defects are remedied but without more knowledge 
about Tax Office and Treasury practices it is difficult to make any firm 
suggestions.
Apart from quickly introducing amending anti-avoidance legislation 
such legislation should be free from defects. At times Parliament has 
let legislation slip through which has been ambiguous and incomprehensible, 
[See for instance s.80, ss.82KK-KL, S.99B-C, s.lOOA.] It would seem 
that if the Taxation Advisory Committee does not achieve its objectives 
then there would be a need for some form of s e l e c t  c o m m i t t e e  approach 
to screen proposed legislation. This committee would review draft 
legislation to see that it would have its desired effects and was free 
from technical defects.
7.4 OTHER REFORM PROPOSALS RELEVANT TO EVASION AND AVOIDANCE
Mention has already been made of the strict time limits imposed 
on taxpayers wishing to lodge objections or appeals (Table 3.8). No 
similar limits are imposed on the Commissioner of Taxation when he is 
required to make decisions on these appeals and no mechanism is available 
to relax the current requirements whatever the reason. This situation 
is unsatisfactory and consideration should be given to alternative 
practices. For instance, in the United Kingdom taxpayers are allowed 
to make late appeals if they have genuine reasons (e.g., if they have
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been in hospital or if they have been overseas). Another practice, 
operating in the United Kingdom, which would improve the appeal process 
is the granting to senior tax officers of the power to settle appeals 
and impose penalties in consultation with the taxpayer at a regional 
level. This saves time and leaves the formal appeal process for the 
more serious disputes. At present there is an enormous number of 
objections waiting to be considered (201,376 were lodged in 1980/81) 
and very lengthy delays, up to two years, to have matters heard by 
Boards of Review. Even the Treasurer has recognised the lengthy delays 
that exist in having a matter heard by a Board of Review. In answer to 
a question in Parliament the Treasurer gave the following estimates of 
time which would be required to dispose of cases which, at 30 September
541982, were awaiting hearing:
T i m e  N e e d e d  t o  D i s p o s e  o f  
C a s e s  A w a i t i n g  H e a r i n g  a t  
Z O  S e p t e m b e r  1 9 8 2
No. 1 Board 18 monthsNo. 2 Board 28 monthsNo. 3 Board 9 months
Alternative procedures to reduce the number of formal objections and
reduce delays in the hearing of appeals must be considered. Suggestions 
are continually arising. For example, the Victorian President of the 
Taxpayers' Association of Australia suggested that the Taxation Office 
should set up a section to deal with small claims, requiring no more
55than the details an ordinary taxpayer could put on his own behalf.
This would allow the formal objection and appeal process to be reserved 
for more serious matters. However, without the establishment of more 
regional offices it is difficult to see how this suggestion would work. 
Alternatively, additional Boards could be established having only one 
member rather than having at present three members. Taxpayers would
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have access to earlier hearings yet still have the right to appeal to 
a Court if they were dissatisfied with the Board's decision.
One practice, formally adopted under United States tax law, which 
should be considered is the process of advance rulings. This practice, 
which is also adopted in a number of other countries, reduces confron­
tation between taxpayers and revenue authorities because it reduces 
uncertainty. Taxpayers who are about to undertake business arrangements 
which have tax implications can submit them to the revenue authorities 
for approval. Once approved, any tax advantages which accrue are not 
subject to dispute. Economic decision making and risk taking is, 
therefore, not impaired by doubts over the tax consequences of proposed 
actions.
The need to amend s.243 of the Act and the need to issue "non- 
taxable" assessments has already been raised (3.7). Section 243, which 
allows for prosecution by averment, should be immediately withdrawn and 
replaced by a section requiring the Commissioner to produce evidence 
of matters alleged in prosecutions. Further, taxpayers should be entitled 
to "non-taxable" assessments where they lodge a return but have no 
taxable income. This would allow them to dispute assessments where, 
for instance, they had incurred losses but for tax purposes not all of 
those losses were allowed. At the present time no formal assessment is 
issued and this means that no objection or appeal can be made. This 
appeal process must wait until a later year when the taxpayer claims 
a deduction for the carry forward of past losses.
Alternative means of improving relations with taxpayers ought to 
be considered. Already mentioned is the need to establish a public 
relations department within the Taxation Office (7.2.4). This could
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include the establishment of a taxpayers' service centre and the 
appointment of an Ombudsman within the Taxation Office. Such a service 
centre should seek to cut red tape where possible, to remedy errors 
quickly and to consider genuine cases of hardship for various matters, 
e.g. payment of tax. Tax forms and guides could be simplified and 
improved. One study on the comprehensibility of Australian tax forms
and guides showed that they would be easier to read if an attempt was
56made to reduce the length of sentences in them. Tax forms should 
also consider the Canadian practices of (i) issuing information 
circulars describing policies and practices adopted in dealing with tax 
avoidance and evasion; and (ii) defining, in simple terms, what is 
meant by the terms "tax evasion" and "tax avoidance".
All correspondence entered into by the Taxation Office with tax­
payers ought to be carefully checked to see that information is accurate 
and timely and that any requests or directives are clear, polite and 
unambiguous. Confidence in tax administration could also be strengthened 
by abandoning small claims for unpaid taxes. Facilities to pay tax by 
way of instalment could also be considered where this would alleviate 
hardship.
Another important area is that of paying interest with refunds 
where refunds have been delayed. For example, where no refund has been 
received within six weeks of lodgement the refund should be paid with 
interest at commercial rates. Similarly, where taxpayers are late 
lodging their returns they should be liable to pay tax with interest.
On 10 August 1982, the Treasurer announced the Government's
57intention to pay interest with refunds in a limited number of circum­
stances, viz, on income tax refunds following a successful objection
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or appeal by the taxpayer. Interest will be calculated from the date 
the assessment was objected against, or the date the tax was paid, 
whichever is the later. However, it is unclear whether taxpayers will 
be better off under this new arrangement. At present the Commissioner 
allows half the tax in dispute to remain in abeyance until the objection 
is settled. In future this practice will, in almost all cases, be 
stopped. Consequently, a l l  the tax due on an assessment will have to 
be paid in full on or before the due date. It is the intention that 
refunds resulting from objections will be repaid with interest. The 
rate at which the Tax Office will pay interest will be the rate applicable 
to long-term Treasury Bonds. At the time of the Treasurer's announcement 
this rate was about 6% less than the penalty rate of interest imposed 
on taxpayers for late payment of tax.
One question in the tax avoidance survey showed that tax agents 
thought that "self-employed" persons did not have adequate tax allowances 
for superannuation or retirement benefit contributions (Table 6.3).
Changes should be made to improve the tax concessions available for 
such contributions. Self-employed persons should be treated no differ­
ently from employees and bringing the tax concessions available for 
both into line would do much to mitigate the feelings of inequity in 
this area. A majority of tax agents (65%) were also dissatisfied with 
the t i m e  it took the Tax Office to consider objections. Tax agents 
were also dissatisfied with the t i m e  it took the Tax Office to deal 
with other correspondence on income tax matters [57% of agents were 
dissatisfied (Table 6.3)]. Part of the Tax Office's problem may have 
been lack of staff and part may have been due to the increasing number 
of objections lodged against assessments. If staff levels are not to 
be increased then consideration should be given to ways to reduce the 
number of objections received. For instance, tax agents should be
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forewarned of changes in assessment policies or if particular items 
are no longer regarded as allowable;tax agents ought to be advised of 
this before they prepare taxpayers' returns. Similarly where deductions 
will only be allowed in certain circumstances, then tax agents should 
again be advised of those circumstances. Where assessments are altered 
greater detail should be provided about the reasons for doing so.
For relatively minor matters a less formal objection procedure might be 
implemented; for instance taxpayers could go to their local Tax Offices 
to have their disputes resolved.
It would seem that the Taxation Office should continue to challenge 
blatant, artificial or contrived tax avoidance schemes because this was 
the reason tax agents thought was most likely to discourage tax 
avoidance (6.5). In designing reforms to prevent tax avoidance the 
Government should encourage professional bodies, such as the Institute 
of Chartered Accountants, the Society of Accountants and the various 
Law Societies, to help. About half the tax agents responding to the . 
avoidance survey believed that the accountancy profession should be 
actively engaged in designing reforms and 61% approved of the Institute 
of Chartered Accounts' plan to impose sanctions on members who promoted 
tax avoidance schemes.
The tax evasion survey also revealed that about three-quarters of 
all taxpayers were dissatisfied with our income tax laws [82% of 
"evaders" and 75% of "non-evaders" (Table 5.12)]. Further research 
needs to be done to see exactly what aspects of these laws cause 
discontent. Judging from the comments received consideration should 
be given to the system of paying tax by way of provisional tax, to the 
way in which overtime and interest are taxed, and to the objection and 
appeal process. Questions in the tax evasion survey relating to the
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administrative control hypothesis also indicate areas where reforms 
could be made (Table 5.15). Apart from reforming the system of 
provisional tax, which caused dissatisfaction among 75% of "evaders" 
and 73% of "non-evaders", the area most in need of reform seemed to 
be official investigations by income tax officers. A majority of 
"evaders" (66%) and a minority of "non-evaders" (37%) were dissatisfied 
with official investigations. Part of this dissatisfaction would, of 
course, be because taxpayers were caught evading and were charged 
additional tax, but judging from the comments received part was due to 
the way in which taxpayers were treated during investigations. Attempts 
should be made to give tax investigation staff some training in dealing 
with people so that they can conduct tax audits and investigations 
without unnecessarily upsetting the taxpayers. This does not mean that 
staff should not enforce the law to the extent required, rather it means 
that they should carry out their duties as politely as possible and 
should, at all times, let taxpayers know what their rights are in the 
circumstances and see that these rights are respected. It would help 
if taxpayers subject to audits or investigations were given a brochure 
containing information about the audit or investigation process and 
their rights during, and after, it. More details could also be given 
with annual assessments when items of expenditure have been disallowed.
7.5 SUMMARY
Though it was not the central purpose of this thesis to provide 
a detailed list of changes to the Australian income tax system, quite 
a number of changes have been suggested in this chapter. Most of these 
changes are designed to reduce the scope for evasion or avoidance; 
some are designed to improve administration of the tax system. The
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latter though might indirectly reduce the incidence of evasion or 
avoidance because taxpayers might feel the tax system is fairer.
However, in suggesting changes no attempt has been made to determine 
their likely cost. It is hoped that the cost would be small in relation 
to the likely benefits. Further, no attempt has been made to assess the 
recommendations against other criteria. For example, a number of the 
suggestions involved increased staff for the Tax Office and while these 
were designed to reduce evasion they might conflict with other criteria. 
It might add to the overall cost or complexity of running a large 
bureaucracy and this might outweigh the benefits sought.
Further, some of the changes suggested, such as a flat rate tax 
and a tax on capital gains, are such fundamental changes that they 
should not be introduced overnight. Time and care should be taken in 
drafting them. Other changes require the gathering of more information 
- information about people. This, though it might reduce evasion or 
avoidance, might be at the expense of undue invasion of their privacy. 
Some trade-offs might therefore be necessary before more controls are 
introduced. If the tax system is to survive and operate efficiently 
it requires acceptance by taxpayers and a commitment by them to 
co-operate. Unless tax laws are seen to be fair, unless Governments are 
seen to spend taxpayers' money wisely, unless other taxpayers are seen 
to comply, then taxpayers will always be dissatisfied. The role of the 
media in improving taxpayers behaviour should also be fully explored.
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
C O N C L U S I O N S
8.1 INTRODUCTION
Evasion and avoidance of income tax in Australia has, over the 
last decade, reached alarming proportions; so much so that
(a) a Royal Commission estimated that one evasion 
practice (known as "bottom-of-the-harbour schemes") 
could have lost the Commonwealth Government "hundreds 
if not thousands of millions of dollars".i
(b) the Commonwealth Government, 1 December 1982, passed 
laws retrospective in effect to 1 January 1972 to help 
recover some, if not all, of the evaded tax from the 
so-called "bottom-of-the-harbour schemes".%
(c) the Prime Minister addressed the nation to explain the 
Government's campaign against tax evasion and avoidance.^
Unfortunately there has been little published in Australia on 
the possible causes of evasion or avoidance. In this thesis an attempt 
was made to determine some of the causes. To this end the thesis was 
divided into two parts: firstly, the tax system itself was analysed
to see how it might have contributed; secondly, an attempt was made 
to determine why taxpayers wanted to evade or avoid. In the pages that 
follow there is a summary of the conclusions of this thesis. These 
conclusions extend to both of the above aspects, viz. systemic weaknesses 
which provide opportunities for evasion and avoidance and taxpayers' 
motives for wanting to evade or avoid.
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8.2 CONCLUSIONS REGARDING THE OPPORTUNITY, IN THEAUSTRALIAN INCOME TAX SYSTEM, FOR EVASION AND AVOIDANCE OF INCOME TAX
As a prerequisite to determining the opportunities for evasion 
and avoidance, it was necessary to distinguish what was meant by the 
two terms. In part, this was the function of Chapter One where, at 
1.6, it was concluded that:
. - Tax evasion was an act in contravention of the law whereby a person paid less tax than he was legally bound to pay. Evasion presupposed that a liability for tax had already fallen on a taxpayer who then took steps to
escape payment of the tax.
- Tax avoidance was an act, carried out by means which were within the law, whereby a person paid less tax than he would have paid but for those means. The distin­guishing feature about tax avoidance was that the taxpayer took steps to get out of the way of the tax 
liahitity before it fell on him. The means by which this was achieved often lacked commercial purpose, other than avoidance of tax, involved complex legal manoeuvres and involved some degree of secrecy.
Though the definitions involved more than that outlined above 
(see generally 1.4 and 1.5) and although there were other aspects of 
evasion and avoidance (1.2), the above seems sufficient for present 
purposes. Given these definitions it appeared that, in the Australian 
income tax system, there was considerable scope for both activities.
In Chapter Three it was found that inadequate tax collection practices 
(3.3), inadequate record keeping requirements (3.4), inadequate resources 
used to detect evasion (3.5) and inadequate penalties for evasion (3.6) 
were the main systemic weaknesses which provided scope for evasion. 
Analysis in Chapter Four revealed systemic weaknesses which provided 
scope for avoidance. Among the main defects where the ease with which 
taxpayers were able to split income with others (4.2) and the oppor­
tunities that existed for converting income into capital (4.3). Other 
defects included the large number of exemptions from the tax base (4.4),
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the inadequacy, between 1936-1981, of the anti-avoidance provisions 
(4.5), and the delays that have occurred in remedying defects in the 
legislation (4.6).
It should be stressed that these systemic weaknesses may not 
necessarily have been a bad thing. They could, for example, have 
provided for some taxpayers a necessary safety valve. This may have 
meant the difference between small scale evasion or avoidance and 
outright tax revolt. Alternatively, a tax system free of these defects 
may have been far too complex or too expensive to administer. However, 
one cannot overlook the fact that the opportunities to evade and avoid 
were not available to all taxpayers. If for no other reason an attempt 
should be made to reduce such opportunities so that equity between 
taxpayers can be restored. Wage and salary earners have had least 
opportunity to evade because tax has been deducted at source and they 
have had little opportunity to avoid tax by splitting income with others
5Attempts to assign wage and salary income have failed. Purported 
assignments of wage and salary income are still ineffective for tax 
purposes because there is no presently existing right to future income 
in existence at the time of making any agreement. All that exists is 
a mere expectancy. The parties can agree to assign the income once it 
has come into existence but then it is too late to avoid tax. Tax 
accrues as soon as the income is derived and payment of that income
to another person is merely an application of income rather than an
6
alienation of it.
To restore equity and to limit the scope for avoidance and 
evasion, reforms are required. While it was not the purpose of this 
thesis to examine possible reforms, some policy options were considered. 
It was decided that among the reforms which ought to be considered to
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reduce the scope for evasion were
(i) extension of the principle of deduction of tax
at source to income consisting of interest, dividends, 
annuities and mining rents (7.2.1);
(ii) enactment of provisions requiring a minimum set of books 
of account that should be kept and accounting procedures 
that should be followed (7.2.2); and
(iii) a review of the penalties that are imposed for detected 
evasions (7.2.3). These penalties should apply at a 
predetermined rate so as to be commensurate with the 
offence.
To reduce opportunity for avoidance, the following reforms were 
suggested:
(i) the introduction of a flat rate of tax (7.3.1) - or at 
the very least a rate not as sharply progressive as the 
existing rate;
(ii) the extension of the tax base to catch all capital gains 
(7.3.2); and
(iii) a restriction in the number of exemptions from the tax 
base (7.3.3).
8.3 CONCLUSIONS REGARDING AUSTRALIAN TAXPAYERS' MOTIVES FOR WANTING TO ENGAGE IN TAX EVASION AND AVOIDANCE
8.3.1 Conclusions about the Evasion Survey
Two nationwide surveys were conducted to help determine what 
might influence Australian taxpayers to evade or avoid tax. The first 
survey, dealing with evasion (5.3), obtained and compared information 
from two different survey populations, viz. an "evader" population and 
a "non-evader" population. The same questionnaire was distributed to 
each and, among other things, three hypotheses about taxpayer behaviour
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were tested. These hypotheses were referred to as "the exchange 
relationship hypothesis", "the social orientation hypothesis” and 
"the administrative control hypothesis" (2.6). Statistical tests of 
significance were applied to responses from each group and it was 
found (5.4) that
(i) there was no statistically significant difference 
of opinion between "evaders" and "non-evaders" on 
questions relating to "the exchange relationship 
hypothesis";
(ii) there was a statistically significant difference 
of opinion between "evaders" and "non-evaders" 
for - some but not all (in fact in three out of five 
cases) - questions relating to "the social orientation 
hypothesis"; and
(iii) there was a statistically significant difference of
opinion between "evaders" and "non-evaders" for almost 
all (three out of four) questions relating to "the 
administrative control" hypothesis.
At first sight there seemed to be little support for "the 
exchange relationship hypothesis". However, judging from the comments 
received (5.7), this was the element regarded most likely to influence 
taxpayers' behaviour. Evaders, in particular, justified their actions 
because they believed that tax rates were too high, that high income 
earners had more opportunity to avoid tax and that the Government wasted 
taxpayers' money. Non-evaders had similar views. There was ample 
questionnaire support to verify these claims and this is summarised in 
Table 8,1.
After respondents' comments were considered (5.7.2) and the 
above information tabulated it was considered that "the exchange 
relationship hypothesis" embodied the most important motivating influences
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TABLE 8.1
Summary of Some Responses, in the Tax Evasion Survey, to Questions Relating to the Exchange Relationship Hypothesis
Evaders Non-Evaders
1. Percentage of respondents who thought that tax rates were "too high" in relation to the amountthey earned 89% 85%
2. Percentage of respondents who were dissatisfied with the way the Federal Government spent taxpayers'money 72 73
3. Percentage of respondents who were dissatisfied with our income taxlaws 82 75
This meant that some other reason had to be found to explain the lack 
of statistical difference between the responses from the "evader" 
population and the "non-evader" population. It seemed that either the 
methodology was defective or that there might be just as many evaders 
in both populations. Responses to some of the other questions (Table 
5.8) tended to suggest the latter might be the case. For example, when 
respondents were asked about their likely action in respect of part-time 
cash earnings of $100 (i.e. whether to declare for tax purposes or 
whether to omit it), about two thirds of respondents from each group 
(the evader group and the non-evader group) said that they would omit
7the earnings.
The other implication of the conflict between the results 
obtained from statistical analysis and results obtained from an analysis 
of respondents' comments, was that the methodology used was defective.
Consequently, at 5.5, the data were retested using "traditional metho-
8dologies". However, the results obtained were less satisfactory.
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Not only were there very few significant differences but some of the 
differences conflicted with prior traditional theory (5.5.2). Other 
differences were apparent with one of the traditional methodologies 
but not the other. This suggested that choice of methodology could 
influence the results obtained. This same comment about the influence 
of the choice of methodologies must be made about the methodology used 
in 5.4.
If the traditional methodologies supported any of the three 
hypotheses, it was likely that it was "the administration control 
hypothesis". In particular, one of the traditional methodologies 
indicated a strong relationship between the way in which the Tax Office 
dealt with taxpayers' annual returns and their membership of one of the 
groups [viz. evader or non-evader). However the causal factor or 
independent variable could not, with certainty, be identified.
8.3.2 Conclusions about the Avoidance Survey
For various reasons (6.1) the avoidance survey (6.3) elicited 
responses from tax agents about taxpayers' behaviour rather than from 
taxpayers about their own behaviour. In addition tax agents were 
asked about various reform proposals. The survey, though less ambitious 
and less sophisticated than the evasion survey, was more positive in 
its conclusions.
The reason given by almost three-quarters of tax agents for 
taxpayers most wanting to engage in tax avoidance was that they (the 
taxpayers) thought the amount of tax they had to pay in relation to the 
amount of money they had earned was too high (6.4). This, of course, 
is one of the aspects of the "exchange relationship hypothesis".
Comments received from tax agents (6.7) also supported this finding.
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Most comments made connected tax avoidance with high rates of tax.
Some comments indicated other influences but these were generally 
related to "the exchange relationship hypothesis". The connection 
between high rates of tax and tax avoidance was not altogether surprising 
because it has often been alleged that those who undertake avoidance 
schemes were high income earners. The strength of the suspected 
relationship between tax avoidance and high rates of tax was further 
explored with another question concerning the most likely reaction of 
professional persons whose incomes reached the level where they were 
liable to pay tax at the 60% rate. Almost four-fifths of tax agents 
thought that such taxpayers would "continue to earn, but look for ways 
of reducing their tax burdens by legal means". Ten percent of tax 
agents thought the most likely response would be tax evasion and only 
eight percent thought that work effort would be reduced (Question 8,
6.4).
In respect of the question concerning factors which would most 
discourage taxpayers from undertaking tax avoidance (Question 7, 6.5) 
schemes, a greater variety of responses was obtained. However, the 
most significant influence seemed to be the possibility of protracted 
legal battles with the Tax Office. Responses to questions concerning 
the likelihood of future avoidances (6.5) of tax were divided. Forty- 
seven percent felt that the new anti-avoidance provisions (Part IVA) 
would be effective in preventing tax avoidance whereas 35% thought that 
it would not be effective.
There was also a mixed reaction to the extent to which the 
accountancy profession should be involved in designing reforms to 
prevent tax avoidance with only about half (49%) agreeing that the 
profession should be involved, the remainder either disagreeing (37%)
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or being undecided (14%). One reform proposal which met with little 
approval was the proposal of a capital gains tax. Only 32% of tax 
agents agreed that it should be introduced IF it would prevent tax 
avoidance [Question 2(d), 6.6]. Some 61% disagreed and 7% were 
undecided.
8.4 THE INFLUENCE OF TAX RATES - SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS
One of the main findings of this thesis was the strong positive 
relationship seen to exist between evasion/avoidance and high tax rates 
(5.8 and 6.8). Perhaps the high levels of evasion or avoidance 
(indicated in the Annual Reports of the Commissioner of Taxation and 
elsewhere) are, in part, attributable to the Government's increased 
emphasis on income tax relative to 'other' taxes as Table 8.2 shows;
TABLE 8.2







1948-49 78% 11% 11% 100%
1964-65 80 12 8 100
1980-81 91 8 1 100
Source: Annual Reports of the Commissioner of 
Taxation (figures rounded).
* These figures do not include collection of customs and excise duties which at present account for slightly less than a quarter of total Commonwealth tax receipts. N.B. In 1948-49 such duties accounted for slightly more than a quarter of total Commonwealth tax receipts.
** Includes payroll tax, land tax, estate duty, gift duty, enter­tainment tax, wool tax, stevedoring industry charges, tobacco charges and canning fruit charges.
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Table 8.2 shows that income tax accounted for about 78% of 
revenue collections by the Commonwealth Taxation Office in 1948-49 
and for over 90% in 1980-81. When Table 8.3 is analysed it is clear 
that much of the increased burden of income tax has fallen on wage and 
salary earners (i.e. the P.A.Y.E. category). Separate figures are not 
available for 1948-49 but they are available for the latter two 
financial years. In 1964-65 some 43% of income tax collections were 
from wage and salary earners but this percentage had increased by 
almost 50% to 64% in 1980-81. Over the same period the percentage of 
income tax collected from companies had fallen from 31% in 1964-65 to 
21% in 1980-81. The percentage of income tax collections from individuals 
other than wage and salary earners had also declined over this period - 
from 26% in 1964-65 to 15% in 1980-81.
The growing burden of income" tax, especially the burden on wage 
and salary earners, is again evident in Table 8.4. It shows tax payable 
on average earnings as a percentage of average earnings. The figures 
have been obtained by assuming a single person would have earned the 
average weekly wage throughout the whole of the year of income and would 
not have been entitled to any deductions or rebates. In 1948-49 that 
person would have been required to pay about 6% of his earnings in income 
tax whereas in 1980-81 the corresponding amount would have been 23% - 
almost a fourfold increase\
The impact of marginal rates of tax is perhaps more of a problem.
For 1981/82 average weekly earnings for male workers was $328.70 and 
given that they will increase by an amount roughly equivalent to the 
rate of increase for the previous twelve months then one would expect 
average earnings for 1982/83 to be about $384 per week or $19,968 per 
annum. Under the revised tax scale for 1982/83 the middle rate of tax
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TABLE 8.3
Percentage of Income Tax Collections from Individuals and Companies
Individuals 
RAIE Other Total Companies Total
1948-49 n.a. n.a. 73** 27 100
1964-65 43 26 69 31 100
1980-81 64 15 79 21 100
N.B. The P.A.Y.E. category is equivalent to a wage andsalary earner category.
** Separate figures did not become available until 1963-64.
Source: Annual Reports of the Corrmissioner
of Taxation.
TABLE 8.4





* Average Income = Average Weekly Earnings x 52.
Sources: Australian Bureau of Census & Statistics (for average weekly earnings), and Gunn's Income Tax 
Guides and Mannix's Income Tax Guides (for tax rates).
of 46% applies to taxable incomes of %19,500 and over. Therefore, for 
the first time, in the 1982/83 tax year average earnings will be taxed 
at the margin at 46% whereas previously the rate was the standard rate 
(32% for 1981/82). The likely effect of this on avoidance and evasion 
is only too apparent.
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The message is clear that the perceived burden of personal income 
tax rates must be reduced. This can be done in a number of ways, the 
simplest of which is that of reducing the tax rates. It seems far too 
severe that in two steps the marginal rate almost doubles [from 30.67% 
to 60% - 1982/83 rates]. If Government revenue requirements cannot be 
cut to accommodate this change then further reliance should be placed 
on indirect taxes. Alternatively, if income tax rates are not to be 
reduced then existing inequities ought to be eliminated and taxpayers 
should be better informed as to how their money is used. It is likely 
that taxpayers who believe they are getting more value for their tax 
dollar are likely to be less motivated to evade or avoid. Thus more 
attention should be given to effectively communicating,with taxpayers, 
information about Government spending.
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER EIGHT
1. Costigan Royal Commission into the Federated Ship Painters' and
Dockers' Union, First Volume of the Fourth Interim Report. Statements
quoted in F'tnanc'idl Review, 25 August 1982, pp.l & 8.
2. C.C.H., Special Income Tax Report, 24 September 1982, p.l.
3. Financial Review, 28 September 1982, p.5.
4. For instance, see R.B. Cross and G.K. Shaw, "The Evasion-Avoidance
Choice; A Suggested Approach", National Tax Journal, Vol.XXXIV, No.4, 
pp.489-491 who argue, legal consequences aside, the two should be • 
analysed jointly because economic determinants and consequences are 
the same.
5. See, for example, 2 CTBR (NS) Case 68 or 20 CTBR (NS) Case 11.
6. See s.19 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 as amended.
7. See Table 5.28 for full details.
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APPENDIX 1
E V A S I O N  S U R V E Y  M A T E R I A L
This appendix contains a copy of: _
(i) The advance letter,
(ii) The letter accompanying the questionnaire,
(iii) The questionnaire and responses to each question, and 
(iv) The follow up letter.
T H E  U N I V E R S I T Y  OF N E W C A S T L E  
N E W  SOUTH WALES, 2308
Telephone 68 0401
351
683 or 735 Area Code: (049)
V t p a n X m o ^ n t  o i  Comm&tce
Dear
Many people complain about paying taxes but few people seem 
to do anything about it. I am conducting a research project 
to determine exactly what the public thinks. You can help.
In a few days you will receive a questionnaire. If you would like to help, complete it and return it to me. It will not take up much of your time and your answers will be important 
to the success of this project.
Yours sincerely,
IAN 6. WALLSCHUTZKY ^  j 
Lecturer in Commerce
T H E  U N I V E R S I T Y  O F  N E W C A S T L E  352
N E W  SOUTH WALES, 2308
Telephone 68 0401
VepoÂ ent CotmeAca
683 or 735 
Area Code (049)
Dear
This is the questionnaire I wrote to you about a few days ago.The questions seek youA answers about various aspects of taxation. Unless your views are expressed they cannot be taken into account in determining public opinion. The questionnaire is not related to any Government Department or political party so you can say what you really think.
Your address has been taken from the electoral rolls and I hope you can spare the time, about fifteen minutes, to complete these questions. You will find the questions interesting and you will be helping my research by answering them. You might also be helping to influence future taxation policies which will affect your life.
Your answers will be treated in the confidence. Thequestions have not been marked or coded in any particular way so no-one will know which answers are yours. Also do not put your name on the completed questionnaire.
Please Aetu/in the questionnaire in the reply paid envelope within 
one week. Thank you for your co-operation.
Yours sincerely.
I. X V . . " .I;
IAN G. WALLSCHUTZKY ' Lecturer in Commerce
P.S. Enclosed is a complementary biro to help you complete the questionnaire. Please keep this biro as a token of my appreciation for helping with this project.
TAX EVASION QUESTIONNAIRE & ANSWERS 353
MuchTooHigh A Little About Too High Right A Li ttlc Too Low
1. What do you think about the amount of income tax you pay compared with the amount :
(a) you earn?
(b) of Governmentservices from which you, and any dependents you might have, personally benefit?
EV* 117 HE 95 67 2078 27(no difference)**
EVNE 8572 27 4045 35(no difference)
2734
Very Somewhat SomewhatSatis- Satis- Indiff- Dissat- fied fied erent isfied
2. How do you feel about:





Very Dissat* i sfied
207205
207205
your money? EV 4 40 14 85 64 - 207NE 3 35 18 82 67 - 205(no difference)
(b) income tax lawsin this country? EV 2 22 14 76 93 - 207NE 1 33 19 73 79 - 205(no difference)
(c) other laws in EV 16 72 29 67 23 = 207this country? NE 3 74 39 67 22 - 205(significant difference)
(d) the way you havebeen treated indealings withGovernmentDepartments? EV 17 63 35 44 48 « 207NE 18 61 38 52 36 - 205(no difference)
Legend
EV = "Evaders"NE = "Non-Evaders'





41% 41% (no difference)
** Chi-Square tests were used; P = 0.05
(except where test is shown to be ANOVA wherein analysis of variance tests were used; F » 0.05)
- 2 - 354
Strongly Slightly Approve Approve
Slightly Indlff- DIs- erent approve
StronglyDis­approve
3. How do you feel about the following:
Someone, in similar circumstances to your own, who omi ts ...
(a) $100 cash earnings from his income tax return
(b) $1,000 cash earnings from his income tax return





EV 13 NE 4
38 84 44 14
39 75 48 30(significant difference)
20 60 78 3125 45 66 63(significant difference)





Not Very Applic- Sat- able . isfied
4. How satisfied are you with each of the foll­owing?
(a) the efficiency of the income Tax Office in dealing with your annual return.
For example:
(i) the time it takes to deal with your annual return EV NE
(i i) the wcy in which the Income Tax Office deals with your annual return











tions” by Income Tax Officers, of your taxaffairs? EV 17NE 103
SomewhatSatis­fied Indiff­erent Dissat-isified
Very Dissat- i sfied
58
59




104 18 139 15(no difference)
4324
14











- 3 - 355
5. Some people have a good idea of the penalties for cheating on their income tax returns but others have no idea. If a friendasked you what the penalties were, what wouId you say?
EV NE
1 have almost no idea ... 19 39
... very little idea ... 25 51
... some idea ... 50 64
... a fairly good idea ... 59 40
... a very good idea ... 54 11
207 205
(significant dTffe
6. We ail hear about people cheating on their income tax returns butsome of us hear about it more often than others. If ten (10)people known to you were ^officially investigated” by Income TaxOfficers how many do you think would be discovered:
(a) cheating a little (say omitting less than $100 earnings)
NE - average - 3 :75 6 *"0** (significant difference)
(b) cheating a lot (say omitting more than $1,000 earnings)
(c)
NE - average " 2̂ 673 (significant difference)
cheating a great deal (say omitting more than $10,000 earnings)
EV - average 2 .8 7 0NE - average - 2.449 ANOVA (no difference)
Not Very ExtremelySerious  Serious  Serious
7. On a scale of one (1) to five (5), how serious would you rate the following offences:
(a) Stealing, from a large retail store, goods valued at;
(i) $100 EV 17 7 54 14 115 = 207NE 16 20 56 15 98 = 205(no difference)
(ii) $1,000 EV 1 8 29 27 142 = 207NE 3 2 37 34 129 = 205(no difference)
(iii) $10,000 EV 1 14 7 185 - 207NE 3 19 13 170 - 205(no difference)
Evading income tax of;
(i) $100 EV 121 20 31 6 29 - 207NE 82 32 ■ 40 15 36 - 205(significant difference)
(ii) $1,000 EV 42 37 53 31 44 - 207NE 20 27 60 35 63 « 205(significant difference)
(iii) $10.000 EV 21 13 31 17 125 - 207NE 6 6 27 21 145 « 205(significant difference)
- 4 -
8. Il your annual earnings were $20,000, and you earned one (1) more dollar, how much of that dollar do you THJMC the law requires, should go in tax?
EV - average NE - average 36.3d 36.8d ANOVA (no difference)
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Almost Very Certainly Likely NotOmit it Omit it Sure
VeryLikelyIncludeit
Almost Certainly Include it




EV 84 51 24 14 34 - 207.NE 95 46 22 15 27 - 205(no difference)
EV 22 28 35 56 66 - 207NE 19 35 31 49 71 - 205(no difference)
EV 6 6 23 32 140 * 207NE 6 7 23 27 142 - 205(no difference)
A very A verygood A good i have A poor poor





EV . 73 27 26 32 49 - 207NE 76 42 20 30 37 = 205(no difference)
EV 17 28 14 55 93 . 207NE 16 28 34 49 78 * 205(significant difference)
EV 4 10 12 21 160 « 207 -NE 2 3 18 27 155 » 205(no difference)
Q. 11 (#) How old are you?
(b) Which of the following describes you?
(c) How much do youcurrently earn a year?
F 357
NE
Under 25 0 28
25 and under 40 48 79
40 and under 60 114 64




Self employed 88 26
Employed (either full or part-time) 81 109
Reti red 27 26
Housewi fe 9 •34







$4,195 - $17.894 109 110
$17,895 - $35.788 72 43
Over $35.788 11 4
207 205
(s ignificant difference)














T H E  U N I V E R S I T Y  OF  N E W C A S T L E








Recently I mailed you a questionnaire asking for your help in an important survey.
If you have already returned the questionnaire, please consider this letter a tkoLYik you for your help.
If you have not had a chance to do so yet, may I ask you to return the completed questionnaire now. Your participation is vital to the success of this project.
Yours sincerely.
L  ''.ALÀ
IAN G. WALLSCHUTZKY Lecturer in Conwnerce
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APPENDIX 2
A V O I D A N C E  S U R V E Y  M A T E R I A L
This appendix contains a copy of:
(i) The letter accompanying the questionnaire,
(ii) The questionnaire and responses to each question, and
(iii) The follow up letter.
T H E  U N I V E R S I T Y  OF  N E W C A S T L E  









Dear Fellow Tax Agent,
Many people complain about our income tax system but few people seem to do anything about it. I am conducting a research project to determine exactly what tax agents think about it. You can help.
Enclosed is a questionnaire which seeks your answers to various aspects of our tax system. If you would like to help, complete it and return it to me. It will not take much of your time and your answers will help my research.
Your name has been selected by chance from a list of tax agents and the questionnaire has not been marked or coded in any way so no one will know which answers are yours. The survey is independent of any Government Department or political party so you can say exactly what you AcaUy think. All answers will, of course, be treated in the 
6tAtct.eMt conltdence.
Please return the completed questionnaire in the reply paid envelope WITHIN ONE WEEK. Thank you for your help.
Yours sincerely, i ' <
IAN G. WALLSCHUTZKY Lecturer in Commerce
P,S, As a token of my appreciation for completing the questionnaire 
I would like you to keep the enclosed biro.
TAX AVOIDANCE QUESTIONNAIRE & ANSWERS
Q.l Over the laet ten year# do you think that relation# between-the accountancy profession and the Australian Income Tax Office have improved or deteriorated?
Ho.
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Improved a great deal 
Slightly improved 
About the same 
Slightly deteriorated 









142 159 79 118 82
Q.2 Could you indicate the extent of your agreement/disagreementwith the following:
Neither
Agree
Strongly Slightly nor Slightly Strongly 
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree Disagree
(a) "Taxpayers are much more willing , to undertake tax avoidance schemes now than they were a year ago"
(b) "The accountancy profession should be actively engaged in design­ing reforms to prevent tax avoidance."
(c) ”SeJii employed taxpayers do not have adequate tax allowances for superannuation or * retirement benefit contributions."
580
173 109 82 84 132 580
321 104 46 66 43 - 580
(d) "If tax avoidance can be prevented by the introduc­tion of a capital 
gaijiô tax then such a tax should be introduced."
(e) "The new section 
260 will probably be effective in preventing tax­payers from under­taking tax avoidance schemes."
(f) The Commissioner might use the new 
Aectlon 260 against some family transact tions which previously hedid not challenge."
94 93 40 53 300 - 580
4(7 229 104 136 71 580
93 284 113 63 27 580
'.3 Could you indicate 
the extent of your 
approval/d i sapprova1 
for the following:
(a) The systen of
paying tax by way
of p.*ia\j/̂ ioncbL
tax
(b'i The use of trusts 
to carry on 
family businesses
: (c) The Government's
apparent determin­
ation to stamp out 
tax avoidance
Id) The "new section
260" (i.e. Part IVA) 
of the Act






















Q.4 How satisfied/dissatis- isfied have you been with the time it takes Verythe Income Tax Office Satis*to: fied
Neither Some- Satisfied what nor Somewhat VerySatis- Dissatis- Dissatis- Dissatis­fied fied fied fied
(a) Process annualreturns 89 221 138
(b) Make decisions on objections lodged against assess­ments 29 89 86


















Q.6 In your opinion, why have taxpayers mo6t wanted to engage in tax 
avoidance?
They have thought the tax lavs have been unfair 39
They have wanted to emulate friends they haveknown who have successfully engaged in taxavoidance 30
They have been dissatisfied with the way the government has spent taxpayers* money 16
They have been dissatisfied with the treatmentthey have received from the Income Tax Officeand have wanted to get even -
They have thought the amount of tax they havepaid in relation to the amount of money theyhave earned has been too high 428
Other (please specify) 67
580
Q.7 Which of the following do you think has mo6t often discouraged taxpayers from undertakiî  tax avoidance schemes?
The costs that have been associated withimplementing those schemes 71
The complexity of the scheme 108
The expectation that benefits will only betemporary 64
The belief that such schemes are morally wrong 58
The possibility of protracted legal battleswith the Tax Office 223
Other (please specify) 56
580
Q.8 What do you think most professional people would most likely do when their income reaches the level where they have to pay the maximum marginal rate of tax (i.e. sixty cents in the dollar).They would:
Continue to work as before 10
Work more to counteract the effect of tax ontheir income 8
Limit their income by working less 47
Continue to earn, but look for ways of reducingtheir tax burdens by legal means 453
Continue to earn but seek ways of evading tax 57
Other (please specify) _5
580
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Q.9 (a) How many years have you been registered as a taxagent?
Five years or less 134
More than five but less than ten years 143
Ten years or more 303
580










TOTAL NUMBER OF QUESTIONNAIRES SENT 1,000
NUMBER OF USEABLE RESPONSES 580
RESPONSE RATE 58%
NUMBER OF REQUESTS FOR RESULTS 337
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N E W  SOUTH WALES, 2308
Telephone <8 0401
683 or 735 (Area code 049)
VepoAtment o i ComtAce
Dear
Recently I mailed you a questionnaire asking for your help in an important survey.
If you have already returned the questionnaire, please consider this letter a thank you for your help.
If you have not had a chance to do so yet, may I ask you to return the completed questionnaire now. Your participation is vital to the success of this project.
Yours sincerely.
I. 6. WALLSCHUTZKY Lecturer in Commerce
